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Abstract
ESSAYS ON BANKING AND CORPORATE FINANCE
by
ALEV ISIL YILDIRIM
Advisor: Professor Linda Allen
This dissertation consists of two chapters. . .
Chapter 1: The Effect of Relationship Banking on Firm Efficiency
This paper analyzes the impact of relationship bank oversight on firm operational efficiency
and default risk. I find that a new loan from a relationship bank improves the technical
efficiency of inefficient firms that have an elevated probability of default. Moreover, bor-
rowing firms with elevated default risk exposure experience reductions in their probabilities
of default in the years following new relationship bank loans, benefiting both banks and
borrowers. Thus, the benefits of relationship bank monitoring are most apparent the higher
the ex ante default risk and the lower the baseline efficiency of the borrower.
Chapter 2: The Intangible Value of Key Talent: Decomposing Organization Cap-
ital
Specialized firm-specific information, strategies, activities and procedures, identified as orga-
nization capital (OC), is comprised of a heterogeneous group of disparate items. We isolate
firm value creation by decomposing OC into two endogenously determined components: (1)
key talent comprised of disclosed compensation of top executives which creates value and
(2) a residual comprised of undisclosed executive perquisites versus agency costs and empire
building expenses that do not increase firm value. Whereas the first component is portable,
the second is unobservable, and therefore generates rents for shareholders. Thus, only resid-
ual OC creates systematic risk exposure, whereas key talent engenders idiosyncratic risk.
Furthermore, we find that systematic risk exposure is higher for firms with weak governance.
v
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Relationship Banking on
Firm Efficiency
1.1 Introduction
This paper contributes to our understanding of how relationship banks affect borrower firms’
performance. In particular, I examine whether relationship bank oversight improves firm op-
erational efficiency and reduces default risk. In the course of lending activity, relationship
banks invest in costly production of private information about their borrowers’ financial
performance through multiple interactions over time and/or across products (Boot, 2000).
Private information production differentiates relationship banks from arm’s-length lending
such that in the course of collecting both hard and soft information about firm operations,
relationship banks develop an expertise that can be used both to screen future loan appli-
cations to mitigate adverse selection and to monitor the borrower’s ongoing performance to
avoid moral hazard, thereby reducing the bank’s default risk (Diamond, 1991; Rajan and
Winton, 1995; Boot and Thakor, 2000; Boot, 2000; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2007;
Gustafson et al., 2017). Over time, relationship banks gain expertise that should also benefit
1
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the operation of the borrowing firm’s business. This paper addresses the question of how
these benefits are allocated across borrowing firms. That is, which firms realize improve-
ments in their operational efficiency and default risk in the course of new borrowing activity
from their relationship banks?
As banks hold convex cash flow claims that expose them to losses upon firm default, but
do not allow sharing in upside gain of firm’s profitable investments and efficient allocation
of resources, the banks’ incentive to invest in private information production about their
borrowers is mainly to reduce the borrowers’ default risks, and thereby to avoid the loss given
default. However, in doing so, relationship banks intervene in borrowers’ operations through
regular site visits, advising the management team, assessing financial statements, monitoring
covenants, renegotiating the existing loan terms and negotiating the renewal of loans and/or
future loan terms (Fama, 1985; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). This suggests that screening
and monitoring might affect not only the solvency of a firm but also its operational efficiency.
Therefore, in this paper I examine how private information production by relationship banks
affect both firm efficiency and default risk.
Using the Dealscan syndicated loans database for public firms in the U.S., I find that new
borrowing from the firm’s relationship bank increases firm efficiency on average. However,
the beneficial impact of relationship bank oversight is focused on firms with an elevated risk
of default, consistent with bank loss avoidance incentives. That is, firms closest to the default
threshold at loan origination date experience the largest improvement in both operational
efficiency and default risk in the period immediately following the new loan. Moreover, banks
appear to focus on low hanging fruit in that the greatest efficiency improvement is realized
for those firms that have the lowest levels of baseline operational efficiency. I also examine
the persistence of the relationship bank oversight effect and find that it dissipates after one
year from new loan origination. That is, I find that the operational efficiency improvement
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for high default risk borrowers lasts only for one year beyond loan origination.1
I estimate a firm’s technical efficiency by comparing the firm’s production and operational
costs with what is feasible given the technology set for the industry, i.e. the boundary or
frontier of the technology set (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). As a measure of firm’s technical
efficiency, I utilize parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). As a first robustness check I
calculate efficiency using non-parametric and deterministic data envelopment analysis (DEA)
following Demerjian et al. (2012). For a second robustness check I use semi-parametric total
factor productivity (TFP) estimate of Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014). I use Jarrow-Merton
default probabilities to calculate the default risk and estimate the effect of relationship
banking on the efficiency of firms in the first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default
probabilities. Furthermore, as robustness tests, I use default risk proxies of Altman’s Z score
(Altman, 1968) and Whited and Wu (2006) financial constraint model.2
However, the decision to borrow from a relationship bank is itself endogenous, and may
introduce bias to my analysis. Firms can obtain funds from publicly traded debt or equity
markets in lieu of syndicated bank loans. Once borrowers obtain alternative sources of funds,
such as access to public debt markets, they typically face lower interest rates on bank debt as
the lending bank’s monopoly power is dissipated (Hale and Santos, 2009). Therefore, firms
that are dependent on banks for financing may be the ones that are unable to access public
debt markets because of severe adverse selection and potential moral hazard. I control for
endogeneity of financing choice using Heckman’s two-stage model for endogeneity in which
I model the firm’s choice to take a bank loan using a probit regression for the sample of
firms with and without bank borrowing. I estimate the inverse Mills ratio from this probit
regression and include it in the second stage of my analysis of borrowing firm efficiency
1This may be consistent with a hold-up problem. Alternatively, however, the impact of an individual
relationship bank loan may be limited if the loan is renegotiated over time. Roberts (2015) estimates that
syndicated bank loans are renegotiated every nine months on average.
2The results of robustness tests are available in the Appendix.
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levels to control for selection bias induced by the decision to finance using bank loans. In
addition, however, there is another selection bias induced by the decision to borrow from
a relationship bank. To control for this problem, I estimate a second probit regression to
model the probability of acquiring a relationship bank and use the probabilities from this
regression as an instrument for the existence of relationship banking dummy variable in my
two-stage analysis. Thus, the second stage of my analysis controls for the firm’s endogenous
decisions first to borrow from any bank, and second, to borrow from a relationship bank.
Controlling for endogeneity, I find that low baseline efficiency firms with elevated default
risk experience both improvements in efficiency and reductions in default risk in the wake of
a new relationship bank loan.
Moreover, to further control for endogeneity in my analysis of the impact of relationship
bank oversight on borrower default risk, I use propensity score with nearest-neighbor match-
ing in a quasi diff-in-diff setting. That is, I compare the default risk of those firms with
relationship banking (treatment group) to the default risk of those with public debt (control
group) in order to observe the direct effect of relationship banking on the borrowing firm’s
default risk using a control group of firms that only differ in their choice of having a relation-
ship bank. I find that reductions in the borrowing firm’s probability of default in the wake
of a new relationship bank loan occur for firms with higher ex ante levels of default risk.
In contrast, low default-risk firms with relationship banks experience increases in default
risk in the years following relationship bank lending activity. Further, borrowing on public
debt markets is consistent with increases in default risk for all firms (high and low default
probability). Thus, the beneficial impact of relationship bank oversight in reducing default
risk over the two years following loan origination is limited to firms with higher pre-loan
levels of default risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: A brief review of the literature
and hypothesis development is provided in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 describes the data and
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variable construction. Section 1.4 introduces the model and presents the empirical findings
measuring the impact of a bank relationship on borrowing firm’s efficiency of operation.
Section 1.5 concludes with a brief summary.
1.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
A relationship bank invests in obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary in
nature, and evaluates the profitability of these investments through multiple interactions
with the same customer over time and/or across products (Boot, 2000). As in Bharath et al.
(2007), to the extent that relationship lending produces reusable and proprietary information
about the borrower, a possible benefit for the relationship lender is that it would be better
placed to win future loan business and other fee-generating services from its relationship
borrower. They find that the probability of subsequent borrowings is 42% from a relationship
bank in contrast to 3% from a non-relationship bank. Moreover, the relationship bank will
tend to sell many additional services to its borrowers (e.g., deposit-taking, factoring, merger
and acquisition advice, underwriting).
Theoretical debate on bank monitoring argues that compared to other private lenders
banks provide more efficient monitoring than arm’s-length investors do (Leland and Pyle,
1977; Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Especially those firms that
are unable to borrow from the capital markets because of information asymmetries and
potential moral hazard can benefit from informed bank borrowing since banks alleviate the
moral hazard problem by closely monitoring the borrower’s activities (Diamond, 1991). In
addition, Yosha (1995) and Bhattacharaya and Chiesa (1995) argue that firms choose bank
financing if there is proprietary information to be protected for competitive purposes. In their
empirical study, Bharath and Hertzel (2016) find that loan issuances have a significantly more
positive effect on post-issuance productivity than bond issuances. Particularly, consistent
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with bank specialness in providing governance, they find that a bank loan issue causally
increases total factor productivity of firms by 1% to 1.6% per year over a bond issue for up
to four years after the issuance. Spyridopoulos (2017) finds that stricter loan covenants cause
an increase in profitability and a reduction in operating cost. These findings suggest that
banks use information obtained in the course of lending in order to impact firm performance.
Previous studies on relationship banking find evidence of private information production
in stock prices (James, 1987; Li and Ongena, 2015), access to financing (Petersen and Rajan,
1994), and the cost of financing (Bharath et al., 2011). In addition, Boot and Thakor (1994)
find that an infinitely repeated bank-borrower relationship is welfare enhancing and benefits
the borrower. Therefore, focusing on new loans granted by relationship banks, I argue that
production of private information by a relationship bank through ongoing screening and
monitoring, which includes, but is not limited to, the relationship bank’s intervention into
borrower firm’s operations by imposing covenants and possible renegotiation options will
result in an increase in firm efficiency. Therefore I posit my first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, relationship bank lending improves firm operational effi-
ciency.
As a bank is exposed to a higher default risk when it lends to an informationally opaque
borrower, it will have more incentives to avoid the losses that will incur if the borrower
defaults. Benmelech and Bergman (2017) find that when the underlying debt value de-
teriorates, debt shifts from being informationally insensitive and becomes informationally
sensitive with rising information asymmetries, which result in liquidity freezes in public debt
markets. These potential information asymmetries can be in two forms: an information-
ally opaque borrower poses an adverse selection risk ex-ante (before the borrowing takes
place) and a potential moral hazard risk ex-post (after the loan is granted). In order to
reduce the adverse selection, banks invest in information production in order to engage in
high quality screening. After a borrower is granted the loan, the banks engage in ongoing
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monitoring through the collection of information to ascertain that the borrower is solvent
and will repay the loan. The success of ex-ante screening activities is related to ongoing
monitoring activities throughout the life of the loan to make sure that the loan covenants
are not violated, the borrower is solvent and loan repayment will be made. Moreover, good
ongoing monitoring can assist in future screening, as borrowers know that poor behavior
will be detected and penalized in future loans and renegotiations. As Roberts (2015) argues,
the frequency of renegotiation triggered by ex-ante contractual contingencies emphasizes the
fundamental incompleteness of loan contracts. The finding that borrowers grant creditors
strong control rights suggests that information asymmetry in conjunction with agency prob-
lems is an important element of the contracting environment. Further, the persistence of
strong creditor control rights throughout the lending relationship suggests that information
asymmetry about the investments, if not the borrower, is persistent. These control rights
are triggered by borrower’s default. Thus, banks have strong incentives to invest in private
information about borrowers that have high levels of default risk. Accordingly, I test the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Relationship banks concentrate on producing private information to im-
prove the efficiency of those firms with elevated risk of default.
In addition to the default risk of the borrower, the baseline efficiency at the time of
relationship lending is a significant determinant for a relationship bank to invest in the
private information production. Allen et al. (2008) finds that syndicated bank loan prices
incorporate information about earnings approximately one month prior to public earnings
announcements. The private information obtained by relationship banks, therefore, focuses
on earnings as well as default risk. Therefore the third hypothesis I test is:
Hypothesis 3: Relationship banks concentrate on producing private information to im-
prove the efficiency of those firms with low baseline levels of operational efficiency.
Lastly, following the findings in Fama (1985); Diamond (1991); Preece and Mullineaux
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(1996); Ongena and Smith (1998), I argue that it is in the interest of both a borrower and its
relationship bank to improve the borrower’s solvency, thereby to avoid default and loss given
default. Indeed, monopoly rents that banks may earn on relationship loans encourage their
investment in information production to preserve the relationship. Phelan (2017) shows that
banks earn monopoly rents by gathering private information about correlated loan outcomes
and pre-committing to ongoing monitoring. Banks have incentives to keep this valuable
information secret (Dang et al., 2017), thereby preventing dissipation of the bank’s monopoly
profits. Accordingly, I examine the impact of relationship bank oversight on borrower default
risk after the new loan origination and hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: The probability of default decreases in the years following a relationship
bank loan for firms with elevated risks of default.
1.3 Data
The data for syndicated loans comes from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC)’s Dealscan
database. I collect data on the annual financial statements of U.S. firms from the Com-
pustat database. Focusing on the period 1991-2011, I match the firm financial statements
with the syndicated loans market data using Chava and Roberts (2008) linking database. For
the Jarrow-Merton default probabilities, I use KRIS database (KRIS, 2011). The matched
sample consists of all firms with non-missing values of sales and total assets. I exclude firms
with sales and total assets less than $5 million and that have less than three consecutive years
of data. I also exclude finance (SIC codes 6000-6799) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4942)
industries since they are regulated. All the financial ratios are winsorized by 1% at both
ends. The sample includes 63994 firm-year observations of 6991 firms, out of which 4918
have bank borrowing and out of these firms 2671 have relationship banks. In total there are
17067 loan facilities in the sample.
CHAPTER 1. RELATIONSHIP BANKING - FIRM EFFICIENCY 9
In order to introduce the lead lender relationship, following Bharath et al. (2011) and
Acharya et al. (2014), I first define the Lead dummy that is equal to one if the lender role
is given as or includes ‘Agent’, ‘Arranger’, ‘Lead’ or ‘Manager’. Then, in order to get a
complete definition, I use the variable ‘Lead Arranger Credit’, which can take values of
“Yes” and “No” depending on if a particular lender receives Lead Arranger League Table
credit based on Reuters LPC’s League Table guidelines. I include those with “Yes” value
in the Lead dummy definition as in Sufi (2007). Finally I include sole lender loans as lead
banks in the Lead dummy. Next, following Bharath et al. (2011), I define the relationship
dummy (Rel dummy)3, which indicates whether the firm has borrowed from the same lead-
lender in the last 5 years. There are firms that have bank relationship with more than one
lead lender within the same year. In order to be able to use firm-year level estimations
I reduce multiple firm-year observations to single observations. Therefore for those firms
with multiple relationship lenders in a given year, I use selection criteria to include the
strongest relationship among a firm’s relationship banks. Particularly, in a given year I
choose the facility of a firm with a relationship lender with the highest relationship intensity
(Rel intensity), which is defined in Bharath et al. (2011) as the amount of loans by bank
m to borrower i in the last 5 years scaled by the total amount of loans by borrower i in
the last 5 years. If relationship intensity between a firm and its multiple relationship banks
are equal, I choose the facility of a firm with a relationship lender with the highest number
of relationship loans (Rel number), which is defined as the number of loans by bank m to
borrower i in the last 5 years scaled by the total number of loans by borrower i in the last 5
years (Bharath et al., 2011). Finally, for the same relationship intensity and number between
a firm and its multiple relationship banks I choose the relationship lender that has the highest
bank allocation, which is defined as the amount a particular lender has committed to the
given facility. I follow the same rule for the facilities with more than one lead bank. As a
3The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1.11.
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result of this construction, I define 8412 relationship borrowings of 2671 firms. The summary
statistics in Table 1 show that 26% of the sample firms have bank borrowing throughout the
sample period and 13% of the firms have relationship bank borrowing.4
The focus on the bank relationship-firm efficiency link in the context of syndicated loans
market offers a new perspective for the analysis of firm efficiency as well as the relationship
banking. One of the reasons why I focus on firm efficiency rather than profitability is that the
possible positive effect on profitability of a relationship bank’s private information production
about firm’s ongoing and new investments might be delayed as returns on investments are
not actualized instantaneously and therefore would be hard to observe. Moreover, increase
in profitability does not always translate into operational efficiency. Lastly, the methods
that explicitly model a firm’s efficiency allow the econometric flexibility that profitability
ratios lack. Three common measures of firm efficiency are stochastic frontier analysis (SFA),
data envelopment analysis (DEA) and total factor productivity (TFP). Aigner et al. (1977);
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977) simultaneously developed
a Stochastic Frontier Analysis method (SFA) that, in addition to incorporating the efficiency
term into the analysis (as do the deterministic approaches) it also captures the effects of
exogenous shocks beyond the control of the analyzed units. This type of model also covers
errors in the observations and in the measurement of outputs (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004).
The DEA method was introduced by Farrell (1957) and improved by Charnes et al. (1978)
and Banker et al. (1984). The aim of this non-parametric approach is to define a frontier
envelopment surface for all sample observations. This surface is determined by those units
that lie on it, that is the efficient decision-making units (DMUs). On the other hand, units
that do not lie on that surface can be considered as inefficient and an individual inefficiency
score will be calculated for each one of them. Unlike stochastic frontier techniques, DEA has
4As robustness tests, I use Rel intensity and Rel number as alternative relationship bank measures. I
also run placebo estimations using a pseudo dummy variable for the existence of relationship bank lending.
The results are robust and available in the Appendix.
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no accommodation for noise, and therefore can be initially considered as a non-statistical
technique where the efficiency scores and the envelopment surface are ‘calculated’ rather
than estimated (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004). In their analysis of cost efficiency in the banking
sector, Ferrier and Lovell (1990) argue that the differences between the two approaches are
due to the fact that a stochastic specification had been compared with a deterministic one.
More recent studies that utilize SFA and DEA models to estimate/calculate the firm
efficiency have dealt with questions such as the effect of firm efficiency on stock returns
(Frijns et al., 2012), on firm performance (Baik et al., 2013) and on mergers and acquisitions
performance (Leverty and Qian, 2011). They all find positive effect of efficiency on the related
performance measure. Furthermore as Leverty and Grace (2012) discuss, empirical research
documents a strong relationship between property-liability insurer efficiency and traditional
and market measures of performance. For example, Cummins et al. (2008) find that efficiency
measures are directly related to the market value performance of publicly traded insurers.
Leverty and Grace (2010) find that efficiency measures are closely related to traditional
measures of firm performance, such as return on assets and return on equity. Demerjian
et al. (2012) introduce a new measure of managerial ability defining it as a component of
firm efficiency and look at the performance of those firms with high vs. low ability managers.
They show that high managerial ability increases firm performance.
Another commonly used efficiency measure in macroeconomics and corporate finance
literature is total factor productivity (TFP). Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) argue that it is
a broader measure of firm level performance than some of the more conventional measures,
such as labor productivity or firm profitability as profitability captures only the part of the
value added that goes to shareholders, and labor productivity can be an inadequate measure
of overall efficiency especially in capital intensive industries. They estimate firm level TFP
using the semi-parametric method and find that low TFP firms are riskier and therefore earn
a significant risk premium over high productivity firms in the stock market.
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In this paper I use SFA method to estimate the efficiency variable.5 SFA model assumes
that the error term of the regression of firm outputs on inputs includes both randomness
(statistical noise) and technical inefficiency. To estimate SFA efficiency I use translog pro-
duction function, which is quadratic in logarithms and incorporates interactions of inputs in
addition to the levels of inputs to control for nonlinearity in the specification. As Bogetoft
and Otto (2011) discuss, when we estimate the parameters of the translog function, we es-
timate the second-order derivative that determines how the inputs and outputs interact.
In this way, we let the data determine the latter, i.e. whether the inputs and outputs are
substitutes or complements. Therefore it is more flexible than other production functions.6
For the translog production function and in logarithmic terms, the single-output stochastic
frontier can be shown as








βijlnXilnXj + νi − ui (1.1)
where
νi ∼ N (0, σ2ν) and ui ∼ N+(0, σ2u)
in which Yit represents output measured as total revenue (REVT) and Xn,it represents the
inputs. Using Demerjian et al. (2012)’s definitions the inputs are cost of goods sold (COGS)
that are the costs of production; selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A), which
are operational costs also known as the costs unrelated to the production process; net prop-
erty, plant and equipment (PPENT) that accounts for fixed assets; net operating leases
(OpsLease) that are included to capture the expenses of the firms that lease the fixed as-
sets rather than purchase; research and development expenses (R&D); purchased goodwill
5My results are robust to using DEA method and TFP estimates of Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) and
are available in the Appendix.
6The results are robust to Cobb-Douglas production function and are available upon request.
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(Goodwill), which is the excess of the purchase price for a business acquisition; and other
intangibles (OtherIntan) that include items such as client lists, patent costs, and copyrights.
The five stock variables (PPENT, OpsLease, R&D, Goodwill and OtherIntan) are measured
at the beginning of year t and the two flow measures (COGS and SG&A) are measured over
the year t. I follow Ge (2006) to calculate Net Operating Leases as the discounted present
value of the next five years of required operating lease payments (MRC1-MRC5 on Compu-
stat). I follow Lev and Sougiannis (1996), who use a five-year capitalization period of R&D
expense. Other Intangible Assets item (OtherIntan) is calculated by subtracting Goodwill
(GDWL) from the Other Acquired and Capitalized Intangibles (INTAN). The term νit− uit
is a composed error term where νit represents randomness and uit represents technical ineffi-
ciency. An important assumption in this model is that νit and uit are independent. If uit = 0
the firm is 100% efficient, and if uit > 0, then there is some inefficiency. The N+ denotes a
half-normal distribution, which is truncated at point 0 and the distribution is concentrated
on the half-interval [0,∞) (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004). The analysis is done by maximum
likelihood estimation of cross-sectional observations of firms within each year and industry
using Fama-French 12 industry classification. The firm-specific technical efficiency is given
by
TEi =





The summary statistics are given in Table 1.1. Mean (median) SFA efficiency scores are 0.89
(0.92) with a standard deviation of 0.11.
To control for firm-specific features that might affect efficiency through channels other
than existence of banking relationship, I use leverage, size, square of size, profitability, cash
holdings, market to book, tangibility, interest coverage, capital expenditures, firm age and
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rating dummy, which are standard control variables in debt contracting literature (Dass and
Massa, 2011; Denis and Mihov, 2003). Leverage is the ratio of public debt to equity; the two
forms of firm’s outside financing. It is defined as the ratio of book value of debt to the total
of market value of equity and book value of debt.7 Firm size is the natural log of total assets.
I also control for square of size to include possible nonlinear effect of firm size on efficiency.
Profitability is the return on assets (ROA) defined as the ratio of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization to book value of assets. Cash holdings are measured
as total cash and equivalents scaled by total assets. I define market to book ratio (M/B) as
market value of equity plus book value of debt scaled by total assets. Tangibility is the ratio
of net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Interest coverage is earnings
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization scaled by total interest payments. Capital
expenditures ratio is total capital expenditures scaled by total assets. Firm age is the number
of years since the initial public offering. Rating is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm
has S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating and zero otherwise.
According to the summary statistics in Table 1.1 mean (median) size of firms in the
sample is about 2.5billion(261 million). Average profitability is 10%. Tangibility, which
measures the riskiness of the firm in terms of the fixed assets, has a mean (median) of 29%
(22%). 25% of the sample has S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating. The market-to-
book ratio (M/B) measures the growth opportunities of the firm, which has a mean (median)
of 1.47 (1.11) in the sample. Mean (median) leverage ratio is 25% (18%).
In order to analyze the impact of the existence of relationship banking on firms with
low vs. high probability of default I use Jarrow Merton (JM) Hybrid Model, which is a
statistical hazard model that relates the probability of firm default to the same explanatory
variables as the Jarrow-Chava Model (firm financial ratios, other firm attributes, industry
classification, interest rates, macroeconomic factors, and information about firm and market
7The results are unchanged when book leverage is used instead of market leverage.
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equity price levels and behavior), and incorporates the default probability of the Merton
Structural Model as an additional explanatory variable. The Merton Structural Model uses
option-pricing methods to relate the probability of firm default to its financial structure and
information about the firm’s market price of equity. The explanatory variables include a
measure of the firm’s outstanding debt, its market valuation, and information about firm
and market equity price behavior. In this model firm default occurs when the market value
of the firm’s assets decline below a threshold related to the firm’s outstanding debt (KRIS,
2011). For yearly default probabilities I use one-year estimations of the model and include
the value of the last day of a firm’s reporting month (fyr in Compustat). The mean (median)
value for a one-year default probability estimate is 1.33% (0.15%). As a robustness test, I
estimate firms’ default risks using Altman’s Z-score and Whited-Wu financial constraint
index. The mean (median) default risk value using the former is 1.75 (2.04) and latter is
-0.27 (-0.26).
The syndicated loans market provides an opportunity to the researchers to analyze firms
with varying levels of information asymmetries (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). Sufi (2007)
shows that the borrowers with little or no credit reputation obtain syndicated loans that are
similar to sole-lender bank loans. In these loans, the lead arranger retains a larger share of the
loan and there are fewer participant lenders on the syndicate. More transparent borrowers
obtain syndicated loans that are similar to public debt; i.e., the syndicate is dispersed and
the lead arranger retains a smaller share of the loan.8 In Table 1.2 I explore the univariate
8Using syndicated loans market data has become very common in the empirical relationship banking
analysis (such as Bharath et al. (2007); Dass and Massa (2011)). Yet, firms that have access to syndicated
loans market are larger in size, more profitable and transparent and have more tangible assets, which shows
that syndicated loans market is not a perfect representation of the Compustat sample. This suggests that the
implications of theoretical banking literature, that opaque firms with intermediate levels of default risk are
the ones with the highest benefit out of relationship lending (such as Fama (1985); Diamond (1991); Rajan
and Winton (1995)), are not observed in the syndicated loans market database. In order to mitigate this
selection bias, I model a firm’s decision to borrow in the syndicated loans market using all Compustat firms.
Then I model the decision to have a relationship banking conditional on having borrowed in the syndicated
loans market. In addition, in Section 1.4.3 I use all Compustat firms’ data to compare the default risk of
firms with relationship banking to that of those only with public debt after the borrowing takes place.
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analysis of syndicated loan terms and syndicate structure for the subsamples of firms I define
according to their baseline efficiencies (below vs. above median SFA efficiency) and default
probabilities (first vs. fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities). This allows
me to gauge the type of firms that the relationship banks would have highest incentive to
produce private information. In Panel A columns 1, 2 and 3, I evaluate the differences in
means of low efficiency subsamples with low PD vs. high PD (elevated risk of default).
The differences of low PD vs. high PD and the t-statistics of the differences show that
among the low baseline efficiency firms, low PD firms have lower loan spreads, longer loan
maturities and lower lead bank share of the loan when compared to high PD firms. For the
high efficiency subsample in columns 4, 5 and 6 of Panel A, I find that low PD firms have
lower loan spreads, larger loan amounts and longer loan maturity when compared to high PD
firms’ syndicated loans and syndicate structure. These results show that high PD subsample
is the one that relationship banks will screen and monitor more closely. To assess further,
I look at the subsample of high PD firms with low vs. high baseline efficiencies in Panel
B. I find that among the high PD firms, those with low baseline efficiency receive a higher
loan spread, smaller loan amount, larger lead bank share and lower number of lead banks in
the syndicate. Therefore I find that relationship banks evaluate low baseline efficiency firms
with elevated risk of default (high PD) more closely, since lenders of these firms are exposed
to the highest loss given default in the sample.
1.4 Model and Results
1.4.1 Two-Stage Analysis
I analyze the effect of relationship banking on the borrowing firm’s efficiency using the
Rel dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm has borrowed from the same lead-lender
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in the last 5 years. However, the decision to borrow from a bank is endogenous, and may
introduce bias to my analysis. The firms that can obtain funds from publicly traded debt
or equity markets may choose to do so in lieu of syndicated bank loans since they typically
face higher interest rates on bank debt. Therefore, firms that are dependent on banks
for financing may be the ones that are unable to access public debt markets because of
severe adverse selection and potential moral hazard, thereby injecting endogeneity into my
analysis. In order to mitigate this concern, I endogenize the loan taking decision and define
a Bor dummy variable, which is equal to one if a firm has borrowed in any given year in the
syndicated loans market and zero otherwise. Conditional on taking a loan in the syndicated
loans market, having a relationship bank is also endogenous as not all firms borrowing in the
syndicated loans market choose to have a relationship bank. Therefore I also endogenize the
Rel dummy variable and estimate the likelihood of the existence of relationship so that the
results reflect the effect of likelihood of relationship banking on firm efficiency controlling
for both sources of endogeneity in the borrowing decision (Bharath et al., 2011; Dass and
Massa, 2011; Elsas, 2005).
Following Wooldridge (2010), I use a Heckman’s two-step correction model for endogene-
ity. I estimate the probability of syndicated loan borrowing and use the inverse Mills ratio
(lambda) from the probit regression to control for endogeneity in the second step of my anal-
ysis. Then, I estimate another probit regression for having a relationship bank conditional
on borrowing in the syndicated loans market, and use the probabilities from this regression
as instruments in the second stage of the two-stage model. Following Papke and Wooldridge
(1993); Ramalho et al. (2010) and Ramalho et al. (2011), in the second stage estimation of
SFA efficiency I use fractional response regression since SFA efficiency score is a continuous
variable within the unit interval and OLS estimation does not guarantee that the predicted
values of the dependent variable are restricted to the unit interval. Using lagged levels of all
control variables in the first step probit estimations to alleviate reverse causality concerns, I
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estimate below first probit estimation model:
Prob(Bor dummyit = 1|Xit−1) = Φ(αXit−1 + Y earFE + IndustryFE) (1.3)
in which Xit−1 includes two instruments: number of previous bank relationships in the
industry a firm operates and a dummy variable that indicates an outstanding relationship
bank borrowing from the previous period. The first instrument controls for the industry
effect on a firm’s decision to take a loan each year. As it is measured at the industry and
year level and lagged, it is not related to current firm level efficiency. The second instrument
is to account for the existence of prior bank relationships, consistent with Bharath et al.
(2007), who find that subsequent borrowings are more likely following earlier syndicated
bank loans for both relationship and non-relationship banks (40% and 3%, respectively).
Therefore I define the second instrument as a Dummy for outstanding relationship from
previous period, which includes a firm’s outstanding relationship borrowing from any lead-
lender. Consistent with literature, I find that both instruments increase the probability of
having a bank loan. In addition to these instruments, I control for leverage, size, square
of size (to allow for non-linearity), profitability, cash holdings, market to book, tangibility,
interest coverage, capital expenditures, firm age and rating dummy. The results of the first
step analyses are presented in the first column of Table 1.3. Similar to the findings of Dass
and Massa (2011), younger firms with credit rating, low cash holdings, high profitability
and growth opportunities (M/B), low interest coverage, high capital expenditures and low
tangibility have a higher likelihood of borrowing from a bank. Furthermore, size has an
inverted u-shape impact on loan taking decision suggesting that it initially has a positive
effect on the likelihood of loan taking but as firms get larger in size, they are less likely to
borrow from banks. These suggest that larger firms and firms with credit rating have access
to syndicated loans market. Those firms with higher growth opportunities, lower tangibility
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and lower liquidity have higher probability of borrowing in the syndicated loans market.
The second column of Table 1.3 presents the results of the second probit regression
estimated to control for relationship bank endogeneity as follows:
Prob(Rel dummyit = 1|Cit−1) = Φ(γCit−1 + Y earFE + IndustryFE) (1.4)
Following the findings in Bharath et al. (2007), I use the Dummy for outstanding loan from
previous period variable for existence of bank loan from any lead-lender in the previous
periods to instrument the likelihood of establishment of a relationship. My results show
that outstanding loans from previous periods have a positive and statistically significant
effect at 1% level on the existence of relationship banking. Moreover, I find that large
firms with credit rating, low cash holdings and leverage ratio, high profitability and growth
opportunities (M/B), low interest coverage, high capital expenditures and low tangibility
have a higher likelihood of having a relationship bank. These suggest that among the firms
borrowing in the syndicated loans market those with low information asymmetries that have
low liquidity have higher probability of having a relationship bank.
Wooldridge (2010) argues that (1) using valid instruments for the second step probit
(Dummy for outstanding loan from previous period), (2) nonlinearity of probit model and
(3) using estimated probabilities as instruments for existence of relationship bank in the
two-stage regression rather than using instruments as regressors directly in the second step,
satisfy exclusion restrictions. Using inverse Mills ratio (lambda) from column 1 of Table 1.3
and the fitted value of the estimated relationship probability from column 2 of Table 1.3, I
estimate a two-stage model with fractional response regression in the second stage in order
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to study the effect on firm efficiency of a new loan from a relationship bank:
SFA Efficiencyit = α + βZit + γX̄i[t−1,t−5] + δLambdait + Y earFE + IndustryFE + εit
(1.5)
in which Zit is the Rel dummy, which is instrumented using estimated probabilities from
second probit regression in equation (1.4). Following Dass and Massa (2011), X̄i[t−1,t−5]
indicates the five-year average values of the same control variables from the first step probit
specification.9 I use bootstrapping at the firm level in all regressions to correct the standard
errors.
Table 1.4 presents the first stage results of the two-stage model for all sample (column
1), low probability of default (Low PD) (column 2), elevated probability of default (High
PD) (column 3), low baseline efficiency (column 4) and high baseline efficiency subsamples
(column 5). Estimated probabilities from the equation (1.4) are significant at 1% level
in all five estimations. F-statistic of the excluded instrument in all columns rejects the null
hypothesis of weak instrument. Column 1 in Table 1.5 presents the second stage results of the
estimation of equation (1.5), which exhibits support for Hypothesis 1. Particularly, according
to all sample results in column 1, borrowing firm technical efficiency increases, on average,
as a result of a new loan from a relationship bank. These results are both statistically and
economically significant such that a 1% increase in the likelihood of existence of relationship
banking increases SFA efficiency by 0.7 percentage points, significant at 1% level. This
corresponds to an increase of 2.51 percentage points in average SFA efficiency score. The
average annual growth rate of SFA efficiency scores throughout the sample period is -0.07%.
Therefore the results in Table 1.5 indicate economically meaningful efficiency gains.
9Average maturity of relationship bank loans is 43 months in the sample. It corresponds to about 3.5
years. However I define the existence of relationship banking if the firm has borrowed from the same lead-
lender in the last 5 years. Therefore I use the average of 5 years lags of control variables. The results are
robust to using 3-year lagged averages of controls.
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All sample results also show that an increase in the five-year average profitability and
efficiency increase firms’ efficiency during the year of a newly active syndicated bank loan.
Both size and the square of size have positive and significant impact on a firm’s efficiency.
Moreover, the results shows that increase in cash holdings increase a firm’s efficiency in
the year of borrowing. Firms with more growth opportunities (M/B) also operate more
efficiently. Increase in default risk of a firm reduces its efficiency. Higher tangibility in
the previous five years has a positive impact on a firm’s efficiency, suggesting that firms
with less information asymmetries operate more efficiently. In addition, firms with higher
interest coverage have higher operational efficiency. Higher investment (Capex/TA) does
not have an impact on firms’ efficiency. Firm efficiency also decreases, as firms get older.
Firms with credit rating operate more efficiently when a new loan from a relationship bank
is initiated. A positive and significant coefficient on lambda shows that there is selection
bias in firms’ decision to borrow from a bank and that without controlling for lambda the
effect of relationship banking would be biased.
1.4.2 Efficiency Effects Controlling for Distance to Default and
Baseline Efficiency
The convex nature of the bank’s return function may cause the bank to focus only on
borrowers in elevated risk of default. I test Hypothesis 2 for the subsamples of low vs.
elevated default risk firms defined by the first and fourth quartile of Jarrow Merton default
probabilities. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1.5 present the second stage results of the estimation
of equation (1.5) for subsamples of low vs. elevated default risk firms, respectively. The
results provide evidence for Hypothesis 2 that relationship banks concentrate on producing
private information to improve the efficiency of those firms with elevated risk of default.
Specifically, 1% increase in the likelihood of existence of relationship banking increases the
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efficiency of low PD subsample firms by 0.6 percentage points, whereas a similar change
increases the efficiency of high PD subsample firms by 1.1%, both statistically significant at
1% level.
Relationship banks improve borrower outcome through intervening in the borrower’s
operations during the course of private information production via screening and monitoring.
This intervention requires assessment of efficient use of resources while evaluating the default
risk. Therefore the baseline efficiency of a borrower at the time of a relationship lending is
also a significant determinant for a relationship bank to invest in the private information
production. To test Hypothesis 3, I define the subsamples according to below and above
median baseline SFA efficiency scores. The results in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.5 indicate
that low baseline efficiency firms experience higher increase in their efficiency when they
borrow from a relationship bank. 1% increase in the likelihood of existence of relationship
bank increases the efficiency of low baseline efficiency firms by 1.2 percentage points at
1% statistical significance level, while a similar increase in the likelihood of relationship
bank increases the efficiency of high baseline efficiency firms by 0.1 percentage points at 5%
significance level. Therefore these results present support for Hypothesis 3 that relationship
banks concentrate on producing private information to improve the efficiency of those firms
with low baseline efficiency.
I also argue that among the firms with elevated risk of default, increases in efficiency in
the presence of relationship bank loans are highest for firms that have low baseline levels of
operational efficiency. In order to test this, I estimate equation (1.5) for the subsamples of
firms defined as low baseline efficiency firms with low default risk, high baseline efficiency
firms with low default risk, low baseline efficiency firms with elevated default risk and high
baseline efficiency firms with elevated default risk. Table 1.6 presents the results for each
subsample for the first stage estimation of equation (1.5) using estimated probabilities from
the second step probit regression as instruments for existence of relationship banking.
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Table 1.7 reports the second stage results of the estimation of equation (1.5). The coef-
ficient of Rel dummy is statistically significantly positive (at the 1% significance level), and
economically important with a 1% increase in the likelihood of existence of bank relationship
increasing the efficiency of low efficiency firms that have an elevated probability of default
(column 3) by 1.1 percentage points at 1% statistical significance level. A similar increase
in the likelihood of existence of relationship banking increases the efficiency of high baseline
efficiency that have an elevated probability of default (column 4) by 0.5 percentage points. In
comparison, while firms with high baseline efficiency and low default risk (column 2) do not
experience significant change in their efficiencies as a result of relationship bank borrowing,
firms with low baseline efficiency with low default risk (column 1) experience 1 percentage
point increase in their efficiency when the likelihood of relationship banking increases by 1%.
These results show that among the firms with elevated risk of default increases in efficiency
in the presence of relationship bank loans are highest for firms that have low baseline levels
of operational efficiency. In addition, these results show additional support for Hypothe-
sis 3 that relationship banks concentrate on producing private information to improve the
efficiency of those firms with low baseline efficiency.
In order to test the persistence of the impact of relationship bank oversight on borrower
performance, I use 5-year window around the year a new loan from a relationship bank is
granted. Particularly, I estimate equation (1.5) for two years before and after the borrowing
takes place as well as for the year of borrowing for subsamples of low efficiency firms substan-
tially above the default threshold and low efficiency firms that have an elevated probability
of default. Table 1.8 shows that both low PD and high PD firms experience statistically
significant (at the 1% level) increases in technical efficiency in the year of a new relationship
bank loan. However, the efficiency improving effect of the relationship bank loan persists
for one more year after the loan origination for firms that have an elevated probability of
default whereas it disappears for firms above default threshold after the loan is originated.
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Table 1.9 shows the 5-year window results for high baseline efficiency firms. Similar
to low baseline efficiency firms with elevated default risk, high baseline efficiency firms with
elevated default risk experience an improvement in their efficiency for one more year after the
loan origination. The effect disappears thereafter. Therefore, these findings suggest that the
benefits of relationship bank information production in generating efficiency improvements
offer diminishing returns over time.
One alternative explanation to the insignificant results for low baseline efficiency firms
with elevated risk of default two years after the relationship bank borrowing could be that
it corresponds to the loan maturity. Therefore banks may not have an incentive to monitor
the borrower any more. However, as Panel B of Table 1.2 shows, the average maturity of
the relationship bank loans for low baseline efficiency firms with elevated risk of default
is 36 months. This means that although the relationship bank is still monitoring, it does
not have further incentive to improve the borrower outcome. A second and more plausible
explanation is that the loans are restructured very frequently during the life of a loan.
Therefore efficiency-increasing incentives might disappear as a loan approaches maturity.
In fact, Roberts (2015) estimates that syndicated bank loans are renegotiated every nine
months on average. Moreover, Garleanu and Zwiebel (2008) suggest that renegotiation is a
response to initially tight contracts designed to mitigate information-related problems.
1.4.3 Examining the Impact on Default Risk
It would be reasonable to expect that banks’ investments in information production should
pay off in terms of improved loan outcome, i.e., reduced default risk. I examine this in my test
of Hypothesis 4, presented in Table 1.10. I estimate a propensity score matching with nearest
neighbor matching approach10 and compare the year-to-year difference in the probability of
10I also use Mahalanobis matching technique as a robustness check. The results are statistically and
economically similar and available in the Appendix.
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default of firms that have relationship banking with those of matched control firms that have
public debt. I match the firms according to their propensity score (using 0.1 as the maximum
distance criteria), estimated as the probability of having a relationship banking one period
before the borrowing took place. I estimate equation (1.4) using logistic regression, where
the dependent variable is equal to one for the firms that have relationship banking during the
sample period (treatment group) and zero for the firms, which do not have relationship banks
during the sample period but have issued public debt (control group). Following Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1985) I check the standardized percentage bias for the matched treated and
non-treated groups’ covariates before and after the matching. The bias after matching is
reduced to below 25%, which is the accepted limit. After matching I define the difference
of default probabilities between year 0 and -1, where 0 is the year of borrowing and -1 is
the prior year. Similarly I check the difference of default probabilities between year 1 and
-1 and year 2 and -1.
Results in Panel A of Table 1.10 show a reduction in default risk over years 1 and 2
(as compared to year -1 ) only for the high default risk borrowers with bank relationships.
That is, default risk declined by 0.79% both one year and two years after the origination of
a relationship bank loan. These measures are all statistically significant at the 1% and 5%
levels, respectively, and imply economic significance of -19.03% (-0.79%/4.15%)11 of mean
default risk in year 1 and 19.94% (-0.79%/3.96%) of mean default risk in year 2. In contrast,
Panel B of Table 1.10 shows that default risk actually increases for both relationship bank
borrowers (treatment group) and public debt issuers (control group) that are far from the
default threshold.
Finally, I perform a quasi diff-in-diff estimation by comparing the treatment group to the
control group in the years before and after the debt issuance. These results are presented
11The mean of Jarrow-Merton default probability in the fourth quartile is 4.15% in year 1 and 3.96% in
year 2. For the first quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities the mean is 0.017% in both year 1 and
2.
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in boldface in Table 1.10. As shown in Panel A of Table 1.10, relationship bank borrowers
experience significant decreases in default risk as compared to bond issuers in the year of
new debt issuance as compared to the year before. The mean of -1.16% (significant at the
1% level) indicates a decrease in default risk of 27.95% (-1.16%/4.15%) in mean default
risk. The magnitude of this effect increases in the year following the debt issuance, with
relationship bank borrowers experiencing a -1.24% decline in default risk relative to bond
issuers, corresponding to -31.31% (-1.24%/3.96%) in mean default risk. The differences are
not significant for the low default risk subsample shown in Panel B. These results provide
support for Hypothesis 4 that the probability of default decreases for firms with elevated
default risk in the years following a new loan from a relationship bank.
1.5 Conclusion
I analyze the impact of relationship banking in the syndicated loans market on firm efficiency,
as measured by Stochastic Frontier Analysis method. In particular, I determine whether a
firm that borrows a new loan from a banking relationship is more or less likely to operate
efficiently in the years before, during and after the loan is granted. This permits an exami-
nation of whether a relationship bank’s information production is narrowly focused on firm
default risk or more broadly related to overall firm performance even when the probability
of default is low.
I find that relationship banks’ value added in improving outcomes appears to be limited to
borrowing firms with elevated risks of default. In addition, the results show that relationship
banks appear to invest efficiency-improving information resources in low baseline efficiency
firms even if they have low probabilities of default. Moreover, I find evidence that among
firms with low efficiency, relationship banks have the most impact for the borrowers that have
elevated risks of default. The results also provide evidence that the impact of relationship
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banking on firm efficiency disappears one year after the new borrowing from a relationship
bank takes place.
Lastly, I find that relationship banking appears to reduce the probability of default only
for firms closer to the default threshold. That is, low default-risk firms with relationship
banks experience increases in default risk in the years following bank-lending activity, con-
sistent with their increased leverage. Further, borrowing on public debt markets is consistent
with increases in default risk for all firms (high and low default probability). Thus, my results
suggest that relationship banks are successful in reducing default risk on syndicated bank
loans for less creditworthy borrowing firms with low baseline levels of technical efficiency.
One important caveat of this analysis is the absence of exogenous variation. I mitigate
this concern by conducting Heckman’s two-step estimation model for endogeneity. Further
research can focus on how an exogenous shock to existence, intensity and/or frequency of
relationship banking affects firm performance. In addition, further research can shed light






































Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Q1 Median Q3
SFA efficiency 63,994 0.89 0.11 0.85 0.92 0.96
DEA efficiency 63,994 0.71 0.22 0.56 0.74 0.88
TFP (Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014)) 46,203 -0.34 0.47 -0.53 -0.32 -0.10
Total Assets (TA) ($ millions) 63,994 2,544.43 8,050.12 62.51 261.48 1,214.02
Size 63,994 5.70 2.06 4.13 5.56 7.10
Size2 63,994 36.77 25.46 17.10 30.98 50.43
Cash/TA 63,994 0.13 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.18
Leverage 63,994 0.25 0.23 0.05 0.18 0.38
ROA 63,994 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.17
Interest coverage 63,994 41.83 173.87 2.34 6.45 17.93
M/B 63,994 1.47 1.16 0.78 1.11 1.72
Capex/TA 63,994 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07
Tangibility 63,994 0.29 0.23 0.11 0.22 0.41
Rating 63,994 0.25 0.43 0 0 1
Firm age 63,994 15.02 15.36 4 10 21
Jarrow-Merton (JM) default probability (%) 63,994 1.33 4.33 0.04 0.15 0.64
Whited-Wu financial constraint index 63,994 -0.27 0.12 -0.34 -0.26 -0.18
Altman’s z-score 63,994 1.76 2.36 1.20 2.04 2.81
Bor dummy 63,994 0.26 0.44 0 0 1
Rel dummy 63,994 0.13 0.34 0 0 0
Dummy for outstanding loan from previous period 63,994 0.48 0.50 0 0 0
Dummy for outstanding relationship from previous period 63,994 0.13 0.33 0 0 1






































Table 1.2: Univariate Analysis of Syndicate Structure and Loan Terms
Panel A: All sample
Low Efficiency High Efficiency
Low PD High PD
Low PD - High PD
(t-stat)
Low PD High PD
Low PD - High PD
(t-stat)
Loan Spread (bps) 125.18 248.44 -123.26*** 73.07 161.61 -88.54***
(-14.61) (-16.99)
Loan Amount ($ millions) 391 416 -25 825 585 240***
(-0.34) (2.88)
Maturity (months) 46.41 36.37 10.04*** 39.14 35.22 3.92**
(6.00) (2.48)
Lead Share (%) 24.03 47.55 -23.51*** 18.21 20.82 -2.60
(-7.18) (-1.31)
Number of Lead Banks 4.52 4.04 0.48 5.52 5.53 -0.01
(1.26) (-0.03)
Panel B: High PD firms
Low Efficiency High Efficiency
Low Efficiency - High Efficiency
(t-stat)
Loan Spread (bps) 248.44 161.61 86.83***
(8,22)
Loan Amount ($ millions) 416 585 -169**
(-2.02)
Maturity (months) 36.37 35.22 1.15
(0.53)
Lead Share (%) 47.55 20.82 26.73***
(7.17)
Number of Lead Banks 4.04 5.53 -1.49***
(-3.00)
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Table 1.3: First step probit regressions
The dependent variable in the first column is Bor dummy variable, which is
equal to one if a firm has borrowed in any given year in the syndicated loans
market and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the second column
is Rel dummy variable, which is equal to one if a firm has borrowed from
the same lead-lender within the previous five-year window. The coefficients
correspond to semi-elasticities (dy/ex). All variable definitions are in the
Appendix. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. All regressions
include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and
1% significance levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Bor existst Rel dummyt
Dummy for outstanding relationship from previous period 0.013***
(12.28)
Total number of industry loans 0.023**
(2.13)
















Interest Coveraget-1 -0.002*** -0.002***
(5.23) (5.03)




Rated dummy 0.041*** 0.021***
(17.65) (7.38)
Firm age -0.007*** -0.001
(2.61) (0.33)
N 54,814 43,981
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Table 1.4: First Stage Results
The table shows the first stage OLS results of two-stage model for the subsample of firms defined
according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities (PD) and below and
above median baseline SFA efficiency scores. The dependent variable is Rel dummy, which is
equal to one if a firm has borrowed from the same lead-lender within the previous five-year
window. The instrument is the estimated probabilities from the second probit regression in
equation (1.4). The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control variables are the
average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The
standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and
*, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.









Prob. of Rel dummyt (instrument) 0.671*** 0.633*** 0.707*** 0.693*** 0.665***
(34.84) (17.03) (14.22) (22.12) (25.25)
ROA 0.066*** 0.069 0.019 0.065** 0.084
(2.65) (1.31) (0.41) (2.28) (1.58)
Efficiency 0.029 0.029 0.111 0.029 0.185
(0.61) (0.29) (1.23) (0.53) (1.64)
Size 0.044*** 0.060*** 0.026** 0.053*** 0.047***
(7.72) (4.59) (2.15) (7.34) (3.43)
Size2 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002* -0.004*** -0.003***
(6.80) (4.62) (1.77) (6.14) (3.64)
Cash/TA -0.108*** -0.135*** -0.153*** -0.122*** -0.083**
(5.47) (3.68) (3.40) (5.31) (2.40)
M/B 0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.005
(0.38) (0.42) (0.80) (1.55) (1.00)
JM prob. of default -0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.76) (0.61) (0.14) (0.67) (0.37)
Tangibility -0.015 -0.047* -0.001 -0.020 -0.005
(1.17) (1.86) (0.03) (1.16) (0.26)
Interest coverage -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000***
(4.20) (1.32) (1.84) (3.32) (2.66)
Capex/TA 0.041 0.125 0.007 0.128* -0.117
(0.70) (1.12) (0.06) (1.74) (1.19)
Leverage 0.014 0.057* -0.027 0.011 0.009
(1.04) (1.78) (1.11) (0.69) (0.44)
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.35) (0.86) (1.04) (0.22) (0.68)
Rating dummy 0.017*** 0.012 0.011 0.019** 0.012
(2.79) (1.19) (0.79) (2.03) (1.45)
Lambda -1.243*** -1.291*** -1.141*** -1.229*** -1.251***
(125.74) (88.40) (47.26) (69.82) (104.67)
F-statistics 708.52 180.55 154.49 369.02 334.28
(p-value) (<0.0000) (<0.0000) (<0.0000) (<0.0000) (<0.0000)
R2 0.63 0.70 0.53 0.56 0.66
N 23,711 6,864 5,081 11,679 12,032
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Table 1.5: Second Stage Results of SFA Efficiency
The table shows the semi-elasticities (dy/ex) of the second stage results of two-stage model using
fractional response regression and SFA efficiency as dependent variable for the whole sample as
well as subsample of firms defined according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default
probabilities (PD) (columns (2) and (3)) and below and above median baseline SFA efficiency
scores (columns (4) and (5)). The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control variables
are the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.
The standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis
and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.









Rel dummy (instrumented) 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.001**
(6.80) (3.99) (4.46) (6.40) (2.06)
ROA 0.006*** -0.002 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002***
(8.10) (1.53) (6.73) (6.20) (4.00)
Efficiency 0.188*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.381*** -0.106***
(16.72) (11.06) (5.74) (21.83) (8.50)
Size 0.069*** 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.083*** 0.023***
(7.49) (5.03) (3.82) (6.62) (3.24)
Size2 0.013*** 0.012** 0.018** -0.023*** 0.021***
(3.25) (2.02) (2.51) (4.42) (6.49)
Cash/TA 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000
(2.46) (2.46) (0.71) (2.96) (0.04)
M/B 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002 0.004** 0.002***
(3.65) (3.01) (0.90) (2.50) (3.83)
JM prob. of default -0.001*** 0.000** -0.001 -0.001** -0.000***
(3.63) (2.15) (1.29) (2.29) (2.67)
Tangibility 0.003*** 0.002 0.002 0.004** -0.001*
(2.94) (1.53) (1.15) (2.54) (1.83)
Interest coverage 0.000*** 0.000 0.001** 0.001*** 0.000
(3.09) (1.10) (2.11) (3.14) (0.83)
Capex/TA -0.000 0.004*** -0.002 -0.003* 0.000
(0.23) (3.38) (0.73) (1.90) (1.30)
Leverage -0.001 -0.001 0.006*** -0.000 -0.001***
(1.39) (1.18) (2.91) (0.10) (2.91)
Firm age 0.042*** 0.024*** 0.095*** 0.085*** 0.004*
(6.06) (3.54) (4.29) (5.82) (1.74)
Rating dummy -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.001***
(4.34) (3.52) (2.30) (3.15) (4.16)
Lambda 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(2.98) (2.08) (1.53) (0.51) (0.92)
N 23,711 6,864 5,081 11,679 12,032
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Table 1.6: First Stage Results of Low vs. High SFA Efficiency and Low vs. High PD
Subsamples
The table shows the first stage OLS results of two-stage model for the subsample of firms
defined according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities (PD)
and below and above median baseline SFA efficiency scores. The subsample in column (1) is
low PD - low efficiency, (2) is low PD - high efficiency, (3) is high PD - low efficiency, and (4)
is high PD - high efficiency. The dependent variable is Rel dummy, which is equal to one
if a firm has borrowed from the same lead-lender within the previous five-year window. The
instrument is the estimated probabilities from the second probit regression in equation (1.4).
The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control variables are the average values of
previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors
are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, ***
denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD
Dependent variable: Rel dummyt Low Efficiency High Efficiency Low Efficiency High Efficiency
Prob. of Rel dummyt (instrument) 0.733*** 0.595*** 0.680*** 0.764***
(11.92) (12.58) (10.73) (9.13)
ROA 0.173** -0.066 0.032 -0.032
(2.34) (0.87) (0.65) (0.25)
Efficiency 0.046 0.149 0.052 0.412**
(0.35) (0.55) (0.47) (2.16)
Size 0.084*** 0.030 0.035** 0.017
(5.04) (1.24) (2.27) (0.52)
Size2 -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(5.20) (1.41) (1.54) (0.64)
Cash/TA -0.130*** -0.113** -0.155*** -0.154
(2.61) (2.11) (3.32) (1.39)
M/B -0.016** 0.008 0.009 -0.005
(2.03) (1.30) (1.49) (0.31)
JM prob. of default 0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.003
(0.49) (0.44) (1.16) (0.97)
Tangibility -0.100** -0.010 0.025 -0.045
(2.49) (0.30) (0.84) (0.89)
Interest coverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000
(1.07) (1.06) (2.09) (0.26)
Capex/TA 0.236 -0.031 0.091 -0.148
(1.46) (0.20) (0.76) (0.60)
Leverage 0.060 0.047 0.001 -0.087*
(1.18) (1.15) (0.05) (1.86)
Firm age -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.74) (1.60) (1.34) (0.02)
Rating dummy 0.011 0.016 0.012 0.009
(0.56) (1.21) (0.62) (0.42)
Lambda -1.293*** -1.290*** -1.094*** -1.176***
(44.32) (77.53) (27.46) (37.37)
F-statistics 93.04 93.89 68.05 76.22
(p-value) (<0.0000) (<0.0000) (<0.0000) (<0.0000)
R2 0.65 0.71 0.46 0.57
N 2,602 4,262 3,280 1,801
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Table 1.7: Second Stage Results of Low vs. High SFA Efficiency and Low vs. High PD
Subsamples
The table shows the semi-elasticities (dy/ex) of the second stage results of two-stage model us-
ing fractional response regression and SFA efficiency as dependent variable for the subsample
of firms defined according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities
(PD) and below and above median baseline SFA efficiency scores. The subsample in column
(1) is low PD - low efficiency, (2) is low PD - high efficiency, (3) is high PD - low efficiency,
and (4) is high PD - high efficiency. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control
variables are the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year
fixed effects. The standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats
are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD
Dependent variable: SFA Efficiency Low Efficiency High Efficiency Low Efficiency High Efficiency
Rel dummy (instrumented) 0.010*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.005***
(3.61) (0.67) (3.46) (3.21)
ROA -0.002 -0.000 0.005*** 0.003***
(1.07) (0.25) (4.74) (3.09)
Efficiency 0.340*** -0.094*** 0.289*** -0.079***
(12.50) (5.35) (9.35) (3.53)
Size 0.113*** 0.024** 0.088*** -0.009
(5.04) (2.06) (4.01) (0.72)
Size2 -0.040*** 0.022*** -0.018** 0.032***
(3.62) (3.98) (1.96) (5.71)
Cash/TA 0.005*** -0.000 0.001 0.000
(3.74) (0.33) (0.65) (0.46)
M/B 0.005 0.002*** 0.002 -0.000
(1.55) (3.53) (0.48) (0.03)
JM prob. of default 0.001** 0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(2.32) (1.22) (1.39) (1.47)
Tangibility 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.000
(0.80) (1.17) (1.02) (0.11)
Interest coverage 0.000 0.000 0.001** -0.000
(0.31) (1.05) (2.09) (0.48)
Capex/TA 0.007*** 0.001* -0.004 -0.001
(3.06) (1.78) (1.25) (1.11)
Leverage -0.001 -0.001** 0.011*** -0.001
(0.48) (2.24) (4.02) (1.09)
Firm age -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.002 -0.000
(2.96) (4.37) (1.15) (0.55)
Rating dummy 0.002* 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(1.96) (0.50) (1.12) (1.08)
Lambda 0.053*** 0.002 0.122*** 0.018***
(3.42) (0.60) (3.48) (2.83)






































Table 1.8: Regression results for low SFA Efficiency subsample of firms
The table shows the semi-elasticities (dy/ex) of the second stage results of two-stage model using fractional response regression
and SFA efficiency as dependent variable for the subsample of firms defined according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton
default probabilities (PD) and below median baseline SFA efficiency scores. In the period t−2 Rel dummy is lagged for two-period
and in t− 1 analysis Rel dummy is lagged for one-period. In t+ 1 analysis one-period forward dependent variable is used and in
t+2 analysis two-period forward dependent variable is used. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control variables are
the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors are bootstrapped
and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Rel dummyt-2 (instrumented) -0.001 -0.004*
(0.68) (1.83)
Rel dummyt-1 (instrumented) 0.003 0.001
(1.34) (0.42)
Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.010*** 0.000 0.004 0.011*** 0.008** 0.005
(3.61) (0.03) (0.80) (3.46) (2.06) (1.20)
ROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.007* 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.82) (0.76) (1.07) (0.06) (1.96) (5.51) (5.53) (4.74) (3.54) (2.71)
Efficiency 0.344*** 0.342*** 0.340*** 0.177*** 0.141*** 0.296*** 0.294*** 0.289*** 0.174*** 0.210***
(12.71) (12.66) (12.50) (6.66) (3.00) (9.60) (9.53) (9.35) (4.02) (4.16)
Size 0.133*** 0.131*** 0.113*** 0.149*** 0.099** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.057*
(6.18) (6.06) (5.04) (4.78) (2.57) (5.43) (5.42) (4.01) (3.04) (1.66)
Size2 -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.040*** -0.023 0.015 -0.016* -0.021** -0.018** 0.009 0.027**
(3.97) (4.11) (3.62) (1.56) (0.82) (1.70) (2.21) (1.96) (0.88) (2.12)
Cash/TA 0.003* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(1.92) (2.72) (3.74) (0.92) (0.57) (1.45) (0.61) (0.65) (0.06) (0.46)
M/B 0.006* 0.005* 0.005 0.007** 0.008* 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.004
(1.94) (1.73) (1.55) (2.32) (1.96) (0.97) (0.67) (0.48) (0.36) (0.76)
JM prob. of default 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 -0.003** -0.003* -0.002 -0.001 0.001
(2.06) (2.25) (2.32) (1.11) (1.36) (2.11) (1.70) (1.39) (0.35) (0.46)
Tangibility 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.27) (0.58) (0.80) (0.48) (0.00) (0.07) (0.49) (1.02) (0.87) (0.14)
Interest coverage -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.000
(0.81) (0.52) (0.31) (0.27) (2.23) (1.53) (1.75) (2.09) (1.75) (0.35)
Capex/TA 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005* 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.004
(3.30) (3.15) (3.06) (1.68) (1.28) (0.63) (0.98) (1.25) (0.49) (0.95)
Leverage -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009** 0.003
(0.29) (0.42) (0.48) (0.45) (0.57) (4.25) (3.99) (4.02) (2.44) (0.65)
Firm age -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007***
(3.36) (3.34) (2.96) (2.31) (0.85) (1.54) (1.46) (1.15) (1.45) (2.71)
Rating dummy 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001 0.003** 0.003***
(3.14) (2.65) (1.96) (2.08) (1.14) (3.00) (2.46) (1.12) (2.49) (2.69)
Lambda -0.003 -0.002 0.053*** -0.001 0.021 -0.002 0.003 0.122*** 0.085** 0.047
(0.98) (0.57) (3.42) (0.03) (0.75) (0.29) (0.35) (3.48) (2.05) (1.07)






































Table 1.9: Regression results for high SFA Efficiency subsample of firms
The table shows the semi-elasticities (dy/ex) of the second stage results of two-stage model using fractional response regression
and SFA efficiency as dependent variable for the subsample of firms defined according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton
default probabilities (PD) and above median baseline SFA efficiency scores. In the period t−2 Rel dummy is lagged for two-period
and in t − 1 analysis Rel dummy is lagged for one-period. In t + 1 analysis one-period forward dependent variable is used and in
t+2 analysis two-period forward dependent variable is used. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control variables are
the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors are bootstrapped
and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Rel dummyt-2 (instrumented) -0.001 -0.001
(1.37) (0.69)
Rel dummyt-1 (instrumented) 0.000 0.001
(0.35) (1.08)
Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.005*** 0.008** 0.002
(0.67) (0.04) (0.87) (3.21) (2.47) (0.58)
ROA -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003** -0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004* 0.004*
(0.11) (0.20) (0.25) (2.12) (2.73) (3.45) (3.40) (3.09) (1.72) (1.82)
Efficiency -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** 0.081*** 0.004 -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.079*** 0.090** 0.031
(5.36) (5.33) (5.35) (2.65) (0.11) (3.53) (3.52) (3.53) (2.13) (0.70)
Size 0.025** 0.025** 0.024** 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.009 0.015 0.024
(2.25) (2.18) (2.06) (4.40) (3.83) (0.06) (0.09) (0.72) (0.43) (0.72)
Size2 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** -0.007 -0.001 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.029* 0.032**
(4.00) (3.96) (3.98) (0.78) (0.14) (5.39) (5.32) (5.71) (1.81) (2.01)
Cash/TA -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.97) (0.48) (0.33) (0.71) (1.21) (1.02) (0.34) (0.46) (0.74) (1.32)
M/B 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.004*
(3.74) (3.59) (3.53) (4.36) (5.43) (0.54) (0.22) (0.03) (1.22) (1.94)
JM prob. of default 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(1.14) (1.22) (1.22) (2.01) (2.87) (2.05) (1.70) (1.47) (0.21) (0.75)
Tangibility -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002** 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002
(1.51) (1.22) (1.17) (2.40) (1.15) (0.90) (0.51) (0.11) (1.36) (1.25)
Interest coverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001*
(0.76) (0.97) (1.05) (0.17) (0.30) (0.68) (0.61) (0.48) (0.68) (1.78)
Capex/TA 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(1.92) (1.80) (1.78) (1.25) (0.52) (0.54) (0.84) (1.11) (0.23) (1.15)
Leverage -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.000
(2.08) (2.23) (2.24) (3.03) (2.28) (0.98) (1.16) (1.09) (1.18) (0.11)
Firm age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(4.41) (4.42) (4.37) (4.68) (4.24) (0.58) (0.61) (0.55) (1.35) (0.60)
Rating dummy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002*
(1.23) (0.70) (0.50) (1.62) (3.04) (0.72) (0.02) (1.08) (0.88) (1.79)
Lambda -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.003** -0.002* 0.018*** 0.036** 0.008
(0.92) (0.31) (0.60) (0.22) (0.68) (2.27) (1.87) (2.83) (2.39) (0.46)
N 4,262 4,262 4,262 3,639 3,023 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,538 1,360
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Table 1.10: Propensity Score Matching of Probability of Default
The matching is done on the year before the relationship borrowing takes place
(year = −1) using nearest neighbor matching technique. The matching the prob-
abilities are estimated in equation (1.4) using the dummy variable defined as one for
the treatment group firms (PDt), which have only relationship bank borrowing and
zero for the control group firms (PDc), which have only public debt borrowing. Panel
A shows results for firms in the fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities.
Panel B includes firms that are in the first quartile of Jarrow-Merton default proba-
bilities. The results in bold are quasi diff-in-diff estimations of differences in default
probabilities of treatment and control groups for the year of borrowing and one year
and two years after the borrowing takes place. The period of analysis is between
1991-2011. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
High Probability of Default Firms
Obs. Mean St.Error T-Stat
∆PDt,0 = ¯PDbank relationship,0 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 1,125 0.0169 0.2769 0.06
∆PDc,0 = ¯PDpublic debt,0 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 1,125 0.1607 0.1572 1.02
∆PDt,0 - ∆PDc,0 1,125 -0.1437 0.3149 -0.45
∆PDt,1 = ¯PDbank relationship,1 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 1,049 -0.7987 0.2982 -2.67***
∆PDc,1 = ¯PDpublic debt,1 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 1,049 0.3626 0.1743 2.08**
∆PDt,1 - ∆PDc,1 1,049 -1.1614 0.3315 -3.50***
∆PDt,2 = ¯PDbank relationship,2 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 887 -0.7977 0.3285 -2.42**
∆PDc,2 = ¯PDpublic debt,2 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 887 0.4507 0.2046 2.20**
∆PDt,2 - ∆PDc,2 887 -1.2485 0.3630 -3.43***
Low Probability of Default Firms
Obs. Mean St.Error T-Stat
∆PDt,0 = ¯PDbank relationship,0 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 2,313 0.1007 0.0107 9.37***
∆PDc,0 = ¯PDpublic debt,0 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 2,313 0.1615 0.0704 2.29**
∆PDt,0 - ∆PDc,0 2,313 -0.0608 0.0706 -0.86
∆PDt,1 = ¯PDbank relationship,1 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 1,860 0.2876 0.0405 7.09***
∆PDc,1 = ¯PDpublic debt,1 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 1,860 0.4784 0.0896 5.33***
∆PDt,1 - ∆PDc,1 1,860 -0.1908 0.0975 -1.95*
∆PDt,2 = ¯PDbank relationship,2 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 1,690 0.5236 0.0728 7.18***
∆PDc,2 = ¯PDpublic debt,2 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 1,690 0.5769 0.0979 5.88***
∆PDt,2 - ∆PDc,2 1,690 -0.0532 0.1216 -0.43
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Table 1.11: Variable Definitions
Variable name Definition
SFA efficiency score
Parametric, stochastic efficiency score calculated by Stochastic Frontier
Analysis method for each year and industry.
DEA efficiency score
Non-parametric, deterministic efficiency score calculated by Data
Envelopment Analysis method for each year and industry.
TFP estimate
Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) estimate of firm level efficiency
using a semi-parametric method.
Size Natural logarithm of total assets.
Size2 Square of firm size.
Cash/TA Cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets.
Leverage
Ratio of book value of debt to the sum of market value of equity
and book value of debt.
ROA
Profitability measure defined as the ratio of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization to book value of assets.
Interest coverage
Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
to total interest expenses.
Market-to-Book ratio (M/B)
Ratio of sum of market value of equity and book value of debt to
book value of assets.
Capex/TA Ratio of capital expenditures divided by total assets
Tangibility Ratio of net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets
Rating
Dummy variable equal to one if firm has S&P domestic long-term
issuer credit rating and zero otherwise.
Firm age Number of years since initial public offering.
Jarrow-Merton (JM) default probability (%)
Default probability estimate of a statistical hazard model that relates
the probability of firm default to the same explanatory variables as the
Jarrow-Chava Model and incorporates the default probability of the
Merton Structural Model as an additional explanatory variable.
Whited-Wu financial constraint index Financial constraint index created by Whited and Wu (2006)
Altman’s z-score Bankruptcy score created by Altman (1968).
Bor dummy
Dummy variable equals to one if a firm has borrowed in any given year
in the syndicated loans market and zero otherwise.
Rel dummy
Dummy variable equals to one if the firm has borrowed from the same
lead-lender in the last 5 years.
Rel intensity
The amount of loans by bank m to borrower i in the last 5 years scaled by
the total amount of loans by borrower i in the last 5 years
Rel number
The number of loans by bank m to borrower i in the last 5 years scaled by
the total number of loans by borrower i in the last 5 years.
Dummy for outstanding loan from previous period
Dummy variable for existence of an outstanding bank loan from any
lead-lender in the previous period.
Dummy for outstanding relationship from previous period
Dummy variable that indicates an outstanding relationship bank borrowing
from any lead-lender from the previous period.
Total number of industry relationships Total number of relationship borrowings in an industry within a year.
Chapter 2
The Intangible Value of Key Talent:
Decomposing Organization Capital
(with Linda Allen)
“The manner in which information is accumulated in a firm offers an explanation for the
firm’s existence. Information is an asset to the firm, since it affects the production possibility
set and is produced jointly with output. We call this asset of the firm its organization capital.”
Prescott and Visscher (1980)
2.1 Introduction
A firm is more than a collection of assets. There is something intangible that identifies each
firm and differentiates an Apple from a Microsoft. This intangible asset, denoted organization
capital (OC) constitutes the firm’s culture, internal knowledge and language, firm-specific
policies and procedures, growth opportunities and information technology, brand name and
any other aspects that are not directly related to the production process and are unique
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to the firm itself. A critical component of the OC intangible asset is the firm’s key talent.
For example, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that
OC value creation resides in the firm’s key talent, thereby generating economic rents, which
are shared by the firm’s top executives and stockholders. Executive compensation contracts
include the value of economic rents from OC generated by key talent. However, the executive
compensation contract is not fully observable to outside firms that might want to expropriate
OC by hiring a firm’s top managers. Firms disclose payments to top executives in the form of
cash (i.e., salary and bonus) and non-cash (i.e., stock and options). However, firms may also
offer perquisites and special arrangements as additional compensation to attract strategic
executives. These arrangements are sometimes not publicly disclosed. For example, during
Jeff Immelt’s sixteen-year tenure at General Electric, a spare jet routinely accompanied the
corporate jet on overseas trips. This was not even revealed to GE’s Board.1 The presence
of perquisites and other cash and non-cash emoluments complicates measures of the OC
component of key talent. Was the spare jet a perquisite required to elicit the full OC
contribution of GE’s chief executive to enhance firm value or was it a value reducing agency
cost? Indeed, the challenge is to differentiate payment for value-enhancing OC embedded
in key talent from value-reducing agency costs in the perquisite component of the executive
compensation contract.
In this paper, we dichotomize OC value from key talent into the disclosed executive
compensation contract (comprised of cash, stock and options) in contrast to the undisclosed
emoluments and perquisites that form a portion of executive compensation. Because the
portion of these undisclosed perquisites that generates OC value is unobservable and indis-
tinguishable from agency costs, outside firms are unable to determine the full OC value of a
firm’s executives. This unobservable component of OC, therefore, cannot be expropriated by
1Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ge-airplane/ge-board-did-
not-know-about-ceos-extra-plane-wsj-idUSKBN1CY0RI
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managers when they leave the firm. Indeed, it is destroyed when the firm key talent switches
from one firm to another, since it is determined by the unique combination of firm assets and
managerial skill, i.e., it is manager- and firm-specific OC. In terms of the theoretical model
of Lustig et al. (2011), hereinafter LSV, this component is not portable. The portability
(denoted ′′ϕ′′ ) of OC is a key exogenous component of the LSV and other theoretical mod-
els (e.g., Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) who assume that all OC is 100% portable). LSV
performs comparative statics on portability assumed to vary discreetly from 0% to 50% to
75%. We build on these theoretical models by endogenizing OC portability and suggesting
an empirical measure of OC portability.
To empirically estimate these components of OC, we follow studies that have measured
OC using overhead and non-allocated expenses as empirical measures of the firm’s investment
in the firm itself, rather than in the products it produces and sells (e.g., Lev and Radhakrish-
nan (2005), Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013)). Selling, general and administrative (SG&A)
expenses are considered the inputs into an intangible organization capital production func-
tion since these costs relate to the firm’s operation but are not directly connected to the
firm’s outputs. If we consider the components contained within SG&A to be the factors in
an organization capital production function, we must specify the output. Since organiza-
tion capital represents an investment in the firm itself, the output is firm value. Thus, in
this paper, we examine the impact of organization capital on the firm’s Tobin’s Q (market
to book value). Our results are consistent with other studies that show that organization
capital is positively related to firm performance (Lev et al., 2009; Lev and Radhakrishnan,
2005; Banker et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2012; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013).
However, SG&A expenditures encompass many different factors of production, ranging
from personnel costs (i.e., for top executives and other non-allocated employees) to advertis-
ing, office rent, corporate perquisites, etc. We differentiate between disclosed key talent OC
compensation and the remaining components of OC, which include undisclosed key talent
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OC compensation. This decomposition allows us to differentiate observable payments to
key talent in the form of executive compensation from other unobservable costs aggregated
into SG&A. We utilize Execucomp data on executive compensation in order to isolate the
disclosed component of key talent in organization capital that accrues entirely to managers.
Our approach disentangles the observable component of OC embedded in top management’s
disclosed compensation from the human capital OC component that may contain undisclosed
empire building and entrenched management agency problems.
To accomplish the decomposition, we divide organization capital into two empirical mea-
sures: (1) the disclosed human capital component, defined as the capitalized value of com-
pensation paid to top executives or key talent (denoted HC OC), and (2) the residual com-
prised of all other elements of organization capital (denoted Residual OC), which includes
an undisclosed component of perquisites and other emoluments paid to key talent. This
decomposition allows us to determine which component of organization capital drives firm
value. In particular, higher investment in HC OC may be value enhancing if executives are
paid to diligently and effectively manage the firm. Alternatively, however, agency problems
may lead to higher measures of Residual OC as highly remunerated and entrenched man-
agement pursues empire building or risk diversification strategies at odds with shareholder
value.2 We find that the key talent component of organization capital (HC OC) enhances
firm value (as measured by market to book value), whereas Residual OC expenditures do
not contribute to firm value.
The decision to pay for key talent in the form of disclosed cash and stock compensation
as opposed to unobservable perquisites is endogenous. Indeed, shareholders may retain some
rents from OC value creation if they shift the composition of the compensation contract
away from disclosed payments to implicit, undisclosed payments, thereby creating informa-
2For example, Venieris et al. (2015) find that costs are stickier when OC is high as management delays
reductions in intangible investments in response to decreases in the firm’s production level.
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tion asymmetries about the OC contribution of key talent. This reduces the ability of exec-
utives to communicate the full value of their OC contribution to outside firms.3 We utilize
a two-stage analysis to endogenously estimate the breakdown between observable and un-
observable OC compensation, employing three instrumental variables. The first instrument
exploits the observation that over recent years, the job market has changed dramatically in
terms of labor mobility and job polarization, thereby impacting the decomposition of OC
(but not market to book directly) via changing labor supply and demand conditions. As
one of our instrumental variables, we utilize the classification of Donangelo (2014), which
measures the degree of worker specialization, thereby impacting the breakdown between key
talent (HC OC) and white-collar support personnel (Residual OC). A second instrumental
variable follows Jaimovich and Siu (2012) in measuring the ratio of non-routine, high wage
employees (HC OC) to routine, low wage employees (Residual OC) as firms reallocate their
work force to the polar extremes away from higher paying middle level employment. Our
third instrumental variable relates the firm’s executive compensation (HC OC) to industry
median levels. Using these instrumental variables to address endogeneity, we find a positive
correlation between firm value (Tobin’s Q) and HC OC, but not for Residual OC. The re-
sults are more robust for firms with high institutional ownership, which is a proxy for strong
governance, whereas firms with low institutional ownership do not experience increase in
firm value as a result of an increase in HC OC.
Our decomposition of organization capital allows us to extend work of Eisfeldt and Pa-
panikolaou (2013), hereinafter EP, and to more precisely measure the risk associated with
key talent. We create five value-weighted portfolios sorted on HC OC and Residual OC in-
dividually in order to assess the risk characteristics of each component. We utilize CAPM,
3Top executives compensate themselves for their undiversifiable risk in the firm through consumption of
perquisites and empire building. Moreover, restrictions on executive compensation in the wake of SOX and
Dodd-Frank regulations could also encourage the shift from disclosed compensation to undisclosed implicit
compensation in the form of perquisites.
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Fama-French three-factor model Fama and French (1993) and the Carhart four-factor model
Carhart (1997) for portfolios created using the quintiles of HC OC and Residual OC sepa-
rately. The results show that high HC OC firms do not have higher returns on average than
low HC OC firms, whereas high Residual OC firms have positive and statistically significant
average returns throughout the sample period. That is, high-minus-low HC OC portfolios
have no significant systematic risk incorporated into returns, whereas high-minus-low Resid-
ual OC portfolios have a systematic risk premium amounting to from 4.05% to 6.46% p.a.
Furthermore, consistent with managerial power argument of Bebchuk et al. (2002), we find
that the systematic risk premium in high-minus-low Residual OC portfolios is highest for
firms in the lowest quintile of institutional ownership amounting to 8.73% to 10.40% p.a.,
suggesting that weak governance increases agency costs. For the highest quintile of institu-
tional ownership, high-minus-low Residual OC portfolios do not generate systematic risk.
The paper proceeds as follows. The literature on organization capital is discussed in
Section 2.2. Our empirical decomposition methodology and the impact of each of the com-
ponents of organization capital on firm Tobin’s Q are analyzed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4
estimates the risk characteristics of each of the components of organization capital. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Construction
The concept of organization capital dates back to economists’ attempts to justify the ex-
istence of firms. Organizing assets into distinct companies occurs because these assets are
more productive in unison than in isolation. That is, there is an intangible glue, called
organization capital that connects the assets and makes them more productive. Organiza-
tion capital incorporates the non-production related unique knowledge produced within the
firm using the interaction of human capital and production technologies within themselves
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and among each other. Prescott and Visscher (1980) model the firm’s organization capital
in terms of improvements in the productivity of the firm’s human capital, since the firm’s
knowledge of the capabilities of its individual employees improves efficiency by matching the
worker to the best job, by creating effective teams of employees and by investment in on-
the-job training. Evenson and Westphal (1995) summarize the organization capital as: “the
knowledge used to combine human skills and physical capital into systems for producing and
delivering want-satisfying products”. Carlin et al. (2012) view organization capital as a form
of intra-firm language. This captures the idea that the value of organization capital depends
on its being shared across managers and that it must be transmitted to the next generation
of employees to be preserved. A firm’s language includes informal work routines, convenient
technical jargons, and a vocabulary of patterns remembered from past experiences. They
show that firms with more organization capital have less employee turnover, and therefore,
can invest over the long term. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013, 2014) identify the value of
key talent as critical to the role of organization capital in creating firm value. Berk et al.
(2016) find that actively managed mutual funds create value by reallocating funds based on
the firm’s private information about the skill of its money managers.
Organization capital encompasses the firm’s know-how embedded in its work force. How-
ever, it is more than that. Indeed, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) estimate that the payments
to intangible capital represent about 8% of U.S. manufacturing output, with return on or-
ganization capital encompassing 40% of those payments. Corrado et al. (2009) attribute
30% of all intangible assets in the U.S. to organization capital (in their terms “firm-specific
economic competencies”), representing the largest category. Moreover, Leung et al. (2016)
find that organization capital impacts stock returns in 20 OECD countries. Organization
capital includes the firm’s intellectual capital embodied in research and development, growth
opportunities and corporate culture with respect to innovations. Francis et al. (2015) con-
nect the firm’s organization capital to the number of patents granted. Mart́ın-Oliver and
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Salas-Fumás (2012) show that organization capital increases firm value through the optimal
deployment of the firm’s investment in information technology and other material assets.
Whether investment in organization capital increases or decreases firm value is an em-
pirical question. Oshima et al. (2009) view organization capital as entrepreneurial human
capital that has been transformed from a non-tradable asset into tradable capital that is
embedded in firm value. However, there are limits to the ability to write contracts based
on this entrepreneurial talent. Organization capital is an intangible asset, and therefore,
susceptible to agency problems which may reduce firm value. For example, Eisfeldt and Pa-
panikolaou (2013) highlight the role of key talent in building the firm’s organization capital.
However, these talented executives have an outside option to leave the firm and use their ex-
pertise at another firm. Thus, the firm’s shareholders are exposed to the risk that key talent
will depart, thereby taking valuable organization capital with them. Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2008) show that capital is less efficiently reallocated during downturns because executives
have capital control rights as a result of their private information about asset productivity.
Venieris et al. (2015) also find that selling, general and administrative expenses are sticky
due to managerial reluctance to reallocate capital during downturns. Thus, key talent can
pursue private objectives (such as empire building or risk diversification) at odds with value
maximization. Firms’ shareholders provide incentive pay to induce managers to relinquish
control rights. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) find that organization capital makes firms
riskier, resulting in a 4.5% p.a. increase in risk-adjusted returns. Lustig et al. (2011) find
that shareholders must share economic rents to key talent to prevent them from leaving the
firm. This takes the form of pay for performance and greater inequality of income among
the firm’s employees. Further, Boguth et al. (2016) find that organization capital is fragile,
thereby exposing the firm to risk of loss. They estimate a 6% p.a. risk premium for organi-
zational capital fragility, as measured by the size of the management team (the smaller the
team, the more fragile the firm’s OC).
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Previous studies find significant association of higher executive compensation (included
in SG&A expenses) with increasing agency problems between managers and shareholders
of a firm. Agency theory argues that misalignment of interests between shareholders and
managers could lead to agency problems, so that managers engage in activities for their own
benefits rather than the benefits of the firm’s shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
One well-known agency problem is managerial empire building, which refers to managers’
tendencies to grow the firm beyond its optimal size or to maintain unutilized resources with
the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige
(Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Bebchuk et al., 2002; Masulis et al., 2007; Hope and Thomas,
2008; Chen et al., 2012). For example, in his seminal paper on managers’ utility-maximizing
tendencies, Williamson (1963) specifically uses the expansion of staff (proxied by SG&A
costs) beyond optimal levels as an example to illustrate the effects of managerial discretion
on managers’ opportunistic behavior.
Another agency problem is the managers’ disincentives to downsize as they derive mon-
etary and nonmonetary benefits from managing larger and more complex organizations.
Since any benefits from downsizing accrue primarily to shareholders rather than managers,
managers may prefer the quiet life and try to avoid the difficult decisions and costly efforts
associated with downsizing (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Datta et al., 2010; Chen
et al., 2012).
There are a significant number of studies on the effect of executive compensation on
firm performance. Some of these focus on the executive compensation structure and find
evidence that equity compensation and managerial ownership have a positive relationship
with firm value (Mehran, 1995; Chang et al., 2010; Frydman and Saks, 2010) while, others
show that the relationship has a nonlinear inverted-U shape (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell
and Servaes, 1990; McConnell et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2012). There is also evidence in the
literature that the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value is asymmetric
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in the sense that large increases in managerial ownership increases firm value, whereas large
decreases do not result in decrease in firm value (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009).
Another strand of this literature discusses the effect of CEOs on firm performance. Adams
et al. (2009) and citetVillalongaAmit2006 find evidence that founder-CEOs increase firm
value. Malmendier and Tate (2008) find evidence that award-winning CEOs subsequently
underperform and that the ex-post consequences of media-induced superstar status for share-
holders are negative. Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that an increase in the fraction of aggregate
compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO leads to decreases in firm
value.
In this paper, we utilize a novel decomposition of organization capital in order to resolve
some of the disagreements in the literature. Indeed, we hypothesize that the executive
compensation component of OC has a different relationship with firm value than other fixed
costs (such as R&D, staffing, perquisities, etc.). To test this, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: The key talent component of organization capital (HC OC) enhances firm
value whereas the Residual OC does not contribute to firm value.
If executive compensation reflects the second best opportunity cost of key talent, then the
firm retains the differential between the idiosyncratic value to the firm and the alternative use
of key talent. This explains the positive contribution of key talent (measured by HC OC) to
firm value. However, if executives take back some of this firm value in the form of perquisite
consumption and empire building, the Residual OC component of organization capital will
not contribute to increases in firm value. This agency problem (measured by Residual OC)
exposes firm shareholders to systematic risk, whereas executive compensation (measured by
HC OC) creates only an idiosyncratic risk exposure. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: There are two components of organization capital risk: idiosyncratic and
systematic. High-minus-low HC OC portfolios have no significant systematic risk incorpo-
rated into returns, whereas high-minus-low Residual OC portfolios have a systematic risk
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premium.
Existence of agency problems impact executive compensation contracts. Bebchuk et al.
(2002) and Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that, in
contrast to “optimal contracting” approach to executive compensation, which argues that
boards are assumed to design compensation schemes to provide managers with efficient incen-
tives to maximize shareholder value, the “managerial power” approach suggests that boards
do not operate at arm’s length in formulating executive compensation arrangements; rather,
executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents.
Furthermore, according to the “managerial power” approach, compensation arrangements
approved by boards often deviate from optimal contracting because directors are captured
or subject to influence by management, sympathetic to management, or simply ineffectual
in overseeing compensation. As a result of such deviations from optimal contracting, execu-
tives can receive pay in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders; this excess
pay constitutes rents. More importantly, to camouflage or facilitate the extraction of rents,
managerial power can lead to the use of inefficient pay structures that weaken or distort
incentives and that thus, in turn, further reduce shareholder value. One of the governance
mechanisms to limit managerial power is the existence of large shareholders. Shleifer and
Vishny (1986a) argue that large shareholders have large enough stake to monitor an incum-
bent management. Therefore firms with large shareholders play an active role in corporate
governance. We posit our third hypothesis as:
Hypothesis 3: The value-increasing impact of HC OC is highest for firms with strong gov-
ernance, whereas firms with weak governance experience the highest systematic risk generated
by Residual OC.
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2.3 OC and Firm Value
2.3.1 Theoretical Discussion
Let us assume that OCij is the portion of OC value that is created by key talent by manager i
in firm j. A portion (denoted 1−ϕj) of this total key talent OCij is generated by managerial
skills in combination with firm specific assets, and therefore cannot be replicated outside of
the firm. If all OC is completely independent of the specific firm and is portable or can be
replicated in any outside firm, then ϕj and the executive can fully expropriate all OC value
(i.e., 1 − ϕj = 0), thereby limiting the economic rents that remain for firm shareholders.4
However, as portability declines (ϕj → 0), more of the manager’s OC value is trapped in
the firm, thereby reducing the component of OC rents paid to managers and increasing the
OC rents to shareholders. We suggest that information asymmetries determine the degree
of OC portability. If managers are paid an observable compensation contract, outside firms
can completely evaluate the manager’s OC contribution, and hire her away from their firm,
thereby increasing the portability of managerial OC, and reducing shareholder rents from
OC. However, if a component of managerial compensation is in the form of unobservable
perquisites, then outside firms cannot bid away managers using this portion of their com-
pensation. The manager’s opportunity cost wage, therefore, is limited to the observable,
and therefore portable, component of their executive compensation. Thus, the breakdown of
the managerial compensation contract into observable (cash, stock, bonus, etc.) and unob-
servable (perquisites and other emoluments) determines the breakdown of OC into portable
and non-portable components. That is, the firm’s shareholders endogenously determine the
degree of OC portability by allocating managerial compensation between observable and
unobservable components.
4In the LSV model, shareholders retain some economic rents even when ϕj = 1 since (1) they insure risk
averse managers by back loading the long term managerial compensation contract, and (2) they absorb the
risk that their firm will not survive due to insufficient growth.
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To see how this operates, assume a world of full information (as in the LSV model), where
each manager i - firm j pair is endowed with an observable manager-firm specific total OC
value of OCij. In a world of perfect information, all firms perfectly observe both the cash
and remaining component of the OC value and the shareholders receive all economic rents
from OC value creation. In such an environment manager will get a portion of economic
rents from OC value creation, OCij, in the form of disclosed compensation (ϕjOCij) and the
firm’s shareholders retain economic rents equal to (1− ϕj)OCij.
We introduce information asymmetries in the form of the breakdown of the managerial
compensation contract into observable and unobservable components. Suppose that there is
perfect information within the firm, but that outside firms can only observe the observable
cash component of the manager’s OC compensation. Then the manager’s opportunity cost
wage (disclosed) is limited to ϕjOCij and the firm’s shareholders and managers share the
remaining rents (1 − ϕj)OCij. Under this setting, managers can negotiate to retain the
portion of these rents with firm shareholders. If managers have complete bargaining power,
they expropriate all rents and ϕj = 1. On the other hand, if managers have low bargaining
power, firm shareholders can reduce the portability of the manager’s OC by adjusting the
proportion of compensation paid in the form of cash versus perquisites, i.e., by adjusting ϕj.
The lower the ϕj, the less portable is managerial OC and the smaller the percentage of cash
in the management compensation contract. We denote this optimum ϕj in the absence of
within firm information asymmetries as ϕ∗j such that ϕ
∗
j > ϕj.
Now let us assume information asymmetries within the firm so that managers know
their own OC value contribution (ϕj), but shareholders do not, relying instead on managers
to inform them about their OC value contribution (ϕ̂j). Under this scenario, managers
can deceive shareholders into assessing a higher value of their OC (ϕ̂j), where ϕ̂j > ϕ
∗
j >
ϕj, by incorporating agency costs and empire building objectives into their management
compensation contract, thereby generating compensation in excess of the manager’s optimum
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disclosed and undisclosed OC value (ϕ̂j). Let δ = (1−ϕ̂j)/(1−ϕ∗j) be the ratio of the optimal
OC rent that accrues to shareholders in the presence of information asymmetries as a result
of the biased estimate of ϕ∗j such that ϕ̂j > ϕ
∗
j and δ ∈ (0, 1) by definition. Therefore
shareholders’ rent is defined as (1 − ϕ̂j)OCij = δ(1 − ϕ∗j)OCij. Accordingly, managers’
private benefits (such as empire building, risk diversification, perquisite consumption) will
be (ϕ̂j − ϕ∗j)OCij = (1 − δ)(1 − ϕ∗j)OCij. Thus, managers can expropriate some portion
of shareholders’ OC rent through undisclosed private benefits by a fraction of (1 − δ) and
thereby reduce shareholders’ rent by a fraction of δ by increasing information asymmetries
and pursuing activities with private managerial benefits that increase within firm information
asymmetries. Under this scenario, shareholders’ optimum OC rent (1−ϕ∗j)OCij includes both
value-enhancing OC (δ(1−ϕ∗j)OCij) and value-destroying private benefits to managers ((1−
δ)(1− ϕ∗j)OCij). Moreover, as Bebchuk et al. (2002) argues these information asymmetries
will exacerbate in the presence of weak governance by increasing ϕ̂j and decreasing δ.
2.3.2 Sample Construction
We obtain financial data concerning firms and executive compensation from Compustat,
CRSP, ExecuComp and Thomson Reuters Form 13F filings databases for the period from
1992 to 2015.5 The Compustat sample consists of all firms with sales and total assets higher
than $5 million excluding financial firms and utilities, as these industries are highly regulated.
Our final sample consists of 9,060 firm-year observations of 965 firms.
2.3.3 Variable Definitions
We follow Faleye (2007) and measure Tobin’s Q as the market value of equity plus the
book values of debt and preferred equity, all divided by the book value of assets. Our main
5The period is restricted to 1992 because it is the earliest year ExecuComp data is available.
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variables of interest are the OC measure and its components: human capital (HC OC) and
residual (Residual OC). Previous studies use selling, general and administrative expenses
item (SG&A) of the income statement as a proxy for OC measure (Lev et al., 2009; Eisfeldt
and Papanikolaou, 2013). Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) we construct the stock
of OC using the perpetual inventory method. Therefore, we calculate the following:
Oit = (1− δ)Oit−1 + (SGAit/cpit) (2.1)
in which cpit denotes the consumer price index and δ is the depreciation rate. In order
to implement the law of motion, we choose an initial stock by:
Oi0 = SGAi1/(gOC + δOC) (2.2)
As in Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), we use the depreciation rate of 15%, which is equal
to the depreciation rate used by the BEA in its estimation of R&D capital in 2006 and match
the growth rate, g, with average annual real growth rate of firm-level SG&A expenditures,
which is 8% in our sample. We scale this OCstock by the firm’s book value of assets and
denote this ratio as OC.
For the human capital component of OC measure, we capitalize the total executive com-
pensation (item TDC16 in Execucomp) of top five executives that a firm reports on annual
proxy (DEF14A SEC form).7 We construct the HC OC measure following the same proce-
dure used in Equations (2.1) and (2.2). As it is a proxy for the human capital of a firm, we
6This item includes both cash compensation and the value of stocks and options granted. However, SG&A
expenses did not include the value of options granted until 2005 when FAS 123r statement came into effect.
Therefore, in our construction, we exclude the value of options granted from total executive compensation
until 2005.
7To avoid heterogeneity of firms’ reporting in ExecuComp, we limit our sample to firms with five executives
listed in ExecuComp. Our results are robust to including total compensation to three or more executives
listed in ExecuComp.
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use 1% depreciation rate8 and a 20% real growth rate of executive compensation.9 Similar to
OCstock, we scale this measure by firm’s book value of assets. To construct Residual OC, we
subtract the dollar amount of total executive compensation from SG&A expenses and follow
the procedure in equations (2.1) and (2.2) using a 15% depreciation rate and an annual real
growth rate of 9%.10 11
Besides organization capital and its components, there are other variables that affect firm
value such as governance and firm performance measures. We measure firm governance us-
ing institutional ownership (Bethel et al., 1998) and insider ownership (Morck et al., 1988).
We also include square of insider ownership to capture nonlinearities in the relationship
between governance and firm value. The institutional ownership data are obtained from
Thomson Reuters Form 13F filings. We collect data on insider ownership from the Exe-
cucomp database. Firm performance measures are constructed using Compustat variables.
We follow Yermack (1996) and include profitability measured by return on assets (ROA),
which is defined as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets.12 We
also include tangibility, defined as net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets;
leverage, defined as the ratio of long term debt to total assets; capital expenditures scaled
by total assets; and firm age, defined as the number of years since IPO. We also control
for industry-median adjusted firm size.13 To control for industry variations, we include 48
8Previous studies find human capital depreciation rate between 0.1% and 0.8%. (Browning et al., 1999;
Ludwig et al., 2012). Arrazola and Hevia (2004) find the depreciation rate to be 1% and 1.5% in Spain. Our
results are robust to a depreciation rate in 0-1% interval as well as 15% as in the construction of OC. The
robustness tests with δ = 0 can be found in the Appendix.
9Average annual real growth rate of firm-level executive compensation is 20% in our sample.
10Firm level Residual OC has a real growth rate of 9% per year in the sample. We use 15% depreciation
rate as in the construction of OC.
11Alternatively, we define Residual OC2 from the regression of OC on HC OC variable to estimate a
residual component of OC that is orthogonal to HC OC. Our results are robust to either definition and are
available in the Appendix.
12Our results are robust to excluding ROA from the control variables due to potential endogeneity concerns.
13We use this measure instead of natural logarithm of book value of assets in order to alleviate collinearity
between OC components and firm size. In the untabulated results using size as a control, although the
statistical significance in fixed effects results are reduced, our two-stage results remain unchanged.
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industry classifications from Fama and French (1997).
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the variables described above. As the table
shows, the mean Tobin’s Q in our sample is 1.78. The SG&A item has a mean of $1,153.38
million, and total executive compensation is $9.02 million on average. Therefore, the execu-
tive compensation component constitutes approximately 1% of SG&A expenses on average.
Accordingly, the total OC measure has an average of 0.75. This is decomposed into HC OC
with a mean of 0.05, and Residual OC, which has a mean of 0.71.14 Average firm size is
approximately $2 billion of total assets with 14.9% annual return on assets and long-term
debt constituting 20.7% of the total assets. On average, institutional ownership is 68.7% of
the firm’s outstanding shares, whereas managerial ownership is 2.6% of a firm’s shares on
average.
2.3.4 Empirical Analysis
2.3.4.1 Components of OC and firm value analysis
In order to validate the results of earlier studies, we first perform OLS analysis using the
aggregate measure of organization capital, OC. We use the Tobin’s Q proxy for firm value
as the dependent variable. Table 2.2 presents our results. Using the OC coefficient shown in
column (1) of Table 2.2, a one standard deviation increase in OC (equal to 0.65 from Table
2.1) increases firm value by 11.05% (0.65*0.17), statistically significant at the 1% significance
level. Controlling for firm fixed effects in columns (2) and (3) to reduce omitted variable bias,
a one standard deviation increase in OC (equal to 0.27 using within standard deviation)15
increases firm value by 8.04% (0.27*0.302) in column (2) and 5.80% (0.27*0.215) in column
14The sum of these two components is not equal to average OC measure (0.75) as the real annual growth
rate and depreciation rate of OC, HC OC and Residual OC are not equal.
15In the fixed effects regression the variables are transformed to estimate within variation (Baltagi, 2008).
Therefore, in order to analyze the magnitude of the effect of OC or components of OC on firm value, we use
the standard deviation of within transformation of xit. That is, the estimation uses x̃it = xit − x̄i and the
within standard deviation is equal to 0.27 for OC and 0.01 for HC OC.
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(3), both significant at the 1% level.
In the aggregate, our results suggest that an increase in organization capital is correlated
with increased firm value. However, to determine the source of that value creation, we
decompose OC into two components (HC OC and Residual OC) as outlined in Section 2.3.2.
To test our first hypothesis, we estimate fixed effects regressions of firm value on our two
components of OC and present the results in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 2.2. Our results
show a significant and positive impact on firm value related to executive compensation for
key talent (HC OC), whereas the residual component (Residual OC) remains insignificant in
all three estimations. Using the standard deviation of HC OC from Table 2.1 (equal to 0.05),
column (4) of Table 2.2 shows that a one standard deviation increase in HC OC increases
firm value by 20.26% (0.05*4.052), statistically significant at the 1%. In column (5), using
the within standard deviation of HC OC (equal to 0.01), a one standard deviation increase
in HC OC increases firm value by 7.40% (0.01*7.406), statistically significant at the 1% level.
After controlling for the lagged Tobin’s Q in column (6), a one standard deviation increase in
HC OC increases firm value by 3.01% (0.01*3.015), statistically significant at the 1% level.
These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 that there is a statistically and economically
significant increase in firm value from the key talent component of organization capital. In
contrast, the residual component of organization capital has an insignificant effect on firm
value in all specifications. Our fixed effects model does not suffer from the lack of time
variation in the total executive compensation since it has increased significantly during the
sample period (1992-2015) although the standard deviation is 0.01. According to Bebchuk
and Grinstein (2005), equity-based compensation tripled during the period 1993-2003 and
cash compensation increased by 40% during the same period. Similarly, Shue and Townsend
(2017) report that option compensation grew by more than six fold between 1992-2011,
whereas non-option compensation remained relatively flat during the same period. However,
the model does not fully address endogeneity problems.
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2.3.4.2 Resolving the endogeneity problem
The results presented in Table 2.2 suffer from potential sample selection bias as a result of the
endogenous choice to hire key talent and pay the required level of executive compensation.
For example, if successful firms have the financial resources to hire expensive executives, we
may find a spurious connection that reflects reverse causality between key talent compen-
sation and firm value. We address the endogeneity problem in the Tobin’s Q regressions
utilizing a two-stage estimation approach. We identify three sets of instrumental variables
for our decomposition of OC. Our first instrumental variable is the industry specific labor
mobilization measure (Labor mobility) of Donangelo (2014). The more industry-specific the
skill set required in a particular industry, the lower the degree of labor mobility. This creates
systematic risk as firms with inflexible labor supply face frictions in adjusting to industry
shocks. We utilize the time-varying, industry level classification of Donangelo (2014) in
which workers in occupations concentrated in a few industries are associated with industry
specialists with low labor mobility, while workers in occupations dispersed across the econ-
omy are associated with generalists with high labor mobility. We argue that firms in high
labor mobility industries face more frequent turnover, which is reflected in their hiring and
training costs incorporated in Residual OC. Moreover, attracting and retaining key talent
requires the offering of more perquisites and emoluments, thereby increasing Residual OC
for high mobility industries. On the other hand, more frequent turnover and lower average
tenure would reduce HC OC in high mobility industries.
Our second instrumental variable utilizes the measure of Job polarization developed in
Jaimovich and Siu (2012) that identifies the increasing concentration of jobs in high wage
and low wage extremes coupled with a declining secular trend in middle level employment.
We hypothesize that the growing reliance on routine, low level employees in the work force
reduces firm’s salary expenditures for non-routine middle level workers, as well as reduces the
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firm’s incentive to expend ongoing resources for labor support and training activities, thereby
reducing Residual OC. An increase in the job polarization instrumental variable also implies
greater reliance on non-routine labor, which includes but is not limited to key talent. We
hypothesize a positive relationship with HC OC as a result of the greater expenditures for
high wage employees in general administrative expenses. We construct the Job Polarization
ratio of non-routine cognitive occupations to routine cognitive occupations in each year
using the occupational classification system obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Bank FRED monthly database.16 We use the end of December values to proxy annual
employment numbers.17 18
We utilize Relative Salary OC as our third instrumental variable. The salary component
of total executive compensation (TDC1 on Execucomp) constitutes about 25% of total ex-
ecutive compensation on average and its annual real growth rate is 2.6% during our sample
period. Therefore, it is a fairly stable component of HC OC. In addition, as Berger et al.
(1997) argue CEO’s salary and bonus compensation has extremely low sensitivity to changes
in firm value. We calculate the total salary component of the top five executives on Exe-
cucomp and follow the same procedure outlined in Equations (2.1) and (2.2) to construct
Salary OC. Then, we define Relative Salary OC as the difference between Salary OC of firm
i and the industry median Salary OC, excluding firm i in each year.19 This variable directly
16Non-routine cognitive workers are defined as those employed in “management, business, and financial
operations occupations” and “professional and related occupations” and routine cognitive workers are those
in “sales and related occupations” and “office and administrative support occupations.” Routine manual
occupations are “production occupations,” “transportation and material moving occupations,” “construction
and extraction occupations,” and “installation, maintenance, and repair occupations.” Non-routine manual
occupations are “service occupations.” We only use non-routine cognitive occupations and routine cognitive
occupations to construct the job polarization variable since only these two categories’ wages are included in
the SG&A expenses.
17Our results are robust to measuring the ratio using total of all months’ employment as well as the mean
value of all months’ employment during each year.
18Job Polarization variable is reported yearly at the aggregate level. Therefore we cannot use time fixed
effects in our regressions. However in the untabulated robustness tests the results are unchanged when we
use time fixed effects instead of Job Polarization variable.
19As a robustness test, we define Relative Salary OC2 as the difference between Salary OC of firm i and
the industry mean Salary OC, excluding firm i in each year. We also use Next Salary OC as an instrument,
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impacts the HC OC component of organization capital by construction. It also impacts
Residual OC as increases in cash salary may be met with increases in perquisites and empire
building especially when other components of executive compensation do not grow propor-
tionately, thereby contributing to increases in Residual OC. Increases in the components
of the executive pay package will impact the components of organization capital without
directly impacting the firm’s Tobin’s Q. The Sargan-Hansen test statistic fails to reject the
null that overidentifying restrictions are valid. Furthermore, the Sanderson and Windmeijer
(2016) multivariate F tests of excluded instruments rejects the null that instruments are
weak at 1% significance level for IVs of both components of OC. These show that both the
exclusion restriction and relevance conditions are met for our IV estimations. We present
the first stage of our two-stage estimation in Table 2.3. Consistent with our expectations, we
find that Labor Mobility increases Residual OC but reduces HC OC. The effect is significant
at 5% significance level for both Residual OC and HC OC. Job polarization ratio reduces
Residual OC but does not have an impact on HC OC. Finally, the coefficient estimate on the
Relative Salary OC variable is significantly positive (at the 1% level) in Table 2.3, indicating
that higher cash salaries paid to top executives relative to the industry contribute directly
to higher HC OC and to higher Residual OC.
Our second stage results, presented in Table 2.4, provides evidence that after controlling
for endogeneity, we find strong evidence supporting our hypothesis that the value-enhancing
component of organization capital is HC OC. A one standard deviation increase in HC OC
(equal to 0.05) increases Tobin’s Q by 22.14% (0.05*4.428) at 1% level of statistically sig-
nificance. On the other hand, we find that the coefficient on Residual OC is statistically in-
significant. Thus, the two-stage analysis suggests that HC OC enhances firm value, whereas
Residual OC does not contribute to firm value.
which is the nearest competitor’s Salary OC, where nearest competitor is defined by revenue sorting in each
year and industry. Our results in Table 2.3 and 2.4 are robust to either alternative specification.
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2.3.4.3 Impact of governance
To test our third hypothesis, we analyze the subsamples of firms according to governance
using institutional ownership as proxy for governance following Shleifer and Vishny (1986b).
Weak (strong) governance subsample includes firms with below (above) the median insti-
tutional ownership. We estimate both OLS and 2SLS regressions using our instruments
defined in Section 2.3.4.2. The results in Table 2.5 show that in both estimations, firms
with strong governance experience increase in their Tobin’s Q as a result of an increase in
HC OC. In column 4 one standard deviation increase in HC OC (equal to 0.05) increases
Tobin’s Q by 40.2% (0.05*8.040) at 1% level of statistically significance. The positive and
significant impact of HC OC in OLS results disappears in the weak governance subsample
when we control for endogeneity in 2SLS regressions (column 3). Furthermore, we find that
Residual OC does not have a significant impact on firm value in either subsample. These
findings are consistent with our third hypothesis that the value-increasing impact of HC OC
is highest for firms with strong governance.
2.4 The Risk of Organization Capital Components
To test our second hypothesis, we analyze the risk of each of the two components of organi-
zation capital to distinguish between priced systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. In order
to test this, we estimate CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993)
and Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) for five portfolios of firms sorted on HC OC
and Residual OC separately within each year and industry.
2.4.1 Sample Construction
Data on risk factors are from Kenneth French’s website. We obtain monthly stock returns
data from CRSP and match each year’s HC OC and Residual OC, calculated using the
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Compustat data described in Section 2.2 for the period from 1992 to 2015. Our sample
includes all non-financial and non-utilities firms in Compustat with fiscal year ending in
December with common shares that are traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ and that
have non-missing SIC codes and nonzero values of HC OC and Residual OC.
Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) we first group firms into 17 industries based
on the Fama and French (1997) classification. Then, within each industry and each year,
we sort firms into five subportfolios based on HC OC (Residual OC). We then pool the
subportfolios across industries and years to form five portfolios of firms sorted on HC OC
(Residual OC), where the breakpoints are industry and year specific. Finally, we form five
value-weighted portfolios based on each firm’s within-industry HC OC (Residual OC) rank
in each year, and rebalance these portfolios in June every year.20 Therefore, portfolio 1
(5) contains firms in the lowest (highest) HC OC or Residual OC quintile in each year and
industry.
2.4.2 Asset Prices of Portfolios Sorted on Components of OC
We present our asset pricing results for portfolios sorted on HC OC in Table 2.6 and on
Residual OC in Table 2.7. As in Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), in addition to estimating
CAPM, Fama and French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models21, we also use high-
minus-low portfolio of both HC OC and Residual OC as additional risk factors in panel B of
Table 2.6 and 2.7, respectively. These results show that the beta of high-minus-low HC OC
and Residual OC portfolios increases from low to high quintile portfolios suggesting that both
components of OC are sources of risk that increase monotonically from low to high portfolios.
However, when controlling for other factors in Panel C (3-factor) and Panel D (4-factor), the
20Our results using equal-weighted portfolio returns are stronger and statistically significant at 1% level.
We provide those results in the Appendix.
21As robustness tests we also estimate Fama and French five-factor model (Fama and French, 2015) and
Q-factor model of Hou et al. (2015). The results are robust and available in the Appendix.
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alpha of high-minus-low HC OC portfolio (5-1) becomes negative and insignificant whereas,
alpha of high-minus-low Residual OC portfolio (5-1) becomes positive and significant. In
the four-factor model presented in panel D of Table 2.7 the statistical significance of alpha
in high-minus-low (5-1) is at 10%. Our results suggest that the risk premium of high-minus-
low Residual OC portfolio (5-1) corresponds to 6.46% higher annual returns in three-factor
model (i.e., 12 times the monthly alpha coefficient of 0.539 in Panel C of Table 2.7) and
4.05% higher annual return in four-factor model (i.e., 12 times the monthly alpha coefficient
of 0.338 in Panel D of Table 2.7). These results support our second hypothesis that HC OC
fluctuations engender firm-specific idiosyncratic risk since there is no risk premium required
for diversifiable risk. However, Residual OC encompasses systematic risk that exposes firms
with high Residual OC portfolios to the risks associated with agency costs from empire
building and perquisite consumption.
2.4.3 Asset Prices of Portfolios Sorted on Institutional Ownership
and Components of OC
We argue that weak governance exacerbates the riskiness of the firm embedded in Resid-
ual OC by increasing the potential agency component. In order to test this, we form quintile
portfolios sorted on institutional ownership and OC components. First we form quintile
portfolios of institutional ownership within each year and industry. Then, for each portfolio
in each quintile we form quintile portfolios sorted on HC OC. The results for value-weighted
portfolios are provided in Table 2.8. We find that while low institutional ownership (IO=1)
high-minus-low HC OC portfolios do not have significant alphas in all three models, high in-
stitutional ownership (IO=5) high-minus-low HC OC portfolios have negative and significant
alphas in CAPM and four-factor models, suggesting that HC OC reduces firms’ riskiness for
firms with strong governance.
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Table 2.9 presents results for value-weighted portfolios sorted on institutional ownership
and high-minus-low Residual OC. According to these results, low institutional ownership
(IO=1) high-minus-low Residual OC portfolios have significant and positive alphas in all
three models corresponding to 10.4% in CAPM (i.e., 12 times the monthly alpha coefficient
of 0.867 in Panel A of Table 2.9), 9.25% in three-factor model (i.e., 12 times the monthly
alpha coefficient of 0.771 in Panel B of Table 2.9) and 8.73% in four-factor model (i.e.,
12 times the monthly alpha coefficient of 0.728 in Panel C of Table 2.9). These results
disappear as institutional ownership increases in quintiles 2 to 5 providing evidence to our
third hypothesis that the systematic risk generated by Residual OC is highest for firms with
weak governance whereas, Residual OC of firms with strong governance do not generate
systematic risk.22
2.5 Conclusion
We introduce a new decomposition of the aggregate organization capital measure used in
the literature to explain intangible firm value. We distinguish the contribution of key talent,
as measured by executive compensation, from the remainder of organization capital, which
includes perquisite consumption and empire building costs. We find that key talent is an
important value creation vehicle for firms. However, investment in the remaining component
of organization capital does not contribute to firm value.
We also examine the risk characteristics of each of our newly introduced components
of organization capital. We find that the human capital component of organization capital
exposes shareholders to company-specific, idiosyncratic risk. Thus, there is no key talent
22We present our results with equal-weighted portfolios in the online appendix. The results for institutional
ownership - high-minus-low Residual OC are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. However institutional
ownership - high-minus-low HC OC portfolio results suggest positive and significant alphas for first quintile
of institutional ownership portfolios. This finding is still consistent with our discussion and the significant
effect disappears as institutional ownership increases in quintiles 2 to 5.
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systematic risk premium. In contrast, however, the residual component of organization cap-
ital engenders systematic risk, offering a risk premium that is significant both economically
and statistically. We attribute this to the inclusion of agency costs in Residual OC. That
is, the Residual OC includes perquisite consumption, agency building and other non-value
increasing activities pursued by key talent. The value created by executives empowers them
to demand these intangible benefits, thereby exposing shareholders to systematic risk.
Furthermore, consistent with managerial power argument, we find that HC OC increases
firm value especially for firms with strong governance while the value-increasing effect of
HC OC disappears for firms with weak governance. In accordance with these results, we find
evidence that the systematic risk engendered by Residual OC is higher for firms with weak
governance, whereas firms with strong governance do not expose shareholders to systematic
risk.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Q1 Median Q3
Tobin’s Q 9,060 1.78 1.36 0.97 1.37 2.05
SG&A expenses ($ millions) 9,060 1153.38 3021.04 112.92 296.83 844.55
Total Executive Compensation ($ millions) 9,060 13.73 15.02 4.94 9.02 16.83
OC 9,060 0.75 0.65 0.28 0.55 1.01
HC OC 9,060 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05
Residual OC 9,054 0.71 0.62 0.26 0.52 0.95
Institutional ownership 9,060 0.69 0.22 0.57 0.72 0.84
Managerial ownership 9,060 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01
Managerial ownership2 9,060 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Size 9,060 7.65 1.57 6.51 7.53 8.69
Tangibility 9,055 0.31 0.23 0.12 0.24 0.43
Leverage 9,060 0.21 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.30
ROA 9,560 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.19
Firm Age 9,060 27.37 22.89 10 20 39
Capex/TA 9,012 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07
Labor mobilization 8,014 0.23 0.87 -0.51 0.28 0.89
Job polarization 9,060 1.42 0.16 1.27 1.39 1.56
Relative Salary OC 9,003 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.03
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Table 2.2: Regressions of Tobin’s Q on OC and Components of OC
The dependent variable in all regressions is Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of equity
plus the book values of debt and preferred equity, all divided by the book value of assets.
Regressions in columns (1) and (4) are OLS estimations with industry and year fixed effects.
Other estimations include firm and year fixed effects. Columns (3) and (6) include lagged
dependent variable as a control. All independent variables are one period lagged. In all
estimations the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The sample period is 1992
to 2015. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
OCt−1 0.170*** 0.298*** 0.215***
(3.43) (4.01) (4.36)
HC OCt−1 4.052*** 7.406*** 3.015***
(5.56) (5.53) (3.85)




Institutional Ownershipt−1 0.030 -0.195** -0.257*** 0.051 -0.126 -0.229***
(0.28) (1.98) (3.29) (0.49) (1.34) (3.02)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 2.489* 3.402** 2.161** 2.257* 3.211** 2.122**
(1.91) (2.13) (2.04) (1.71) (2.11) (2.04)
Managerial Ownership2t−1 -6.232* -6.974 -5.036* -5.725 -6.982* -5.108*
(1.73) (1.62) (1.82) (1.59) (1.73) (1.89)
Sizet−1(Ind.med.adjusted) -0.043** -0.278*** -0.145*** -0.020 -0.280*** -0.148***
(2.20) (2.78) (2.69) (1.09) (2.79) (2.70)
Tangibilityt−1 -0.770*** -0.759*** -0.236 -0.668*** -0.661** -0.216
(3.87) (2.70) (1.49) (3.55) (2.46) (1.36)
Leveraget−1 -1.440*** -1.012*** -0.162* -1.314*** -0.948*** -0.153*
(9.41) (7.15) (1.74) (9.25) (6.79) (1.65)
ROAt−1 4.078*** 2.244*** 0.454** 4.215*** 2.258*** 0.501**
(6.31) (3.80) (2.12) (6.74) (4.01) (2.34)
Firmaget−1 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.014*** -0.008**
(2.90) (0.25) (0.71) (1.32) (2.69) (2.10)
Capex/TAt−1 0.649 0.188 -0.401* 0.540 0.159 -0.409*
(1.15) (0.49) (1.73) (0.99) (0.45) (1.75)
Intercept 1.535*** 1.657*** 0.855*** 1.340*** 1.816*** 0.940***
(8.18) (5.24) (3.69) (7.23) (6.02) (4.17)
Industry F ixed Effects YES NO NO YES NO NO
Y ear F ixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.41 0.19 0.43 0.43 0.21 0.43
N 9,015 9,015 9,015 9,009 9,009 9,009
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Table 2.3: First Stage Results of Two-Stage Least Squares Estimations
The instruments for HC OC and Residual OC are Labor mo-
bilization, Job polarization and Relative Salary OC. All in-
struments and control variables are one period lagged. In all
estimations the standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The sample period is 1992 to 2015. *, ** and *** indicate
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
HC OC Residual OC
Labormobilizationt−1 -0.003** 0.051**
(2.18) (2.56)
Job polarizationt−1 0.006 -0.776***
(1.25) (9.29)
Relative Salary OCt−1 0.501*** 1.769***
(15.87) (5.09)
Institutional ownershipt−1 0.008* -0.279***
(1.66) (4.14)
Managerial ownershipt−1 -0.044 1.068
(0.81) (1.54)














SW F − statistic of excluded instruments 33.35 32.81
(p− value) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R2 0.53 0.28
N 7,436 7,436
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Table 2.4: Second Stage Results of Two-Stage Least Squares Estimations
The dependent variable in all regressions is
Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of
equity plus the book values of debt and
preferred equity, all divided by the book
value of assets. HC OC and Residual OC
variables are the estimates from the first
stage regressions in Table 2.3. The instru-
ments for HC OC and Residual OC are La-
bor mobilization, Job polarization and Rel-
ative Salary OC. All independent variables
are one period lagged. In all estimations the
standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The sample period is 1992 to 2015. *, ** and
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Table 2.5: Tobin’s Q regressions of weak vs. strong governance firms
The dependent variable in all regressions is Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of equity plus the book
values of debt and preferred equity, all divided by the book value of assets. Column 1 and 3 include firms
below the median institutional ownership (weak governance) and columns 2 and 4 include firms above
the median institutional ownership (strong governance). HC OC and Residual OC variables in columns
3 and 4 are the estimates from the first stage regressions in Table 2.3. The instruments for HC OC and
Residual OC in columns 3 and 4 are Labor mobilization, Job polarization and Relative Salary OC. All
independent variables are one period lagged. In all estimations the standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. The sample period is 1992 to 2015. *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
OLS 2SLS
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q Weak Governance Strong Governance Weak Governance Strong Governance
HC OCt−1 1.670** 4.645*** 1.346 8.040***
(2.34) (5.64) (0.98) (3.94)
Residual OCt−1 0.031 0.035 -0.065 0.003
(0.45) (0.54) (0.38) (0.01)
Institutional ownershipt−1 -0.142 -0.280 -0.429* -0.898***
(0.78) (1.17) (1.76) (3.41)
Managerial ownershipt−1 1.189 -0.113 -0.138 -6.003***
(0.91) (0.08) (0.08) (3.01)
Managerial ownership2t−1 -2.019 -1.176 1.768 23.079***
(0.59) (0.25) (0.40) (2.71)
Sizet−1(Ind.med.adjusted) -0.022 -0.036 -0.029 0.043
(1.01) (0.91) (1.27) (0.82)
Tangibilityt−1 -0.461** -0.952*** -0.652*** -0.657***
(2.17) (4.26) (2.84) (3.21)
Leveraget−1 -1.651*** -1.132*** -2.284*** -1.188***
(11.78) (6.62) (12.06) (6.49)
ROAt−1 2.502*** 4.899*** 2.646*** 4.980***
(4.13) (7.13) (4.03) (6.50)
Firmaget−1 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.005***
(1.15) (3.03) (0.22) (3.10)
Capex/TAt−1 0.883 0.699 0.875 0.492
(1.14) (1.49) (1.22) (1.07)
Intercept 1.890*** 1.511*** - -
(6.91) (5.46) - -
Sargan overidentification test statistic - - 2.712 1.124
(p− value) - - (0.0996) (0.2891)
R2 0.35 0.45 0.24 0.34
N 5,936 5,996 4,768 4,894
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Table 2.6: Asset Pricing: Five portfolios sorted on HC OC
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five portfolios sorted on
HC OC over book value of assets relative to their industry peers within
each year. In Panel A we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression
of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio. In
Panel B we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression of excess port-
folio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio and high-minus-low
HC OC factor (HMLHC). In Panel C we report portfolio alphas and betas
of a regression of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market
portfolio and Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors. In Panel
D we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression of excess portfo-
lio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio, Fama and French
(1993) SMB and HML factors and Carhart (1997) MOM factor. Data on
SMB, HML, and MOM are from Kenneth French’s website. The sample
period is June 1992 to December 2015. All portfolio returns correspond
to value-weighted returns by firm market capitalization.
Portfolio Low 2 3 4 High High-Low
Panel A. CAPM Model
α 0.205* 0.325** 0.139 0.128 -0.024 -0.229
(1.70) (2.28) (0.92) (0.76) (0.11) (0.86)
βMKT 0.898*** 0.864*** 0.991*** 1.043*** 1.263*** 0.365***
(26.18) (18.96) (19.33) (22.32) (18.90) (4.46)
R2 0.81 0.74 0.78 0.73 0.70 0.12
Panel B. Two-Factor Model
α 0.145 0.287** 0.144 0.158 0.145
(1.48) (2.09) (0.96) (0.95) (1.48)
βMKT 0.994*** 0.924*** 0.983*** 0.993*** 0.994***
(34.99) (21.11) (18.80) (22.47) (34.99)
βHMLHC -0.263*** -0.164*** 0.022 0.135 0.737***
(10.01) (4.32) (0.60) (1.56) (28.02)
R2 0.88 0.77 0.78 0.74 0.95
Panel C. Fama-French Three-Factor Model
α 0.228** 0.298** 0.097 0.101 0.037 -0.191
(2.19) (2.22) (0.65) (0.64) (0.19) (0.88)
βMKT 0.949*** 0.910*** 0.988*** 0.988*** 1.135*** 0.186***
(32.97) (22.41) (19.63) (23.08) (21.41) (3.10)
βSMB -0.300*** -0.138** 0.131*** 0.323*** 0.409*** 0.709***
(6.07) (2.43) (3.05) (4.65) (3.58) (7.28)
βHML -0.019 0.130* 0.129** 0.029 -0.314*** -0.295**
(0.33) (1.78) (2.17) (0.37) (3.09) (2.43)
R2 0.85 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.45
Panel D. Fama-French-Carhart Four-Factor Model
α 0.317*** 0.325** 0.141 0.264* 0.074 -0.243
(3.06) (2.43) (0.90) (1.75) (0.42) (1.19)
βMKT 0.905*** 0.897*** 0.966*** 0.907*** 1.117*** 0.212***
(31.54) (21.30) (19.22) (23.78) (19.02) (3.01)
βSMB -0.284*** -0.133** 0.139*** 0.352*** 0.416*** 0.700***
(6.72) (2.40) (3.44) (6.67) (3.87) (7.18)
βHML -0.057 0.118 0.110* -0.042 -0.330*** -0.273**
(1.10) (1.63) (1.88) (0.66) (3.74) (2.58)
βMOM -0.112*** -0.035 -0.055 -0.205*** -0.047 0.065
(3.00) (0.84) (1.55) (4.66) (0.79) (0.90)
R2 0.87 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.46
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Table 2.7: Asset Pricing: Five portfolios sorted on Residual OC
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five portfolios sorted on
Residual OC over book value of assets relative to their industry peers
within each year. In Panel A we report portfolio alphas and betas of
a regression of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market
portfolio. In Panel B we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression
of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio and
high-minus-low Residual OC factor (HMLRes). In Panel C we report
portfolio alphas and betas of a regression of excess portfolio returns on
excess returns of the market portfolio and Fama and French (1993) SMB
and HML factors. In Panel D we report portfolio alphas and betas of
a regression of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market
portfolio, Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors and Carhart
(1997) MOM factor. Data on SMB, HML, and MOM are from Kenneth
French’s website. The sample period is June 1992 to December 2015. All
portfolio returns correspond to value-weighted returns by firm market
capitalization.
Portfolio Low 2 3 4 High High-Low
Panel A. CAPM Model
α -0.184 0.251** 0.252** 0.251* 0.398*** 0.583***
(1.27) (1.98) (2.13) (1.92) (2.63) (2.91)
βMKT 1.067*** 0.920*** 0.858*** 0.802*** 0.659*** -0.408***
(28.48) (29.05) (27.15) (21.52) (15.95) (7.89)
R2 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.74 0.59 0.24
Panel B. Two-Factor Model
α 0.096 0.348*** 0.236* 0.199 0.096
(0.84) (2.64) (1.91) (1.54) (0.84)
βMKT 0.870*** 0.852*** 0.869*** 0.838*** 0.870***
(25.24) (23.59) (24.10) (23.15) (25.24)
βHMLRes -0.482*** -0.166*** 0.028 0.089** 0.518***
(11.06) (2.86) (0.70) (2.15) (11.90)
R2 0.89 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.78
Panel C. Fama-French Three-Factor Model
α -0.177 0.284** 0.218* 0.249** 0.362** 0.539***
(1.28) (2.34) (1.94) (2.09) (2.48) (2.83)
βMKT 1.100*** 0.947*** 0.892*** 0.855*** 0.703*** -0.397***
(29.77) (32.99) (32.84) (25.97) (18.07) (7.75)
βSMB -0.168*** -0.218*** -0.059 -0.240*** -0.099* 0.069
(2.90) (4.36) (1.39) (4.89) (1.92) (0.98)
βHML 0.011 -0.076* 0.143*** 0.057 0.158** 0.147
(0.16) (1.82) (3.06) (0.93) (2.18) (1.51)
R2 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.62 0.25
Panel D. Fama-French-Carhart Four-Factor Model
α -0.066 0.380*** 0.271** 0.289** 0.271* 0.338*
(0.49) (2.87) (2.39) (2.41) (1.87) (1.86)
βMKT 1.044*** 0.900*** 0.866*** 0.836*** 0.748*** -0.296***
(29.33) (26.11) (28.75) (23.69) (18.59) (6.35)
βSMB -0.148*** -0.201*** -0.049 -0.233*** -0.115** 0.033
(2.99) (4.52) (1.23) (4.94) (2.21) (0.54)
βHML -0.037 -0.117** 0.120*** 0.039 0.197*** 0.234***
(0.67) (2.54) (2.70) (0.66) (2.75) (2.69)
βMOM -0.139*** -0.120** -0.067** -0.050 0.114*** 0.254***
(4.27) (2.35) (2.30) (1.46) (3.37) (6.28)
R2 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.64 0.36
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Table 2.8: Asset Pricing: Five portfolios sorted on institutional ownership (IO) and HC OC
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five portfo-
lios sorted on institutional ownership (IO) and HC OC over
book value of assets relative to their industry peers within
each year. In Panel A we report high-minus-low HC OC
portfolios (sorted on IO) alphas and betas of the regressions
of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the mar-
ket portfolio. In Panel B we report high-minus-low HC OC
portfolios (sorted on IO) alphas and betas of a regression
of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market
portfolio and Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML fac-
tors. In Panel C we report high-minus-low HC OC portfo-
lios (sorted on IO) alphas and betas of a regression of excess
portfolio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio,
Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors and Carhart
(1997) MOM factor. Data on SMB, HML, and MOM are
from Kenneth French’s website. The sample period is June
1992 to December 2015. All portfolio returns correspond to
value-weighted returns by firm market capitalization.
Portfolio IO=low IO=2 IO=3 IO=4 IO=high
Panel A. CAPM Model
α 0.382 -0.274 -0.403 -0.033 -0.756*
(0.66) (0.62) (1.12) (0.08) (1.70)
βMKT 0.578*** -0.031 0.035 0.033 0.087
(3.21) (0.25) (0.40) (0.28) (0.76)
R2 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B. Fama-French Three-Factor Model
α 0.586 -0.329 -0.444 -0.003 -0.621
(1.05) (0.77) (1.33) (0.01) (1.46)
βMKT 0.287** -0.126 -0.060 -0.123 -0.101
(2.14) (1.07) (0.70) (1.10) (0.93)
βSMB 0.745*** 0.588*** 0.540*** 0.604*** 0.474***
(3.23) (3.76) (4.41) (3.48) (2.92)
βHML -0.925*** 0.079 0.032 -0.288 -0.608***
(3.07) (0.35) (0.21) (1.64) (3.76)
R2 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.14
Panel C. Fama-French-Carhart Four-Factor Model
α 0.440 -0.605 -0.445 -0.213 -0.896**
(0.84) (1.40) (1.28) (0.51) (2.09)
βMKT 0.360** 0.012 -0.059 -0.027 0.036
(2.12) (0.10) (0.67) (0.25) (0.31)
βSMB 0.719*** 0.539*** 0.540*** 0.606*** 0.425***
(3.09) (3.77) (4.36) (3.75) (3.01)
βHML -0.862*** 0.198 0.032 -0.222 -0.489***
(3.20) (0.90) (0.21) (1.34) (3.24)
βMOM 0.184 0.347*** 0.002 0.252** 0.346***
(1.01) (3.12) (0.02) (2.20) (3.91)
R2 0.24 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.19
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Table 2.9: Asset Pricing: Five portfolios sorted on institutional ownership (IO) and
Residual OC
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five portfolios
sorted on institutional ownership (IO) and Residual OC over
book value of assets relative to their industry peers within
each year. In Panel A we report high-minus-low Residual OC
portfolios (sorted on IO) alphas and betas of the regressions
of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market
portfolio. In Panel B we report high-minus-low Residual OC
portfolios (sorted on IO) alphas and betas of a regression
of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market
portfolio and Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors.
In Panel C we report high-minus-low Residual OC portfolios
(sorted on IO) alphas and betas of a regression of excess
portfolio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio,
Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors and Carhart
(1997) MOM factor. Data on SMB, HML, and MOM are
from Kenneth French’s website. The sample period is June
1992 to December 2015. All portfolio returns correspond to
value-weighted returns by firm market capitalization.
Portfolio IO=low IO=2 IO=3 IO=4 IO=high
Panel A. CAPM Model
α 0.867** 0.350 0.405 0.259 -0.026
(2.33) (0.77) (1.32) (0.73) (0.06)
βMKT -0.260*** -0.561*** -0.338*** -0.052 -0.185**
(2.97) (4.55) (3.80) (0.55) (2.03)
R2 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.01
Panel B. Fama-French Three-Factor Model
α 0.771** 0.151 0.364 0.275 0.013
(2.19) (0.37) (1.25) (0.77) (0.03)
βMKT -0.337*** -0.456*** -0.382*** -0.081 -0.300***
(4.12) (4.59) (4.43) (0.83) (3.34)
βSMB 0.624*** 0.084 0.319** 0.081 0.403***
(5.50) (0.60) (2.36) (0.62) (2.64)
βHML 0.225* 0.723*** 0.086 -0.080 -0.241
(1.72) (3.41) (0.51) (0.53) (1.52)
R2 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.01 0.08
Panel C. Fama-French-Carhart Four-Factor Model
α 0.728** -0.039 0.227 -0.023 -0.133
(2.01) (0.09) (0.81) (0.06) (0.32)
βMKT -0.316*** -0.361*** -0.316*** 0.065 -0.229**
(3.49) (3.41) (3.78) (0.66) (2.37)
βSMB 0.616*** 0.050 0.296** 0.030 0.378***
(5.58) (0.36) (2.39) (0.26) (2.67)
βHML 0.243* 0.805*** 0.144 0.045 -0.179
(1.75) (3.70) (0.88) (0.33) (1.23)
βMOM 0.054 0.240** 0.166** 0.361*** 0.176*
(0.66) (2.11) (2.13) (3.14) (1.86)
R2 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.10
Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
Summary:
I include the supplementary material for Chapter 1 in this Appendix. Section A.1.1 dis-
cusses the DEA method and presents all results using DEA efficiency score as the dependent
variable. Section A.1.2 presents the results with TFP estimate of Imrohoroglu and Tuzel
(2014) as dependent variable. Section A.1.3 present robustness tests for the evaluation of
borrower default risk using Mahalanobis propensity score matching technique. Section A.1.4
presents the robustness test results using Altman’s Z-score and Whited-Wu financial con-
straint index as alternative proxies of default risk. Section A.1.5 shows the results using
alternative relationship bank measures. Section A.1.6 presents placebo tests using pseudo
relationship bank dummy variable. Section A.1.7 shows the results of possible survivorship
bias analysis. Section A.1.8 presents the results excluding top 5 lead lenders in the sample
to evaluate possible lender bias.
A.1 DEA method:
Farrell (1957) introduced a single-input/output efficiency measure for the measurement of
productive efficiency, which is based on a production possibility set consisting of the convex
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hull of input-output vectors. This measure is generalized into a multiple-input/output case
by Charnes et al. (1978) and the authors named the method Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA).
A DEA model can be divided into an input-oriented model, which minimizes inputs while
satisfying at least the given output levels, and an output-oriented model, which maximizes
outputs without requiring more of any observed input values. DEA models can also be
divided in terms of returns to scale by adding weight constraints. Charnes et al. (1978)
originally proposed the efficiency measurement of the DMUs for constant returns to scale
(CRS), where all DMUs are operating at their optimal scale. Later Banker et al. (1984)
introduced the variable returns to scale (VRS) efficiency measurement model, allowing the
breakdown of efficiency into technical and scale efficiencies in DEA (Ji and Lee, 2010).
The linear programming method of technical efficiency (TE) is stated by Murillo-Zamorano
(2004) as:






µjXij ≤ ψX0i (A.A.2)
n∑
j=1
µjYrj ≥ Y 0r (A.A.3)
n∑
j=1
µj = 1 (A.A.4)
where Xij are the inputs, Yrj are the outputs and ψ is the proportion of consumption of
inputs. This method allows for flexibility in the weights (µj) assigned to each DMU (decision
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making unit) and calculates the relative efficiency score of a DMU compared to the Pareto-
efficient frontier technology as opposed to average efficiency comparisons done by OLS and
stochastic frontier analysis. Therefore it is more flexible than OLS and stochastic frontier
analysis (Demerjian et al., 2012). I use the input minimization with variable returns to scale
option of DEA. The equation (A.1.4) satisfies variable returns to scale condition.
I follow Demerjian et al. (2012)’s measure of firm efficiency and solve the following op-
timization problem for all firms in each year and industry, using Fama-French 12 industry
classification (Fama and French, 1997):
min
µ
ψ = (Sales) ∗ (µ1CoGS + µ2SG&A+ µ3PPE




in which ψ ∈ [0, 1] is the efficiency measure. As in SFA model, the output is the revenue of
a firm (REVT) in a given year and the inputs are cost of goods sold (COGS) that are the costs
of production; selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A), which are operational
costs also known as the costs unrelated to the production process; net property, plant and
equipment (PPENT) that accounts for fixed assets; net operating leases (OpsLease) that are
included to capture the expenses of the firms that lease the fixed assets rather than purchase;
research and development expenses (R&D); purchased goodwill (Goodwill), which is the
excess of the purchase price for a business acquisition; and other intangibles (OtherIntan)
that include items such as client lists, patent costs, and copyrights. The five stock variables
(PPENT, OpsLease, R&D, Goodwill and OtherIntan) are measured at the beginning of year
t and the two flow measures (COGS and SG&A) are measured over the year t. I follow
Ge (2006) to calculate Net Operating Leases as the discounted present value of the next
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five years of required operating lease payments (MRC1-MRC5 on Compustat). I follow Lev
and Sougiannis (1996), who use a five-year capitalization period of R&D expense. Other
Intangible Assets item (OtherIntan) is calculated by subtracting Goodwill (GDWL) from
the Other Acquired and Capitalized Intangibles (INTAN).
Table A.1 below presents the results of the second stage fractional response regression
estimation of equation (1.5) using DEA efficiency as the dependent variable. Column 1
presents all sample results, which exhibit support for Hypothesis 1. That is, borrowing
firm technical efficiency increases as a result of a new loan from the relationship bank.
Particularly, 1% increase in the likelihood of existence of relationship bank increases DEA
efficiency by 0.7 percentage points at 5% significance level . These results are identical to
the SFA results provided in Table 5.
Similar to SFA estimations, I test Hypothesis 2 for the subsamples of low vs. elevated
default risk firms defined by the first and fourth quartile of Jarrow Merton default probabil-
ities. Columns 2 and 3 in Table A.1 present the second stage DEA results of the estimation
of equation (1.5) for subsamples of low vs. elevated default risk firms, respectively. The
results provide proof for Hypothesis 2 that relationship banks concentrate on producing
private information to improve the efficiency of those firms with elevated risk of default.
Specifically, 1% increase in the likelihood of existence of relationship banking increases the
efficiency of high PD subsample firms by 1.9 percentage points, whereas the efficiency of low
PD subsample firms remain unchanged.
To test Hypothesis 3, I define the subsamples according to below and above median
baseline DEA efficiency scores. The results in columns 4 and 5 of Table A.1 indicate that low
baseline efficiency firms experience 1.8 percentage points increase in their efficiency as a result
of 1% increase in the likelihood of existence of relationship bank, while a similar increase
in the likelihood of relationship bank decreases the efficiency of high baseline efficiency
firms by 0.6 percentage points at 10% significance level. Therefore these results present
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further evidence for Hypothesis 3 that relationship banks concentrate on producing private
information to improve the efficiency of those firms with low baseline efficiency.
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Table A.1: Second Stage Results using DEA Efficiency
The table shows the semi-elasticities (dy/ex) of the second stage results of two-stage model using
fractional response regression and DEA efficiency as dependent variable for the whole sample as
well as subsample of firms defined according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default
probabilities (PD) (columns (2) and (3)) and below and above median baseline DEA efficiency
scores (columns (4) and (5)). The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control variables
are the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.
The standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis
and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.









Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.007** 0.002 0.019*** 0.018*** -0.006*
(2.06) (0.34) (3.48) (5.29) (1.89)
ROA 0.010*** 0.002 0.002 0.010*** -0.006**
(4.82) (0.31) (0.86) (4.73) (2.04)
Efficiency 0.418*** 0.443*** 0.363*** 0.209*** 0.305***
(44.04) (31.04) (20.67) (22.64) (27.46)
Size -0.260*** -0.317*** -0.373*** 0.079*** -0.309***
(10.47) (5.88) (8.40) (2.78) (12.61)
Size2 0.180*** 0.217*** 0.205*** -0.014 0.184***
(13.67) (7.66) (9.38) (1.01) (13.99)
Cash/TA 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.006** 0.001 0.004***
(4.49) (4.35) (2.49) (0.66) (3.36)
M/B 0.008*** 0.015*** -0.011** -0.004 0.012***
(2.96) (3.18) (2.50) (1.30) (4.68)
JM prob. of default 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002 -0.000 0.000
(2.71) (3.35) (1.07) (0.42) (0.45)
Tangibility 0.007** -0.002 0.007 0.002 0.001
(2.55) (0.42) (1.43) (0.50) (0.36)
Interest coverage 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.48) (0.46) (0.81) (0.60) (0.43)
Capex/TA -0.003 0.012*** -0.008* -0.007*** 0.006***
(1.16) (2.96) (1.90) (2.65) (2.76)
Leverage -0.004* 0.000 0.012*** -0.001 -0.000
(1.81) (0.14) (2.63) (0.39) (0.12)
Firm age -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.004***
(0.97) (0.02) (0.63) (0.37) (2.75)
Rating dummy -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001
(1.11) (0.98) (0.29) (0.32) (1.22)
Lambda 0.025 0.004 0.141*** 0.112*** -0.031**
(1.39) (0.18) (3.33) (4.84) (2.22)
N 23,711 6,864 5,081 11,510 12,201
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Table A.2 below reports the second stage DEA results of the estimation of equation (1.5).
1% increase in the likelihood of existence of bank relationship increases the efficiency of low
efficiency firms that have an elevated probability of default (column 3) by 1.3 percentage
points at 5% statistical significance level. A similar increase does not have a statistically
significant effect on the efficiency of high baseline efficiency firms that have an elevated
probability of default (column 4). Similarly, while firms with high baseline efficiency and
low default risk (column 2) do not experience significant change in their efficiencies as a
result of relationship bank borrowing, firms with low baseline efficiency with low default risk
(column 1) experience 2 percentage points increase in their efficiency when the likelihood of
relationship banking increases by 1%. These results show that among the firms with elevated
risk of default increases in efficiency in the presence of relationship bank loans are highest
for firms that have low baseline levels of operational efficiency. In addition, these results
show additional evidence for Hypothesis 3 that relationship banks concentrate on producing
private information to improve the efficiency of those firms with low baseline efficiency.
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Table A.2: Second stage of low vs. high DEA efficiency and low vs. high PD subsamples
The table shows the semi-elasticities (dy/ex) of the second stage results of two-stage model us-
ing fractional response regression and DEA efficiency as dependent variable for the subsample
of firms defined according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities
(PD) and below and above median baseline DEA efficiency scores. The subsample in column
(1) is low PD - low efficiency, (2) is low PD - high efficiency, (3) is high PD - low efficiency,
and (4) is high PD - high efficiency. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control
variables are the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year
fixed effects. The standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats
are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD
Dependent variable: DEA Efficiency Low Efficiency High Efficiency Low Efficiency High Efficiency
Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.020*** -0.008 0.013** 0.013
(2.87) (1.35) (2.54) (1.58)
ROA 0.001 -0.007 0.005** -0.013***
(0.18) (1.49) (2.19) (3.00)
Efficiency 0.209*** 0.305*** 0.190*** 0.297***
(14.28) (19.87) (12.06) (12.20)
Size 0.186*** -0.390*** -0.042 -0.401***
(2.87) (7.92) (0.87) (10.10)
Size2 -0.059* 0.230*** 0.033 0.211***
(1.80) (9.15) (1.44) (10.43)
Cash/TA 0.006* 0.006*** 0.000 0.003
(1.81) (3.23) (0.14) (1.36)
M/B 0.006 0.010*** -0.010** 0.005
(0.98) (2.59) (2.11) (1.00)
JM prob. of default 0.001 0.001** -0.001 0.000
(1.06) (2.50) (0.39) (0.08)
Tangibility -0.014** 0.004 0.000 -0.007
(2.50) (1.17) (0.04) (1.48)
Interest coverage -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.31) (0.20) (0.68) (0.66)
Capex/TA 0.004 0.007** -0.009** 0.007*
(0.92) (2.47) (2.06) (1.88)
Leverage 0.003 -0.002 0.013*** 0.006
(0.97) (0.66) (2.92) (1.40)
Firm age 0.003 -0.004* 0.004 -0.004
(0.88) (1.80) (1.46) (1.29)
Rating dummy -0.002 0.002 0.004** -0.000
(0.92) (1.01) (2.20) (0.19)
Lambda 0.086** -0.032 0.113** 0.062
(2.54) (1.49) (2.40) (1.51)
N 2,581 4,283 3,203 1,878
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As in SFA estimations, I test the persistence of this impact using 5-year window around
the year a new loan from a relationship lender is granted. Particularly, I estimate equation
(1.5) for two years before and after the new relationship borrowing takes place as well as
for the year of borrowing for subsamples of low DEA efficiency firms substantially above the
default threshold and low DEA efficiency firms that have an elevated probability of default.
Table A.3 shows that both low PD and high PD firms experience statistically significant
increases in technical efficiency (at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively) in the year of a new
relationship bank loan. However, the efficiency improving effect of the relationship bank
loan becomes negative two years after the loan origination for firms with low probability of
default whereas it is positive but statistically insignificant for firms with elevated probability
of default after the year of loan origination.
Table A.4 shows the 5-year window results for high baseline DEA efficiency firms. The
results show that neither the firms with low risk of default, nor those with elevated risk of
default experience changes in their efficiencies as a result of existence of relationship banking.
Therefore, as in SFA results, the findings in Tables A.3 suggest that the benefits of relation-






























Table A.3: Regression results for low DEA subsample of firms
The table shows the semi-elasticities (dy/ex) of the second stage results of two-stage model using fractional response regression
and DEA efficiency as dependent variable for the subsample of firms defined according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-
Merton default probabilities (PD) and below median baseline DEA efficiency scores. In the period t− 2 Rel dummy is lagged for
two-period and in t− 1 analysis Rel dummy is lagged for one-period. In t+ 1 analysis one-period forward dependent variable is
used and in t+2 analysis two-period forward dependent variable is used. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control
variables are the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors
are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Rel dummyt-2 (instrumented) -0.000 0.001
(0.03) (0.39)
Rel dummyt-1 (instrumented) 0.005 0.005
(1.24) (1.22)
Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.020*** -0.001 -0.037** 0.013** 0.010 0.008
(2.87) (0.13) (2.40) (2.54) (1.40) (0.98)
ROA 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.017** -0.027** 0.006*** 0.006** 0.005** 0.004 0.005
(0.34) (0.34) (0.18) (2.04) (2.33) (2.58) (2.57) (2.19) (1.14) (1.40)
Efficiency 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.209*** 0.290*** 0.260*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.190*** 0.229*** 0.253***
(14.36) (14.43) (14.28) (12.82) (9.00) (12.14) (12.14) (12.06) (10.46) (9.72)
Size 0.225*** 0.223*** 0.186*** 0.242*** 0.434*** -0.006 -0.009 -0.042 -0.047 -0.139*
(3.48) (3.46) (2.87) (2.61) (3.46) (0.14) (0.21) (0.87) (0.71) (1.65)
Size2 -0.068** -0.070** -0.059* -0.082* -0.157** 0.024 0.023 0.033 0.033 0.086**
(2.04) (2.15) (1.80) (1.68) (2.37) (1.07) (1.02) (1.44) (1.07) (2.18)
Cash/TA 0.002 0.003 0.006* 0.001 -0.011 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.009**
(0.64) (1.10) (1.81) (0.15) (1.64) (0.72) (0.42) (0.14) (1.29) (1.98)
M/B 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.011 0.025** -0.010* -0.010** -0.010** -0.011* -0.007
(1.27) (1.14) (0.98) (1.28) (2.15) (1.93) (2.03) (2.11) (1.71) (0.88)
JM prob. of default 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.008***
(0.92) (1.07) (1.06) (0.50) (0.62) (0.78) (0.49) (0.39) (1.33) (2.66)
Tangibility -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.014** -0.012 -0.025** -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.012 0.019**
(2.89) (2.71) (2.50) (1.52) (2.39) (0.26) (0.09) (0.04) (1.62) (2.21)
Interest coverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.97) (0.87) (0.31) (0.72) (0.06) (0.88) (0.86) (0.68) (0.66) (1.11)
Capex/TA 0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008* -0.008* -0.009** -0.009 -0.003
(1.15) (1.05) (0.92) (0.59) (0.33) (1.84) (1.96) (2.06) (1.51) (0.42)
Leverage 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.010 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012* 0.011
(1.11) (1.02) (0.97) (1.04) (1.27) (2.92) (2.85) (2.92) (1.88) (1.31)
Firm age 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 -0.005
(0.68) (0.68) (0.88) (0.15) (0.72) (1.29) (1.30) (1.46) (0.18) (1.05)
Rating dummy 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.006* 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.004 0.005
(0.14) (0.23) (0.92) (1.88) (3.23) (3.20) (2.99) (2.20) (1.56) (1.46)
Lambda -0.009 -0.008 0.086** -0.016 -0.170** -0.005 -0.004 0.113** 0.090 0.060
(1.20) (1.06) (2.54) (0.31) (2.30) (0.47) (0.43) (2.40) (1.36) (0.76)





























Table A.4: Regression results for high DEA subsample of firms
The table shows the semi-elasticities (dy/ex) of the second stage results of two-stage model using fractional response regression and
DEA efficiency as dependent variable for the subsample of firms defined according to first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default
probabilities (PD) and above median baseline DEA efficiency scores. In the period t − 2 Rel dummy is lagged for two-period and in
t−1 analysis Rel dummy is lagged for one-period. In t+ 1 analysis one-period forward dependent variable is used and in t+ 2 analysis
two-period forward dependent variable is used. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control variables are the average
values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered
at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Rel dummyt-2 (instrumented) -0.005 0.002
(1.49) (0.38)
Rel dummyt-1 (instrumented) -0.004 0.003
(1.11) (0.64)
Rel dummyt (instrumented) -0.008 -0.002 -0.005 0.013 0.010 -0.010
(1.35) (0.21) (0.50) (1.58) (0.76) (0.80)
ROA -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 0.006 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.002 0.006
(1.61) (1.61) (1.49) (0.14) (0.59) (2.81) (2.83) (3.00) (0.29) (0.84)
Efficiency 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.335*** 0.322*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.321*** 0.304***
(19.88) (19.83) (19.87) (15.69) (11.21) (12.10) (12.14) (12.20) (8.81) (8.21)
Size -0.403*** -0.401*** -0.390*** -0.384*** -0.301*** -0.376*** -0.378*** -0.401*** -0.348*** -0.285***
(8.43) (8.35) (7.92) (5.07) (2.92) (10.08) (10.08) (10.10) (5.15) (4.18)
Size2 0.237*** 0.235*** 0.230*** 0.260*** 0.223*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.211*** 0.217*** 0.198***
(9.48) (9.41) (9.15) (6.76) (4.60) (9.93) (10.01) (10.43) (6.48) (5.69)
Cash/TA 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006** 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008** 0.005
(3.55) (3.58) (3.23) (2.47) (1.26) (0.81) (0.93) (1.36) (2.07) (1.36)
M/B 0.010*** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.018** 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.001
(2.64) (2.57) (2.59) (3.17) (2.21) (1.17) (1.14) (1.00) (1.11) (0.13)
JM prob. of default 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(2.49) (2.48) (2.50) (2.38) (0.55) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.56) (0.23)
Tangibility 0.004 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.008* -0.007 -0.007 0.004 -0.000
(1.17) (1.23) (1.17) (0.09) (0.17) (1.67) (1.63) (1.48) (0.46) (0.00)
Interest coverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.29) (0.38) (0.20) (0.76) (0.19) (0.68) (0.69) (0.66) (0.62) (1.39)
Capex/TA 0.008** 0.007** 0.007** 0.006 0.001 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.005 0.009
(2.53) (2.48) (2.47) (1.09) (0.09) (1.95) (1.94) (1.88) (0.74) (1.11)
Leverage -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.021*** 0.014*
(0.57) (0.65) (0.66) (0.52) (0.10) (1.30) (1.32) (1.40) (2.80) (1.69)
Firm age -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.007** -0.006* -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.009** -0.007*
(1.78) (1.72) (1.80) (2.08) (1.66) (1.31) (1.32) (1.29) (2.02) (1.65)
Rating dummy 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002
(0.89) (0.78) (1.01) (0.67) (0.11) (0.59) (0.42) (0.19) (1.10) (0.58)
Lambda -0.004 -0.003 -0.032 -0.004 -0.009 -0.002 -0.003 0.062 0.043 -0.056
(1.20) (0.85) (1.49) (0.12) (0.25) (0.37) (0.44) (1.51) (0.61) (0.83)
N 4,283 4,283 4,283 3,623 3,007 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,609 1,426
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A.2 Results using TFP estimates:
Table A.5 below presents the results of the second stage 2SLS regression estimation of equa-
tion (1.5) using TFP estimate of Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014) as the dependent variable.
Column 1 presents all sample results, which exhibit additional support for Hypothesis 1.
Particularly, one standard deviation increase in the likelihood of existence of relationship
bank increases TFP by 0.05 points (0.136*0.372)1 at 1% significance level. These results are
similar to the SFA results in Table 1.5 and DEA results in Table A.1.
Similar to SFA and DEA estimations, I test Hypothesis 2 for the subsamples of low vs.
elevated default risk firms defined by the first and fourth quartile of Jarrow Merton default
probabilities. Columns 2 and 3 in Table A.5 present the second stage TFP results of the
estimation of equation (1.5) for subsamples of low vs. elevated default risk firms, respectively.
The results provide proof for Hypothesis 2 that relationship banks concentrate on producing
private information to improve the efficiency of those firms with elevated risk of default.
Specifically, one standard deviation increase in the likelihood of existence of relationship
banking increases the efficiency of high PD subsample firms by 0.177 points (0.542*0.328),
whereas the efficiency of low PD subsample firms remain unchanged2.
To test Hypothesis 3, I define the subsamples according to below and above median
baseline TFP estimates. The results in columns 4 and 5 of Table A.5 indicate that low
baseline efficiency firms experience 0.049 points increase (0.147*0.340) in their efficiency as a
result of one standard deviation increase in the likelihood of existence of relationship bank,
while a similar increase in the likelihood of relationship bank increases the efficiency of high
baseline efficiency firms by 0.031 points (0.076*0.419) at 10% significance level3. Therefore
these results present further evidence for Hypothesis 3 that relationship banks concentrate
1The standard deviation of Rel dummy for the whole sample is 0.372.
2For high PD firms, the standard deviation of Rel dummy is 0.328
3For low efficiency firms the standard deviation of Rel dummy is 0.340 and for high baseline efficiency
firms it is 0.419.
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on producing private information to improve the efficiency of those firms with low baseline
efficiency.
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Table A.5: Second Stage Results of TFP Estimate
The table shows the second stage results of 2SLS. TFP estimate as dependent
variable for the whole sample as well as subsample of firms defined according to
first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities (PD) (columns (2)
and (3)) and below and above median baseline TFP estimate (columns (4) and (5)).
The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control variables are the average
values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.
The standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in
parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.









Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.136*** 0.002 0.542*** 0.147** 0.076*
(3.30) (0.03) (3.39) (2.37) (1.78)
ROA -0.071 -0.358*** -0.220 0.603*** -0.451***
(1.01) (3.52) (1.07) (4.86) (4.71)
Efficiency 0.788*** 0.848*** 0.716*** 0.323*** 0.630***
(46.81) (39.72) (11.66) (8.16) (30.05)
Size -0.008 -0.048*** -0.094*** 0.036** -0.092***
(0.73) (3.19) (3.65) (2.12) (8.07)
Size2 0.001* 0.003*** 0.007*** -0.002 0.006***
(1.92) (3.43) (3.94) (1.45) (7.66)
Cash/TA 0.094** 0.165*** 0.006 -0.106 0.269***
(2.05) (2.66) (0.04) (1.64) (6.02)
M/B 0.038*** 0.047*** -0.014 -0.032*** 0.039***
(5.55) (5.92) (0.72) (2.74) (5.50)
JM prob. of default -0.002 0.023*** -0.001 -0.004 0.004*
(1.03) (3.93) (0.43) (1.51) (1.73)
Tangibility 0.024 -0.041 0.005 0.050 0.017
(1.13) (1.36) (0.08) (1.41) (0.63)
Interest coverage -0.000* -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000***
(1.95) (3.35) (0.58) (1.25) (3.69)
Capex/TA -0.183* 0.120 -0.046 -0.294* 0.129
(1.78) (0.80) (0.18) (1.78) (1.23)
Leverage -0.002 -0.003 0.269*** 0.031 0.003
(0.12) (0.08) (4.72) (1.09) (0.12)
Firm age 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.02) (1.86) (0.22) (1.05) (0.15)
Rating dummy 0.006 0.020** 0.017 0.001 0.004
(0.72) (2.03) (0.66) (0.07) (0.43)
Lambda 0.174*** -0.007 0.659*** 0.199** 0.098*
(3.34) (0.11) (3.34) (2.47) (1.87)
Constant -0.305*** 0.138* -0.686*** -0.785*** 0.276***
(5.67) (1.90) (3.70) (8.21) (4.64)
R2 0.53 0.69 0.26 0.16 0.55
N 16,328 5,281 2,908 8,259 8,069
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Table A.6 below reports the second stage TFP results of the estimation of equation (1.5).
According to these results, regardless of their default probabilities at the time of relationship
bank borrowing, low PD firms do not experience increase in their efficiencies as a result of
relationship bank borrowing. Among the firms with elevated probability of default, one
standard deviation increase in the likelihood of existence of bank relationship increases the
efficiency of low efficiency firms (column 3) by 0.127 points (0.410*0.314) at 5% statistical
significance level4. A similar increase increases the efficiency of high baseline efficiency firms
that have an elevated probability of default (column 4) by 0.197 (0.486*0.406). Although
high baseline TFP firms with elevated probability of default seem to experience a higher
increase in efficiency than low baseline TFP firms with elevated probability of default, the
former subsample has 780 observations, which are less than half of the subsamples in SFA
and DEA results due to missing values in TFP estimate (This is due to the missing values
in the variables used for the TFP estimation by Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2014).). Therefore,
these results show further evidence that those firms with elevated risks of default experience
increases in their efficiencies in the presence of new loans from relationship banks.
4The standard deviation of Rel dummy for low baseline TFP firms with elevated default risk is 0.314.
The standard deviation of Rel dummy for high baseline efficiency firms with elevated default risk is 0.406.
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Table A.6: Second stage of low vs. high TFP and low vs. high PD subsamples
The table shows the second stage results of 2SLS. TFP estimate as
dependent variable for the subsample of firms defined according to
first and fourth quartile of Jarrow- Merton default probabilities (PD)
and below and above median baseline TFP. The subsample in column
(1) is low PD - low TFP, (2) is low PD - high TFP, (3) is high PD
- low TFP, and (4) is high PD - high TFP. The period of analysis
is between 1991-2011. The control variables are the average values
of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed
effects. The standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the
firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%
and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD
Dependent variable: TFP Low TFP High TFP Low TFP High TFP
Rel dummyt (instrumented) -0.088 0.013 0.410** 0.486***
(1.51) (0.21) (2.09) (3.28)
ROA -0.039 -0.354*** 0.292 -0.742***
(0.30) (2.98) (1.14) (3.09)
Efficiency 0.399*** 0.729*** 0.452*** 0.484***
(9.00) (28.90) (5.34) (8.30)
Size 0.052** -0.089*** -0.081** -0.100***
(2.32) (5.01) (2.53) (3.22)
Size2 -0.003* 0.006*** 0.006** 0.005**
(1.86) (4.98) (2.45) (2.47)
Cash/TA -0.164* 0.283*** -0.113 0.473***
(1.86) (4.19) (0.64) (3.62)
M/B 0.017 0.034*** -0.054** 0.026
(1.25) (3.83) (2.27) (1.48)
JM prob. of default 0.008 0.016** -0.000 -0.000
(1.50) (2.52) (0.01) (0.08)
Tangibility -0.048 0.015 0.126 -0.135**
(1.25) (0.40) (1.56) (2.09)
Interest coverage -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.71) (3.29) (0.58) (0.45)
Capex/TA -0.035 0.069 -0.382 0.528**
(0.16) (0.42) (1.19) (2.20)
Leverage -0.047 0.030 0.236*** 0.203***
(1.29) (0.69) (3.60) (2.63)
Firm age 0.000 -0.000* 0.001 -0.000
(0.70) (1.75) (1.09) (0.21)
Rating dummy 0.007 0.012 -0.003 -0.017
(0.63) (0.98) (0.08) (0.73)
Lambda -0.145* 0.019 0.515** 0.550***
(1.82) (0.24) (2.13) (3.03)
Constant -0.361*** 0.360*** -0.779*** -0.200
(3.20) (4.14) (3.38) (1.25)
R2 0.27 0.63 0.12 0.12
N 1,734 3,547 2,128 780
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As in SFA and DEA estimations, I test the persistence of the impact of relationship
banking oversight using 5-year window around the year the new borrowing from a relationship
lender takes place. Particularly, I estimate equation (1.5) for two years before and after
the relationship borrowing takes place as well as for the year of borrowing for subsamples
of low TFP firms substantially above the default threshold and low TFP firms that have
an elevated probability of default. Table A.7 shows that only high PD firms experience
statistically significant increase in TFP (at the 5% levels) in the year of a new relationship
bank loan. However, the efficiency improving effect of the relationship bank loan disappears
in the year after the loan origination.
Table A.8 shows the 5-year window results for high baseline TFP firms. The results show
that low default risk firms do not experience statistically significant change in their TFP,
whereas those with elevated risk of default experience increases in their efficiencies only in
the year of relationship bank borrowing. Therefore, the findings in Tables A.7 and A.8 also
show that the benefits of relationship bank information production in generating efficiency





























Table A.7: Regression results for low TFP subsample of firms
The table shows the second stage results of 2SLS. TFP estimate as dependent variable for the subsample of firms defined according to
first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities (PD) and below median baseline TFP. In the period t−2 Rel dummy
is lagged for two-period and in t − 1 analysis Rel dummy is lagged for one-period. In t + 1 analysis one-period forward dependent
variable is used and in t + 2 analysis two-period forward dependent variable is used. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011.
The control variables are the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The standard
errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Rel dummyt-2 (instrumented) -0.034 -0.038
(0.65) (0.26)
Rel dummyt-1 (instrumented) -0.099** 0.079
(2.18) (0.64)
Rel dummyt (instrumented) -0.088 0.004 -0.027 0.410** 0.204 0.124
(1.51) (0.03) (0.22) (2.09) (1.06) (0.59)
ROA -0.048 -0.046 -0.039 -0.156 -0.426* 0.363 0.335 0.292 -0.077 -0.749*
(0.38) (0.37) (0.30) (0.89) (1.74) (1.43) (1.33) (1.14) (0.26) (1.76)
Efficiency 0.395*** 0.401*** 0.399*** 0.417*** 0.397*** 0.451*** 0.455*** 0.452*** 0.430*** 0.523***
(9.15) (9.07) (9.00) (7.78) (6.05) (5.58) (5.60) (5.34) (6.24) (4.94)
Size 0.049** 0.049** 0.052** 0.043 0.023 -0.062** -0.067** -0.081** -0.038 -0.000
(2.22) (2.17) (2.32) (1.56) (0.49) (2.07) (2.20) (2.53) (1.17) (0.01)
Size2 -0.003* -0.003 -0.003* -0.003 -0.001 0.006*** 0.005** 0.006** 0.003 0.001
(1.83) (1.56) (1.86) (1.29) (0.20) (2.72) (2.51) (2.45) (1.44) (0.23)
Cash/TA -0.145* -0.173* -0.164* 0.100 0.098 -0.277* -0.219 -0.113 0.057 0.048
(1.71) (1.96) (1.86) (0.81) (0.68) (1.66) (1.30) (0.64) (0.35) (0.27)
M/B 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.027* 0.034 -0.051** -0.051** -0.054** -0.029 0.045*
(1.27) (1.32) (1.25) (1.69) (1.37) (2.12) (2.12) (2.27) (0.94) (1.89)
JM prob. of default 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.015* 0.007 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(1.50) (1.37) (1.50) (1.93) (0.39) (0.45) (0.36) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01)
Tangibility -0.044 -0.049 -0.048 -0.028 -0.032 0.107 0.113 0.126 0.121* 0.187**
(1.15) (1.24) (1.25) (0.47) (0.49) (1.39) (1.49) (1.56) (1.78) (2.33)
Interest coverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.66) (0.57) (0.71) (1.15) (0.91) (0.19) (0.34) (0.58) (0.36) (0.72)
Capex/TA -0.030 -0.029 -0.035 0.078 -0.361 -0.348 -0.376 -0.382 -0.290 -0.678*
(0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.27) (0.93) (1.15) (1.23) (1.19) (0.97) (1.75)
Leverage -0.051 -0.039 -0.047 -0.024 -0.078 0.217*** 0.228*** 0.236*** 0.168*** 0.115
(1.40) (1.01) (1.29) (0.46) (1.03) (3.60) (3.63) (3.60) (2.75) (1.63)
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.92) (0.88) (0.70) (0.02) (0.66) (1.03) (1.09) (1.09) (0.19) (0.00)
Rating dummy 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.016 0.015 0.023 0.014 -0.003 0.018 0.005
(0.56) (0.60) (0.63) (1.00) (0.57) (0.84) (0.50) (0.08) (0.67) (0.16)
Lambda -0.030* -0.035** -0.145* 0.015 -0.035 0.026 0.037 0.515** 0.212 0.095
(1.74) (2.10) (1.82) (0.09) (0.22) (0.55) (0.78) (2.13) (0.96) (0.35)
Constant -0.449*** -0.429*** -0.361*** -0.511*** -0.359 -0.468*** -0.469*** -0.779*** -0.486** -0.562**
(4.71) (4.37) (3.20) (2.61) (1.55) (3.15) (3.10) (3.38) (2.04) (2.54)
R2 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.15





























Table A.8: Regression results for high TFP subsample of firms
The table shows the second stage results of 2SLS. TFP estimate as dependent variable for the subsample of firms defined according to
first and fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities (PD) and above median baseline TFP. In the period t− 2 Rel dummy
is lagged for two-period and in t − 1 analysis Rel dummy is lagged for one-period. In t + 1 analysis one-period forward dependent
variable is used and in t+ 2 analysis two-period forward dependent variable is used. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The
control variables are the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors
are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
Low pd High pd
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Rel dummyt-2 (instrumented) -0.053 -0.076
(1.60) (1.06)
Rel dummyt-1 (instrumented) -0.040 0.032
(1.18) (0.42)
Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.013 0.002 -0.003 0.486*** 0.231 0.238
(0.21) (0.02) (0.03) (3.28) (1.31) (1.33)
ROA -0.327*** -0.342*** -0.354*** -0.458*** -0.482** -0.727*** -0.686*** -0.742*** -0.285 -0.250
(2.73) (2.88) (2.98) (2.59) (2.21) (3.19) (3.02) (3.09) (1.11) (0.95)
Efficiency 0.724*** 0.728*** 0.729*** 0.698*** 0.680*** 0.498*** 0.490*** 0.484*** 0.489*** 0.453***
(28.17) (28.68) (28.90) (19.76) (15.77) (8.08) (8.30) (8.30) (6.26) (6.80)
Size -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.089*** -0.094*** -0.099*** -0.071** -0.075*** -0.100*** -0.099*** -0.082*
(4.97) (5.02) (5.01) (3.96) (3.65) (2.56) (2.75) (3.22) (2.69) (1.80)
Size2 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006*
(4.95) (4.96) (4.98) (4.18) (3.70) (2.33) (2.42) (2.47) (2.29) (1.91)
Cash/TA 0.262*** 0.265*** 0.283*** 0.146 -0.028 0.217** 0.232** 0.473*** 0.452** 0.421**
(4.23) (4.25) (4.19) (1.61) (0.26) (2.16) (2.46) (3.62) (2.56) (2.17)
M/B 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.050*** 0.064*** 0.040** 0.032** 0.026 0.029 0.027
(3.78) (3.80) (3.83) (4.10) (4.45) (2.36) (2.04) (1.48) (1.28) (1.37)
JM prob. of default 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.022** 0.021* -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.014** 0.002
(2.48) (2.50) (2.52) (2.51) (1.89) (0.56) (0.14) (0.08) (2.08) (0.41)
Tangibility 0.004 0.006 0.015 -0.009 -0.041 -0.131** -0.128** -0.135** -0.181* -0.146*
(0.10) (0.16) (0.40) (0.16) (0.59) (2.18) (2.25) (2.09) (1.84) (1.76)
Interest coverage -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001***
(3.42) (3.37) (3.29) (2.80) (3.49) (0.48) (0.25) (0.45) (2.00) (3.39)
Capex/TA 0.094 0.101 0.069 0.171 0.243 0.610*** 0.559*** 0.528** 0.145 0.130
(0.58) (0.61) (0.42) (0.72) (0.70) (2.77) (2.62) (2.20) (0.48) (0.38)
Leverage 0.049 0.044 0.030 0.011 -0.035 0.106* 0.089* 0.203*** 0.231*** 0.124
(1.04) (0.95) (0.69) (0.17) (0.43) (1.86) (1.65) (2.63) (2.65) (1.55)
Firm age -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.001* -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(1.70) (1.65) (1.75) (1.89) (1.33) (0.55) (0.32) (0.21) (0.30) (0.63)
Rating dummy 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.026 0.038* 0.024 0.014 -0.017 0.013 -0.002
(1.39) (1.45) (0.98) (1.53) (1.70) (1.41) (0.76) (0.73) (0.41) (0.06)
Lambda -0.005 -0.003 0.019 -0.025 -0.060 -0.050** -0.042* 0.550*** 0.232 0.283
(0.37) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24) (0.49) (2.18) (1.79) (3.03) (1.07) (1.22)
Constant 0.355*** 0.369*** 0.360*** 0.386*** 0.379** 0.161 0.189* -0.200 -0.623** -0.153
(4.58) (4.83) (4.14) (3.14) (2.57) (1.42) (1.90) (1.25) (2.33) (0.56)
R2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.51 0.42 0.36 0.39 0.12 0.26 0.28
N 3,547 3,547 3,547 2,950 2,472 780 780 780 685 604
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A.3 Examining the Impact on Default Risk
As a robustness check, I examine Hypothesis 4 by estimating the propensity score using
Mahalanobis matching and compare the year-to-year difference in the probability of default
of firms that have relationship banking with those of matched control firms that have public
debt. I match the firms according to their propensity score (using 0.1 as the maximum
distance criteria), estimated as the probability of having a relationship banking one period
before the borrowing took place. I estimate equation (1.4) using logistic regression, where
the dependent variable is equal to one for the firms that have relationship banking during the
sample period (treatment group) and zero for the firms, which do not have relationship banks
during the sample period but have issued public debt (control group). Following Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1985) I check the standardized percentage bias for the matched treated and
non-treated groups’ covariates before and after the matching. The bias after matching is
reduced to below 25%, which is the accepted limit. After matching I define the difference
of default probabilities between year 0 and -1, where 0 is the year of borrowing and -1 is
the prior year. Similarly I check the difference of default probabilities between year 1 and
-1 and year 2 and -1.
Similar to the results in Table 1.10, Panel A of Table A.9 show a reduction in default risk
over years 1 and 2 (as compared to year -1 ) only for the high default risk borrowers with
bank relationships. That is, default risk declined by 0.78% both one year and two years after
the origination of a relationship bank loan. These measures are all statistically significant at
the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. In contrast, Panel B of Table A.9 shows that default risk
actually increases for both relationship bank borrowers (treatment group) and public debt
issuers (control group) that are far from the default threshold.
The quasi diff-in-diff estimations in boldface in Panel A of Table A.9 show that relation-
ship bank borrowers experience significant decreases in default risk as compared to bond
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issuers in the year of new debt issuance as compared to the year before. The differences are
not significant for the low default risk subsample shown in Panel B. These results provide
support for Hypothesis 4 that the probability of default decreases for firms with elevated
risk of default in the years following a new loan from a relationship bank.
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Table A.9: Propensity Score Matching Estimations of Default Probabilities
The matching is done on the year before the relationship borrowing takes place (year = −1) using
mahalanobis matching technique. The matching the probabilities are estimated in equation (1.4)
using the dummy variable defined as one for the treatment group firms (PDt), which have only re-
lationship bank borrowing and zero for the control group firms (PDc), which have only public debt
borrowing. Panel A shows results for firms in the fourth quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabili-
ties. Panel B includes firms that are in the first quartile of Jarrow-Merton default probabilities. The
results in bold are quasi diff-in-diff estimations of differences in default probabilities of treatment and
control groups for the year of borrowing and one year and two years after the borrowing takes place.
The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
High Probability of Default Firms
Obs. Mean St.Error T-Stat
∆PDt,0 = ¯PDbank relationship,0 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 1,221 0.0125 0.2777 0.04
∆PDc,0 = ¯PDpublic debt,0 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 1,221 0.1621 0.1577 1.02
∆PDt,0 - ∆PDc,0 1,221 -0.1495 0.3159 -0.47
∆PDt,1 = ¯PDbank relationship,1 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 1,044 -0.7892 0.2996 -2.63***
∆PDc,1 = ¯PDpublic debt,1 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 1,044 0.3651 0.1751 2.08**
∆PDt,1 - ∆PDc,1 1,044 -1.1544 0.3331 -3.46***
∆PDt,2 = ¯PDbank relationship,2 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 882 -0.7868 0.3302 -2.38**
∆PDc,2 = ¯PDpublic debt,2 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 882 0.4337 0.2046 2.11**
∆PDt,2 - ∆PDc,2 882 -1.2205 0.3643 -3.35***
Low Probability of Default Firms
Obs. Mean St.Error T-Stat
∆PDt,0 = ¯PDbank relationship,0 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 2,304 0.1008 0.0107 9.34***
∆PDc,0 = ¯PDpublic debt,0 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 2,304 0.1621 0.0707 2.29**
∆PDt,0 - ∆PDc,0 2,304 -0.0613 0.0709 -0.86
∆PDt,1 = ¯PDbank relationship,1 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 1,848 0.2881 0.0407 7.06***
∆PDc,1 = ¯PDpublic debt,1 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 1,848 0.4798 0.0902 5.31***
∆PDt,1 - ∆PDc,1 1,848 -0.1917 0.0981 -1.95*
∆PDt,2 = ¯PDbank relationship,2 - ¯PDbank relationship,-1 1,683 0.5236 0.0731 7.15***
∆PDc,2 = ¯PDpublic debt,2 - ¯PDpublic debt,-1 1,683 0.5785 0.0983 5.88***
∆PDt,2 - ∆PDc,2 1,683 -0.0549 0.1221 -0.44
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A.4 Robustness tests with alternative default risk measures:
As robustness checks, I use Altman’s Z–score (Altman, 1968; Denis and Mihov, 2003) and
Whited and Wu (2006)’s financial constraint index instead of Jarrow-Merton default proba-
bilities. Altman’s Z–score uses multiple discriminant analysis to predict bankruptcies. The
calculation is:
Altman′s z–scoreit = 1.2 ∗WC/TAit + 1.4 ∗RE/TAit + 3.3 ∗ EBIT/TAit
+0.6 ∗M/Bit + 0.999 ∗NS/TAit
(A.A.6)
in which WC/TA (Working Capital/Total Assets) is the liquidity measure; RE/TA (Re-
tained Earnings/Total Assets) is the cumulative profitability; EBIT/TA (Earnings Before
Interest and Taxes/Total Assets) is the true productivity of a firm; M/B (Market Value of
Equity/Book Value of Liabilities) measures insolvency; and NS/TA (Net Sales/Total Assets)
is the capital turnover ratio, which measures the revenue generating ability of the assets. Ac-
cording to this construction, firms with higher z-score are in safety zone (>2.99) and firms
with low z score are in distress (<1.81). Since the first and fourth quartiles of Altman’s
z–score in Table 1.1 are within the range of distressed firms (1.20) and safety zone (2.81),
respectively, in terms of predicted bankruptcies, the sample is representative of both types
of firms.
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Table A.10: Second Stage Results Using Altman’s Z–score
The table shows the second stage results of SFA and DEA ef-
ficiencies and TFP as dependent variable for the subsample of
firms defined according to fourth (low PD) and first quartile
(high PD) of Altman’s Z–score (PD) and below and above me-
dian baseline SFA efficiency, DEA efficiency and TFP, respec-
tively. The estimation is done by fractional response regression
model with probit for SFA and DEA efficiency scores and semi-
elasticities (dy/ex) are reported. TFP estimations are done by
2SLS. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011. The control
variables are the average values of previous 5 years. All regres-
sions include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors
are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in
parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD Low Eff High Eff
Panel A: SFA Efficiency
Rel dummy (instrumented) 0.003*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.001**
(2.91) (4.34) (6.51) (2.08)
Lambda 0.022*** 0.113*** 0.086*** 0.004*
(2.72) (3.75) (5.93) (1.74)
Other controls YES YES YES YES
N 6,626 4,182 11,510 12,201
Panel B: DEA Efficiency
Rel dummy (instrumented) -0.002 0.031*** 0.018*** -0.006*
(0.43) (3.62) (5.50) (1.88)
Lambda -0.019 0.169*** 0.116*** -0.031**
(0.71) (3.07) (5.04) (2.21)
Other controls YES YES YES YES
N 6,626 4,182 11,679 12,032
Panel C: TFP
Rel dummy (instrumented) 0.089 0.366** 0.142** 0.071*
(1.33) (2.38) (2.30) (1.66)
Lambda 0.110 0.394** 0.193** 0.093*
(1.37) (2.00) (2.40) (1.76)
Other controls YES YES YES YES
N 5,014 1,955 8,259 8,069
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As a second robustness check I use Whited and Wu (2006)’s financial constraint index
constructed via generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation.
The calculated parameters are as follows:
Financial Constraintit = −0.091 ∗ CFit − 0.062 ∗DIV POSit + 0.021 ∗ TLTDit
−0.044 ∗ LNTAit + 0.102 ∗ ISGit − 0.035 ∗ SGit
(A.A.7)
in which CF is the ratio of cash flow to total assets; DIVPOS is an indicator that takes the
value of one if the firm pays cash dividends; TLTD is the ratio of the long-term debt to total
assets; LNTA is the natural log of total assets, ISG is the firm’s industry sales growth; SG
is firm sales growth. Firms with higher scores in this index are more financially constrained.
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Table A.11: Second Stage Results Using Whited–Wu Financial Constraint Index
The table shows the second stage results of SFA and DEA ef-
ficiencies and TFP as dependent variable for the subsample of
firms defined according to first (low PD) and fourth quartile
(high PD) of Whited-Wu financial constraint index (PD) and
below and above median baseline SFA efficiency, DEA efficiency
and TFP, respectively. The estimation is done by fractional re-
sponse regression model with probit for SFA and DEA efficiency
scores and semi-elasticities (dy/ex) are reported. TFP estima-
tions are done by 2SLS. The period of analysis is between 1991-
2011. The control variables are the average values of previous
5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.
The standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm
level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%
and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Low PD High PD Low Eff High Eff
Panel A: SFA Efficiency
Rel dummy (instrumented) 0.004* 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.001**
(1.90) (4.19) (6.42) (2.12)
Lambda 0.010* 0.186*** 0.085*** 0.004*
(1.65) (4.04) (5.84) (1.77)
Other controls YES YES YES YES
N 8,842 3,134 11,679 12,032
Panel B: DEA Efficiency
Rel dummy (instrumented) 0.015** 0.001 0.018*** -0.006*
(2.32) (0.54) (5.36) (1.90)
Lambda 0.033* 0.068 0.112*** -0.031**
(1.65) (0.85) (4.91) (2.23)
Other controls YES YES YES YES
N 8,842 3,134 11,510 12,201
Panel C: TFP
Rel dummy (instrumented) 0.162*** 0.669* 0.147** 0.073*
(3.26) (1.71) (2.38) (1.70)
Lambda 0.222*** 0.590 0.198** 0.096*
(3.45) (1.64) (2.46) (1.81)
Other controls YES YES YES YES
N 6,919 1,418 8,259 8,069
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A.5 Robustness tests with alternative relationship bank measures:
As robustness tests, I use alternative relationship bank measures and estimate the whole
sample results using all three efficiency measures. I replace Rel dummy variable in the
previous estimations with Rel intensity and Rel number as alternative relationship bank
definitions. Following Bharath et al. (2011) I define Rel intensity as the amount of loans
by bank m to borrower i in the last 5 years scaled by the total amount of loans by borrower
i in the last 5 years and Rel number as the number of loans by bank m to borrower i in
the last 5 years scaled by the total number of loans by borrower i in the last 5 years. The
results in Table A.12 below present evidence that alternative measures also have positive
and statistically significant effect on borrower efficiency.
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Table A.12: Second Stage Results using Alternative Relationship Banking Definitions
The table shows the second stage results of
SFA and DEA efficiencies and TFP using
Rel intensity and Rel number as alternative
relationship bank definitions. Rel intensity
is defined as the amount of loans by bank m
to borrower i in the last 5 years scaled by
the total amount of loans by borrower i in
the last 5 years. Rel number is defined as
the number of loans by bank m to borrower i
in the last 5 years scaled by the total number
of loans by borrower i in the last 5 years. The
estimation is done by fractional response re-
gression model with probit for SFA and DEA
efficiency scores and semi-elasticities (dy/ex)
are reported. TFP estimations are done by
2SLS. The period of analysis is between 1991-
2011. The control variables are the average
values of previous 5 years. All regressions
include industry and year fixed effects. The
standard errors are bootstrapped and clus-
tered at the firm level. T-stats are in paren-
thesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1%
significance levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Panel A: SFA Efficiency
Rel intensity (instrumented) 0.007**
(2.01)




Other controls YES YES
N 23,711 23,711
Panel B: DEA Efficiency
Rel intensity (instrumented) 0.007***
(6.42)




Other controls YES YES
N 23,711 23,711
Panel C: TFP
Rel intensity (instrumented) 0.164***
(3.10)




Other controls YES YES
N 16,328 16,328
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A.6 Placebo Tests with Pseudo Relationship dummy variable:
I estimate an additional robustness test, in which I generate a Pseudo Rel dummy variable,
which includes the same number of relationship bank loans as in Rel dummy but in random
ordering. I estimate the first and second stage results using the generated residuals and
estimated probabilities from equations (1.3) and (1.4). The results in Table A.13 below
show that the instrument in the first stage does not explain the Pseudo Rel variable, as
expected. In the second stage instrumented Pseudo Rel variable has a spurious negative
and statistically significant effect on SFA efficiency and statistically insignificant effect on
DEA efficiency and TFP.
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Table A.13: Placebo Regressions with Pseudo Rel dummy variable
The table shows the first and second stage results using Pseudo Rel dummy variable. First three columns are
first stage results using the Pseudo Rel as the dependent variable and probabilities estimated in equation (1.4)
as the instruments. SFA and DEA efficiencies and TFP are the dependent variables in columns 3, 4 and 5,
respectively. The estimation is done by fractional response regression model with probit for SFA and DEA
efficiency scores and semi-elasticities (dy/ex) are reported. TFP estimations are done by 2SLS. The period of
analysis is between 1991-2011. The control variables are the average values of previous 5 years. All regressions
include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the firm level.
T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
First Stage Results Second Stage Results
Pseudo Rel Pseudo Rel Pseudo Rel SFA Efficiency DEA Efficiency TFP
Probability of Rel dummy (instrument) -0.040 -0.039 -0.062*
(1.37) (1.34) (1.73)
Pseudo Rel (instrumented) -4.904*** -0.987 -0.957
(6.92) (0.98) (1.33)
ROA -0.064* -0.046 -0.012 0.085 0.242*** -0.107
(1.91) (1.40) (0.19) (1.35) (3.36) (1.15)
Efficiency 0.073 -0.005 -0.027* 1.901*** 2.144*** 0.759***
(1.25) (0.22) (1.96) (21.11) (44.78) (28.53)
Size -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.082*** -0.160*** 0.004
(0.36) (0.17) (0.05) (8.42) (12.01) (0.28)
Size2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.018*** 0.001
(0.07) (0.34) (0.10) (2.82) (14.66) (1.01)
Cash/TA -0.057** -0.056** -0.065* -0.277*** 0.116** -0.021
(2.05) (2.02) (1.77) (6.60) (2.01) (0.36)
M/B 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.034*** 0.021*** 0.041***
(0.54) (0.41) (0.89) (7.34) (3.41) (4.40)
JM prob. of default 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.006*** -0.001
(0.49) (0.43) (0.01) (1.14) (2.92) (0.31)
Tangibility 0.036* 0.035* -0.020 0.227*** 0.122** -0.001
(1.94) (1.91) (0.81) (6.55) (2.47) (0.04)
Interest coverage 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.18) (0.22) (0.47) (3.41) (0.39) (1.40)
Capex/TA 0.063 0.058 0.179* 0.332*** -0.109 0.041
(0.81) (0.74) (1.68) (3.30) (0.80) (0.20)
Leverage -0.022 -0.021 -0.015 -0.132*** -0.078** -0.024
(1.16) (1.12) (0.60) (5.42) (2.28) (0.74)
Firm age 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.39) (0.25) (0.28) (2.56) (0.41) (0.53)
Rating dummy 0.019** 0.019** 0.025** 0.120*** -0.002 0.028*
(2.35) (2.32) (2.55) (9.31) (0.11) (1.65)
Lambda -0.000 -0.000 -0.008 -0.028*** -0.048*** -0.008
(0.02) (0.01) (0.58) (2.77) (3.40) (0.43)
N 21,527 21,527 14,520 27,337 27,337 14,203
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A.7 Analysis of survivorship bias:
I analyze the effect of existence of relationship banking on efficiency for firms that have
gap years or drop out of the sample completely. I define Dropped dummy variable equal
to 1 if the firm dropped out of the sample for any reason (reported under dlrsn variable in
Compustat) and 0 otherwise. Dropped∗Rel dummy is the interaction of first-step estimated
probabilities of existence of relationship and Dropped dummy variable. The results in Table
A.14 below show that firms that dropped out of the sample have 0.018 lower SFA efficiency
in the year of borrowing (0.054 lower DEA efficiency and 0.036 lower TFP). Yet, firms that
dropped out of the sample did not experience statistically significant differences in their
efficiencies as a result of existence of relationship banking (Dropped ∗ Rel dummy) in the
years they existed in the sample period. Therefore these results provide evidence that the
results drawn in this study are not driven by survivorship bias.
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Table A.14: Analysis of survivorship bias
The dependent variable is the SFA efficiency score for
the first three columns, DEA Efficiency score for the sec-
ond three columns and TFP for the last three columns.
The estimation is done by fractional response regression
model with probit for SFA and DEA efficiency scores and
semi-elasticities (dy/ex) are reported. TFP estimations
is done by 2SLS. Dropped dummy is equal to 1 if the firm
dropped out of the sample within the sample period for
any reason (reported under dlrsn variable in Compustat)
and 0 if it survived. Dropped ∗ Reldummy is the inter-
action of first-step estimated probabilities of existence of
relationship and Dropped dummy. In the period (t+1)
analysis of one-period forward dependent variable is used
and in (t+2) analysis two-period forward dependent vari-
able is used. The period of analysis is between 1991-2011.
The control variables are the average values of previous
5 years. All regressions include industry and year fixed
effects. The standard errors are bootstrapped and clus-
tered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and
*, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
Panel A: SFA Efficiency
t t+1 t+2
Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.002
(6.66) (3.50) (1.38)
Dropped dummyt -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002***
(2.74) (2.21) (2.68)
Dropped ∗Rel dummyt 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.40) (0.09) (0.44)
Lambda 0.043*** 0.025*** 0.008
(6.16) (3.09) (0.94)
N 23,711 20,152 17,335
Panel B: DEA Efficiency
Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.006* 0.005 0.001
(1.92) (1.15) (0.11)
Dropped dummyt -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(6.11) (5.20) (4.84)
Dropped ∗Rel dummyt 0.001** 0.000 -0.000
(2.27) (0.35) (0.00)
Lambda 0.028 0.022 -0.004
(1.57) (1.02) (0.17)
N 23,711 20,152 17,335
Panel C: TFP
Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.135*** 0.089* 0.070
(3.30) (1.80) (1.17)
Dropped dummyt -0.036*** -0.042*** -0.046***
(5.15) (4.47) (4.09)
Dropped ∗Rel dummyt 0.020 0.004 -0.007
(1.32) (0.20) (0.32)
Lambda 0.180*** 0.094 0.062
(3.50) (1.51) (0.82)
N 16,328 13,808 11,793
R2 0.53 0.46 0.43
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A.8 Breakdown of loans by the top 20 lead lenders:
One possible concern about the existence of relationship banking on firm efficiency can be
that several big lead lenders might be the lenders of the majority of the loans in the sample.
In order to address this concern, I look at the breakdown of the percentage of loans lent by
the top 20 lead lenders in the sample. Table A.15 shows that Bank of America lends 17.51%
of the relationship loans and top 5 banks lend 33.41% of the relationship loans. Table A.16
below presents results for second stage analysis excluding the top 5 lead lenders from the
sample. The results are robust, which suggest that they are not driven by a few, big lead
lenders.
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Table A.15: Breakdown of Loans by Lead Lenders
Lender Number of relationship loans Percent Cumulative
Bank of America 1,473 17.51 17.51
Citibank 440 5.23 22.74
SunTrust Bank 321 3.82 26.56
Chase Manhattan Bank 289 3.44 30.00
JP Morgan Chase Bank NA 287 3.41 33.41
Bank of Nova Scotia 205 2.44 35.85
BNP Paribas SA 199 2.37 38.22
JP Morgan 195 2.32 40.54
Morgan Guaranty Trust 152 1.81 42.35
Wachovia Bank 148 1.76 44.11
US Bank NA 147 1.75 45.86
Deutsche Bank AG 139 1.65 47.51
ABN AMRO Bank NV [RBS] 138 1.64 49.15
Bank of New York 137 1.63 50.78
BANK ONE Corp 123 1.46 52.24
PNC Bank 120 1.43 53.67
General Electric Capital Corp 113 1.34 55.01
Credit Suisse First Boston 101 1.2 56.21
Wells Fargo Bank 95 1.13 57.34
Barclays Bank Plc 90 1.07 58.41
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Table A.16: Second Stage Results Excluding Top 5 Lead Lenders
The table shows the semi-elasticities (dy/ex) of the second stage results of two-stage model
using fractional response regression and SFA efficiency as dependent variable in Panel A
and DEA efficiency as dependent variable in Panel B. Panel C shows the second stage
results of 2SLS using TFP estimate as dependent variable. The period of analysis is
between 1991-2011. The control variables are the average values of previous 5 years. All
regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors are bootstrapped
and clustered at the firm level. T-stats are in parenthesis and *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%
and 1% significance levels, respectively.










Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001**
(6.41) (3.89) (4.48) (6.03) (2.16)
Lambda 0.042*** 0.027*** 0.097*** 0.081*** 0.005*
(5.49) (3.45) (4.03) (5.30) (1.82)
N 21,697 6,076 4,750 11,104 10,593










Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.152** 0.034 0.548*** 0.296*** -0.145*
(2.31) (0.30) (4.11) (4.84) (1.66)
Lambda 0.143* 0.025 0.652*** 0.352*** -0.208*
(1.76) (0.18) (3.93) (4.55) (1.93)











Rel dummyt (instrumented) 0.119*** -0.012 0.567*** 0.128** 0.053
(2.73) (0.20) (3.42) (2.00) (1.15)
Lambda 0.130*** -0.021 0.545*** 0.144** 0.063
(2.75) (0.32) (3.32) (2.01) (1.29)
R2 0.53 0.68 0.27 0.18 0.55
N 14,797 4,661 2,670 7,730 7,067
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Table B.1: Tobin’s Q regressions on components of OC (with δ = 0)
The dependent variable in all regressions is Tobin’s Q, de-
fined as the market value of equity plus the book values of
debt and preferred equity, all divided by the book value
of assets. We calculate HC OC with no depreciation of
human capital (δ = 0). Regression in columns (1) is OLS
estimation with industry and year fixed effects. Other
estimations include firm and year fixed effects. Column
(3) includes lagged dependent variable as a control. All
independent variables are one period lagged. In all es-
timations the standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. The sample period is 1992 to 2015. *, ** and ***
indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: M/B (1) (2) (3)
HC OCt−1 5.761*** 7.521*** 4.158***
(4.79) (4.37) (4.17)




Institutional Ownershipt−1 -0.013 -0.157 -0.218***
(0.13) (1.63) (2.95)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.009 3.046** 1.864*
(0.01) (1.97) (1.83)
Managerial Ownership2t−1 -0.457 -6.319 -4.339*
(0.14) (1.54) (1.67)
Sizet−1(Ind.med.adjusted) -0.004 -0.285*** -0.144***
(0.23) (2.91) (2.74)
Tangibilityt−1 -0.399** -0.590** -0.143
(2.53) (2.03) (0.84)
Leveraget−1 -1.633*** -0.947*** -0.117
(10.71) (6.62) (1.28)
ROAt−1 4.067*** 2.276*** 0.461**
(6.55) (4.01) (2.25)
Firmaget−1 -0.003** -0.008 -0.006*
(2.36) (1.55) (1.71)
Capex/TAt−1 0.989** 0.352 -0.403
(2.28) (0.90) (1.40)
Intercept 1.907*** 1.753*** 0.867***
(7.94) (6.80) (4.80)
Firm Fixed Effects NO YES YES
Industry F ixed Effects YES NO NO
Y ear F ixed Effects YES YES YES
R2 0.38 0.19 0.43
N 9,052 9,052 9,052
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Table B.2: Tobin’s Q regressions on components of OC
The dependent variable in all regressions is Tobin’s Q,
defined as the market value of equity plus the book val-
ues of debt and preferred equity, all divided by the book
value of assets. Residual OC2 is the residual of regres-
sion of OC on HC OC. Regression in columns (1) is OLS
estimation with industry and year fixed effects. Other
estimations include firm and year fixed effects. Column
(3) includes lagged dependent variable as a control. All
independent variables are one period lagged. In all es-
timations the standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. The sample period is 1992 to 2015. *, ** and ***
indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: M/B (1) (2) (3)
HC OCt−1 5.875*** 8.208*** 4.931***
(5.25) (5.54) (5.72)




Institutional Ownershipt−1 -0.011 -0.162* -0.221***
(0.11) (1.69) (3.00)
Managerial Ownershipt−1 0.005 3.037** 1.840*
(0.00) (1.97) (1.82)
Managerial Ownership2t−1 -0.435 -6.264 -4.256*
(0.13) (1.54) (1.65)
Sizet−1(Ind.med.adjusted) -0.004 -0.293*** -0.148***
(0.23) (2.98) (2.80)
Tangibilityt−1 -0.401** -0.558* -0.127
(2.53) (1.93) (0.75)
Leveraget−1 -1.629*** -0.954*** -0.119
(10.59) (6.69) (1.31)
ROAt−1 4.068*** 2.266*** 0.457**
(6.56) (4.00) (2.22)
Firmaget−1 -0.003** -0.011** -0.009***
(2.36) (2.38) (2.93)
Capex/TAt−1 0.994** 0.361 -0.399
(2.29) (0.92) (1.38)
Intercept 1.920*** 1.867*** 1.006***
(8.08) (8.13) (6.49)
Firm Fixed Effects NO YES YES
Industry F ixed Effects YES NO NO
Y ear F ixed Effects YES YES YES
R2 0.38 0.19 0.43
N 9,054 9,054 9,054
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Table B.3: Asset Pricing: Five portfolios sorted on HC OC (equal-weighted portfolios)
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five portfolios sorted on
HC OC over book value of assets relative to their industry peers within
each year. In Panel A we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression
of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio. In
Panel B we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression of excess port-
folio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio and high-minus-low
HC OC factor (HMLHC). In Panel C we report portfolio alphas and betas
of a regression of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market
portfolio and Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors. In Panel
D we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression of excess portfo-
lio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio, Fama and French
(1993) SMB and HML factors and Carhart (1997) MOM factor. Data on
SMB, HML, and MOM are from Kenneth French’s website. The sample
period is June 1992 to December 2015. All portfolio returns correspond
to equal-weighted returns by firm market capitalization.
Portfolio Low 2 3 4 High High-Low
Panel A. CAPM
α 0.165 0.181 0.213 0.310* 0.406** 0.241
(1.25) (1.18) (1.34) (1.91) (2.38) (1.37)
βMKT 0.953*** 1.009*** 1.021*** 1.016*** 1.058*** 0.105**
(24.36) (20.45) (21.20) (21.99) (24.32) (2.58)
R2 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.02
Panel B. two-factor model
α 0.246** 0.202 0.195 0.242 0.246**
(2.03) (1.32) (1.22) (1.58) (2.03)
βMKT 0.988*** 1.018*** 1.013*** 0.986*** 0.988***
(27.71) (21.13) (20.98) (21.66) (27.71)
βHMLHC -0.337*** -0.088 0.071 0.284*** 0.663***
(5.70) (1.17) (0.93) (3.58) (11.21)
R2 0.84 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.87
Panel C. three-factor model
α 0.058 0.034 0.074 0.179 0.304** 0.246**
(0.52) (0.27) (0.57) (1.47) (2.47) (2.00)
βMKT 1.015*** 1.043*** 1.027*** 0.980*** 0.988*** -0.027
(33.23) (29.41) (25.86) (28.84) (27.22) (0.89)
βSMB 0.018 0.266*** 0.365*** 0.532*** 0.606*** 0.588***
(0.36) (4.74) (5.35) (8.87) (8.62) (10.15)
βHML 0.397*** 0.494*** 0.438*** 0.372*** 0.249*** -0.148***
(7.30) (7.27) (6.86) (5.70) (3.80) (2.60)
R2 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.54
Panel D. four-factor model
α 0.150 0.143 0.160 0.284** 0.340*** 0.190
(1.40) (1.20) (1.24) (2.40) (2.68) (1.49)
βMKT 0.969*** 0.988*** 0.984*** 0.928*** 0.970*** 0.001
(31.41) (28.78) (24.42) (28.07) (24.98) (0.03)
βSMB 0.034 0.285*** 0.380*** 0.550*** 0.612*** 0.578***
(0.84) (6.42) (6.33) (11.28) (9.17) (9.93)
βHML 0.357*** 0.446*** 0.401*** 0.326*** 0.233*** -0.124**
(6.61) (6.89) (6.61) (5.89) (3.49) (2.18)
βMOM -0.116*** -0.138*** -0.108*** -0.132*** -0.046 0.071**
(4.04) (4.41) (3.63) (4.19) (1.45) (2.18)
R2 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.55
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Table B.4: Asset Pricing: Five portfolios sorted on Residual OC (equal-weighted portfolios)
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five portfolios sorted on
Residual OC over book value of assets relative to their industry peers
within each year. In Panel A we report portfolio alphas and betas of a
regression of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market port-
folio. In Panel B we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression of
excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio and high-
minus-low Residual OC factor (HMLRes). In Panel C we report portfolio
alphas and betas of a regression of excess portfolio returns on excess re-
turns of the market portfolio and Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML
factors. In Panel D we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression
of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio, Fama
and French (1993) SMB and HML factors and Carhart (1997) MOM fac-
tor. Data on SMB, HML, and MOM are from Kenneth French’s website.
The sample period is June 1992 to December 2015. All portfolio returns
correspond to equal-weighted returns by firm market capitalization.
Portfolio Low 2 3 4 High High-Low
Panel A: CAPM
α 0.033 0.102 0.282** 0.436*** 0.431*** 0.399***
(0.20) (0.67) (2.02) (3.36) (2.84) (3.17)
βMKT 1.077*** 1.021*** 1.021*** 0.967*** 0.949*** -0.127***
(21.22) (22.86) (24.60) (26.13) (21.52) (3.95)
R2 0.75 0.77 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.07
Panel B: two-factor model
α 0.297** 0.227 0.350** 0.437*** 0.297**
(2.04) (1.53) (2.54) (3.30) (2.04)
βMKT 0.992*** 0.981*** 1.000*** 0.967*** 0.992***
(22.05) (22.01) (23.89) (25.53) (22.05)
βHMLRES -0.663*** -0.314*** -0.171** -0.002 0.337***
(8.27) (3.41) (2.34) (0.03) (4.21)
R2 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.77
Panel C: three-factor model
α -0.106 -0.025 0.171 0.326*** 0.294*** 0.401***
(0.74) (0.19) (1.49) (3.17) (2.68) (3.22)
βMKT 1.093*** 1.034*** 1.019*** 0.958*** 0.933*** -0.160***
(25.45) (28.18) (30.64) (33.19) (29.12) (4.69)
βSMB 0.321*** 0.302*** 0.326*** 0.353*** 0.465*** 0.144***
(4.85) (4.38) (5.56) (7.38) (8.52) (3.06)
βHML 0.450*** 0.407*** 0.341*** 0.333*** 0.411*** -0.040
(6.42) (5.89) (5.77) (6.31) (7.24) (0.86)
R2 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.13
Panel D: four-factor model
α 0.001 0.078 0.254** 0.396*** 0.356*** 0.355***
(0.01) (0.62) (2.28) (3.79) (3.16) (2.80)
βMKT 1.039*** 0.983*** 0.977*** 0.923*** 0.902*** -0.137***
(23.81) (26.72) (29.03) (30.66) (27.87) (3.93)
βSMB 0.340*** 0.320*** 0.341*** 0.365*** 0.476*** 0.136***
(5.91) (5.51) (6.85) (8.59) (9.94) (2.86)
βHML 0.404*** 0.363*** 0.306*** 0.303*** 0.384*** -0.020
(6.08) (5.41) (5.38) (5.78) (7.22) (0.43)
βMOM -0.135*** -0.129*** -0.104*** -0.087*** -0.077*** 0.058**
(4.09) (3.85) (3.92) (3.29) (2.97) (2.07)
R2 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.14
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Table B.5: Asset Pricing: Q-factor and five-factor results for portfolios sorted on HC OC
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five portfolios sorted on
HC OC over book value of assets relative to their industry peers within
each year. In Panel A we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regres-
sion of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio
and Hou et al. (2015) SMB, RMW and CMA factors. In Panel B we
report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression of excess portfolio
returns on excess returns of the market portfolio, Fama and French
(2015) SMB, HML, RMW and CMA factors. Data on SMB, HML,
RMW and CMA are from Kenneth French’s website. The sample pe-
riod is June 1992 to December 2015. All portfolio returns correspond
to value-weighted returns.
Portfolio Low 2 3 4 High High-Low
Panel A: Q-factor model
α 0.161 0.109 -0.044 0.058 0.218 0.056
(1.42) (0.82) (0.29) (0.35) (1.00) (0.23)
βMKT 0.979*** 0.995*** 1.053*** 1.009*** 1.054*** 0.075
(32.07) (24.81) (20.66) (21.12) (17.98) (1.19)
βSMB -0.243*** -0.040 0.240*** 0.381*** 0.431*** 0.674***
(5.57) (0.60) (4.90) (5.38) (5.23) (8.32)
βRMW 0.121 0.292*** 0.339*** 0.166* -0.090 -0.212
(1.62) (3.99) (5.18) (1.90) (0.63) (1.37)
βCMA -0.020 0.167* -0.036 -0.112 -0.597*** -0.577***
(0.22) (1.96) (0.48) (1.11) (4.63) (3.66)
R2 0.86 0.79 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.50
Panel B: five-factor model
α 0.133 0.092 -0.014 0.077 0.202 0.069
(1.16) (0.72) (0.09) (0.46) (0.97) (0.29)
βMKT 0.992*** 1.004*** 1.039*** 0.999*** 1.061*** 0.069
(32.49) (26.16) (21.13) (21.92) (18.12) (1.12)
βSMB -0.248*** -0.043 0.245*** 0.384*** 0.429*** 0.676***
(5.57) (0.65) (5.08) (5.43) (5.24) (8.46)
βHML -0.095* -0.058 0.100 0.065 -0.051 0.043
(1.81) (0.78) (1.27) (0.70) (0.50) (0.38)
βRMW 0.164** 0.318*** 0.295*** 0.136* -0.067 -0.231
(2.33) (4.49) (4.22) (1.67) (0.50) (1.55)
βCMA 0.066 0.219** -0.126 -0.171 -0.550*** -0.616***
(0.69) (2.26) (1.29) (1.38) (3.67) (3.66)
R2 0.86 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.80 0.50
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Table B.6: Asset Pricing: Q-factor and five-factor results for portfolios sorted on
Residual OC
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five portfolios sorted on
Residual OC over book value of assets relative to their industry peers
within each year. In Panel A we report portfolio alphas and betas of
a regression of excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market
portfolio and Hou et al. (2015) SMB, RMW and CMA factors. In
Panel B we report portfolio alphas and betas of a regression of excess
portfolio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio, Fama and
French (2015) SMB, HML, RMW and CMA factors. Data on SMB,
HML, RMW and CMA are from Kenneth French’s website. The sample
period is June 1992 to December 2015. All portfolio returns correspond
to value-weighted returns.
Portfolio Low 2 3 4 High High-Low
Panel A: Q-factor model
α -0.223 0.288** 0.045 0.096 0.120 0.343*
(1.53) (2.05) (0.41) (0.79) (0.86) (1.87)
βMKT 1.120*** 0.945*** 0.970*** 0.924*** 0.812*** -0.309***
(25.56) (27.57) (36.00) (26.89) (20.86) (5.31)
βSMB -0.129** -0.196*** 0.019 -0.155*** 0.018 0.147*
(2.28) (3.59) (0.42) (2.99) (0.34) (1.82)
βRMW 0.098 0.009 0.254*** 0.222*** 0.346*** 0.248**
(1.06) (0.11) (4.77) (3.03) (4.88) (2.25)
βCMA -0.015 -0.081 0.192*** 0.123* 0.251*** 0.267**
(0.15) (0.84) (3.14) (1.73) (3.44) (2.05)
R2 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.80 0.67 0.29
Panel B: five-factor model
α -0.230 0.261* 0.035 0.058 0.087 0.317*
(1.56) (1.78) (0.32) (0.49) (0.61) (1.68)
βMKT 1.123*** 0.958*** 0.975*** 0.942*** 0.827*** -0.296***
(25.07) (25.52) (34.67) (27.77) (23.36) (5.34)
βSMB -0.131** -0.200*** 0.018 -0.161*** 0.012 0.143*
(2.26) (3.61) (0.39) (3.18) (0.23) (1.74)
βHML -0.022 -0.090 -0.032 -0.129** -0.111 -0.089
(0.28) (1.36) (0.59) (2.23) (1.33) (0.84)
βRMW 0.107 0.049 0.268*** 0.279*** 0.395*** 0.288***
(1.16) (0.62) (5.09) (3.70) (5.51) (2.67)
βCMA 0.004 -0.001 0.221*** 0.239*** 0.351*** 0.347**
(0.03) (0.00) (2.89) (2.85) (3.41) (2.15)
R2 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.67 0.29
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Table B.7: Asset Pricing: Five portfolios sorted on institutional ownership (IO) and HC OC
(equal-weighted portfolios)
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five portfolios
sorted on institutional ownership (IO) and HC OC over book
value of assets relative to their industry peers within each
year. In Panel A we report high-minus-low HC OC port-
folios (sorted on IO) alphas and betas of the regressions of
excess portfolio returns on excess returns of the market port-
folio. In Panel B we report high-minus-low HC OC portfolios
(sorted on IO) alphas and betas of a regression of excess port-
folio returns on excess returns of the market portfolio and
Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors. In Panel C
we report high-minus-low HC OC portfolios (sorted on IO)
alphas and betas of a regression of excess portfolio returns
on excess returns of the market portfolio, Fama and French
(1993) SMB and HML factors and Carhart (1997) MOM
factor. Data on SMB, HML, and MOM are from Kenneth
French’s website. The sample period is June 1992 to Decem-
ber 2015. All portfolio returns correspond to equal-weighted
returns by firm market capitalization.
Portfolio IO=low IO=2 IO=3 IO=4 IO=high
Panel A: CAPM
α 0.671** 0.239 0.131 -0.021 -0.438
(2.03) (0.68) (0.41) (0.06) (1.09)
βMKT 0.219** 0.054 -0.076 0.097 0.132
(2.47) (0.59) (0.98) (0.95) (1.29)
R2 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Panel B: three-factor model
α 0.716** 0.253 0.144 0.071 -0.289
(2.38) (0.76) (0.50) (0.22) (0.77)
βMKT 0.052 -0.057 -0.206*** -0.069 -0.037
(0.74) (0.67) (2.75) (0.76) (0.38)
βSMB 0.633*** 0.464*** 0.546*** 0.468*** 0.342**
(4.29) (4.22) (4.34) (3.48) (2.50)
βHML -0.307** -0.153 -0.175 -0.512*** -0.634***
(2.23) (0.99) (1.40) (3.30) (4.27)
R2 0.24 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.16
Panel C: four-factor model
α 0.661** 0.080 0.053 -0.141 -0.559
(2.15) (0.25) (0.17) (0.42) (1.48)
βMKT 0.079 0.029 -0.162** 0.028 0.098
(0.97) (0.33) (2.23) (0.31) (0.95)
βSMB 0.623*** 0.433*** 0.530*** 0.470*** 0.294**
(4.19) (4.21) (4.10) (3.73) (2.39)
βHML -0.283** -0.078 -0.136 -0.445*** -0.517***
(2.10) (0.52) (1.14) (3.10) (3.58)
βMOM 0.069 0.217*** 0.111 0.255*** 0.339***
(0.80) (2.64) (1.30) (3.05) (4.60)
R2 0.24 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.22
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Table B.8: Asset Pricing: Five portfolios sorted on institutional ownership (IO) and
Residual OC (equal-weighted portfolios)
This table shows asset-pricing estimations for five port-
folios sorted on institutional ownership (IO) and Resid-
ual OC over book value of assets relative to their industry
peers within each year. In Panel A we report high-minus-
low Residual OC portfolios (sorted on IO) alphas and be-
tas of the regressions of excess portfolio returns on excess
returns of the market portfolio. In Panel B we report
high-minus-low Residual OC portfolios (sorted on IO) al-
phas and betas of a regression of excess portfolio returns
on excess returns of the market portfolio and Fama and
French (1993) SMB and HML factors. In Panel C we
report high-minus-low Residual OC portfolios (sorted on
IO) alphas and betas of a regression of excess portfolio
returns on excess returns of the market portfolio, Fama
and French (1993) SMB and HML factors and Carhart
(1997) MOM factor. Data on SMB, HML, and MOM are
from Kenneth French’s website. The sample period is June
1992 to December 2015. All portfolio returns correspond
to equal-weighted returns by firm market capitalization.
Portfolio IO=low IO=2 IO=3 IO=4 IO=high
Panel A: CAPM
α 0.698** 0.278 0.241 0.240 0.061
(2.52) (1.04) (0.96) (0.82) (0.19)
βMKT -0.201*** -0.144** -0.161*** -0.022 -0.261***
(3.09) (2.04) (2.77) (0.30) (3.34)
R2 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.04
Panel B: three-factor model
α 0.677*** 0.220 0.251 0.281 0.100
(2.60) (0.82) (1.01) (0.97) (0.31)
βMKT -0.292*** -0.165** -0.214*** -0.066 -0.370***
(4.62) (2.43) (3.53) (0.89) (4.95)
βSMB 0.474*** 0.262*** 0.208** 0.080 0.373***
(4.59) (2.66) (2.56) (0.81) (3.37)
βHML -0.026 0.162* -0.086 -0.175 -0.232**
(0.25) (1.74) (0.92) (1.42) (1.98)
R2 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.12
Panel C: four-factor model
α 0.687*** 0.197 0.155 0.201 -0.087
(2.67) (0.73) (0.64) (0.66) (0.28)
βMKT -0.297*** -0.154** -0.167*** -0.027 -0.279***
(4.26) (2.14) (2.86) (0.37) (3.77)
βSMB 0.476*** 0.258** 0.192** 0.066 0.341***
(4.50) (2.55) (2.40) (0.65) (3.29)
βHML -0.030 0.172** -0.046 -0.142 -0.153
(0.29) (1.99) (0.52) (1.12) (1.51)
βMOM -0.013 0.029 0.116* 0.097 0.226***
(0.22) (0.35) (1.78) (1.05) (3.24)
R2 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.16
Bibliography
Acharya, V., Almeida, H., Ippolito, F., and Perez, A. (2014). Bank lines of credit as contin-
gent liquidity: a study of covenant violations and their implications. Ecb working paper
series, 1702.
Adams, R., Almeida, H., and Ferreira, D. (2009). Understanding the relationship between
founder ceos and firm performance. Journal of empirical Finance, 16(1):136–150.
Aigner, D. J., Lovell, C. A. K., and Schmidt, P. J. (1977). Formulation and estimation of
stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics, 6.
Allen, L., Guo, H., and Weintrop, J. (2008). The information content of quarterly earnings
in syndicated bank loan prices. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15:91–
122.
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate
bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 23(4):589–609.
Arrazola, M. and Hevia, J. D. (2004). More on the estimation of the human capital depre-
ciation rate. Applied Economics Letters, 11(3):145–148.
Atkeson, A. and Kehoe, P. (2005). Modeling and measuring organization capital. Journal
of Political Economy, 113(5):1026–1053.
118
BIBLIOGRAPHY 119
Baik, B., Chae, J., Choi, S., and Farber, D. B. (2013). Changes in operational efficiency and
firm performance: a frontier analysis approach. Contemporary Accounting Research, 3:3.
Baltagi, B. (2008). Econometric analysis of panel data. John Wiley & Sons.
Banker, R. D., Charnes, A., and Cooper, W. W. (1984). Some models for estimating technical
and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis. Management Science, 30:9.
Banker, R. D., Huang, R., and Natarajan, R. (2011). Equity incentives and long-term value
created by sg&a expenditure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(3):794–830.
Battese, G. and Corra, G. (1977). Estimation of a production frontier model with application
to the pastoral zone of easter australia. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 21:3.
Bebchuk, L. and Grinstein, Y. (2005). The growth of executive pay. Oxford review of
economic policy, 21(2):283–303.
Bebchuk, L. A., Cremers, K. J. M., and Peyer, U. C. (2011). The ceo pay slice. Journal of
Financial Economics, 102(1):199–221.
Bebchuk, L. A. and Fried, J. M. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem.
Journal of economic perspectives, 17(3):71–92.
Bebchuk, L. A., Fried, J. M., and Walker, D. I. (2002). Managerial power and rent extraction
in the design of executive compensation. National Bureau of Economic Research, (w9068).
Benmelech, E. and Bergman, N. (2017). Debt, information and illiquidity. Working paper.
Berger, P. G., Ofek, E., and Yermack, D. L. (1997). Managerial entrenchment and capital
structure decisions. The journal of finance, 52(4):1411–1438.
Berk, J., Binsbergen, J., and Liu, B. (2016). Matching capital and labor. Working paper.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 120
Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the quiet life? corporate governance
and managerial preferences. Journal of political Economy, 111(5):1043–1075.
Bertrand, M. and Schoar, A. (2003). Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm
policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4):1169–1208.
Bethel, J. E., Liebeskind, J. P., and Opler, T. (1998). Block share purchases and corporate
performance. The Journal of Finance, 53(2):605–634.
Bharath, S. T., Dahiya, S., Saunders, A., and Srinivasan, A. (2007). So what do i get? the
bank’s view of lending relationships. Journal of Financial Economics, 85:368–419.
Bharath, S. T., Dahiya, S., Saunders, A., and Srinivasan, A. (2011). Lending relationships
and loan contract terms. Review of Financial Studies, 24(4):1141–1203.
Bharath, S. T. and Hertzel, M. G. (2016). External governance and debt structure. Working
paper.
Bhattacharaya, S. and Chiesa, G. (1995). Proprietary information, financial intermediation,
and research incentives. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4.
Bloom, N. and Van Reenen, J. (2007). Measuring and explaining management practices
across firms and countries. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4):1351–1408.
Bogetoft, P. and Otto, L. (2011). Benchmarking with DEA, SFA and R, volume 157.
Springer.
Boguth, O., Newton, D., and Simutin, M. (2016). The fragility of organization capital.
Technical report. Working Paper.
Boot, A. W. A. (2000). Relationship banking: what do we know? Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 9.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 121
Boot, A. W. A. and Thakor, A. V. (1994). Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely
repeated credit market game. International Economic Review, pages 899–920.
Boot, A. W. A. and Thakor, A. V. (2000). Can relationship banking survive competition?
Journal of Finance, 55:2.
Boyd, J. H. and Prescott, E. C. (1986). Financial intermediary-coalitions. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 38:2.
Browning, M., Hansen, L. P., and Heckman, J. J. (1999). Micro data and general equilibrium
models. Handbook of macroeconomics, 1:543–633.
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance,
52:57–82.
Carlin, B. I., Chowdhry, B., and Garmaise, M. J. (2012). Investment in organization capital.
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21(2):268–286.
Chang, Y. Y., Dasgupta, S., and Hilary, G. (2010). Ceo ability, pay, and firm performance.
Management Science, 56(10):1633–1652.
Charnes, A., Cooper, W., and E.Rhodes (1978). Measuring the efficiency of decision-making
units. European Journal of Operational Research, 2.
Chava, S. and Roberts, M. R. (2008). How does financing impact investment? the role of
debt covenants. Journal of Finance, 63.
Chen, C. X., Lu, H., and Sougiannis, T. (2012). The agency problem, corporate governance,
and the asymmetrical behavior of selling, general, and administrative costs. Contemporary
Accounting Research, 29(1):252–282.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 122
Coles, J. L., Lemmon, M. L., and Meschke, J. F. (2012). Structural models and endogeneity
in corporate finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performance.
Journal of Financial Economics, 103(1):149–168.
Corrado, C., Hulten, C., and Sichel, D. (2009). Intangible capital and us economic growth.
Review of income and wealth, 55(3):661–685.
Cummins, J. D., Grace, M. F., Leverty, J. T., and Phillips, R. D. (2008). The missing link:
Is book value efficiency recognized by the market. Working Paper, University of Iowa.
Dang, T. V., Gorton, G., Holmstrom, B., and Ordonez, G. (2017). Banks as secret keepers.
The American Economic Review, 107(4):1005–1029.
Dass, N. and Massa, M. (2011). The impact of a strong bank-firm relationship on the
borrowing firm. The Review of Financial Studies, 24:4.
Datta, D. K., Guthrie, J. P., Basuil, D., and Pandey, A. (2010). Causes and effects of
employee downsizing: A review and synthesis. Journal of Management, 36(1):281–348.
Demerjian, P., Lev, B., and McVay, S. (2012). Quantifying managerial ability: a new measure
and validity tests. Management Science, 58(3).
Denis, D. J. and Mihov, V. T. (2003). The choice among bank debt, non-bank private
debt, and public debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings. Journal of Financial
Economics, 70.
Dennis, S. A. and Mullineaux, D. J. (2000). Syndicated loans. Journal of Financial Inter-
mediation, 9.
Diamond, D. W. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. The Review of
Economic Studies, 51(3).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 123
Diamond, D. W. (1991). Monitoring and reputation: the choice between bank loans and
directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy, 99(4).
Donangelo, A. (2014). Labor mobility: Implications for asset pricing. The Journal of Fi-
nance, 69(3):1321–1346.
Eisfeldt, A. L. and Papanikolaou, D. (2013). Organization capital and the cross-section of
expected returns. Journal of Finance, 68(4):1365–1406.
Eisfeldt, A. L. and Papanikolaou, D. (2014). The value and ownership of intangible capital.
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 104(5):189–194.
Eisfeldt, A. L. and Rampini, A. A. (2008). Managerial incentives, capital reallocation and
the business cycle. Journal of Financial Economics, 87:177–199.
Elsas, R. (2005). Empirical determinants of relationship lending. Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 14.
Evenson, R. E. and Westphal, L. E. (1995). Technological change and technology strategy.
Handbook of development economics, 3:2209–2299.
Fahlenbrach, R. and Stulz, R. M. (2009). Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value.
Journal of Financial Economics, 92(3):342–361.
Faleye, O. (2007). Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment. Journal of
Financial Economics, 83(2):501–529.
Fama, E. F. (1985). What’s different about banks? Journal of monetary economics, 15(1):29–
39.
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and
bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33:3–56.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 124
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1997). Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial
Economics, 43(2):153–193.
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (2015). A five-factor asset-pricing model. Journal of Financial
Economics, 116:1–22.
Farrell, M. J. (1957). The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, 120.
Ferrier, G. D. and Lovell, C. A. K. (1990). Measuring cost efficiency in banking: Econometric
and linear programming evidence. Journal of Econometrics, 46.
Francis, B. B., Mani, S. B., and Wu., Q. (2015). The impact of organization capital on firm
innovation. Working paper.
Frijns, B., Margaritis, D., and Psillaki, M. (2012). Firm efficiency and stock returns. Journal
of Productivity Analysis, 37.
Frydman, C. and Saks, R. E. (2010). Executive compensation: A new view from a long-term
perspective. Review of Financial Studies, 120:1936–2005.
Garleanu, N. and Zwiebel, J. (2008). Design and renegotiation of debt covenants. The
Review of Financial Studies, 22(2):749–781.
Ge, W. (2006). Off-balance sheet activities, earnings persistence and stock prices: evidence
from operating leases. working paper, University of Washington, Seattle.
Gustafson, M., Ivanov, I., and Meisenzahl, R. R. (2017). Bank monitoring: Evidence from
syndicated loans. Working paper.
Hale, G. and Santos, J. A. (2009). Do banks price their informational monopoly? Journal
of Financial Economics, 93(2):185–206.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 125
Hope, O.-K. and Thomas, W. B. (2008). Managerial empire building and firm disclosure.
Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3):591–626.
Hou, K., Xue, C., and Zhang, L. (2015). Digesting anomalies: An investment approach. The
Review of Financial Studies, 28(3):650–705.
Imrohoroglu, A. and Tuzel, S. (2014). Firm-level productivity, risk and return. Management
Science, 60(8):2073–2090.
Jaimovich, N. and Siu, H. (2012). The trend is the cycle: Job polarization and jobless
recoveries. Working Paper 18334, NBER.
James, C. (1987). Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans. Journal of Financial
Economics, 19(2):217–235.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers.
American Economic Review, 76(2).
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4):305–360.
Ji, Y.-b. and Lee, C. (2010). Data envelopment analysis. The Stata Journal, 10:2.
KRIS (2011). Kamakura corporation risk information services: Kamakura public firm mod-
els. 5.
Leland, H. and Pyle, D. H. (1977). Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and
financial intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32:2.
Leung, W. S., Mazouz, K., and Chen, J. (2016). Organization capital, labor market flexibility
and stock returns around the world. Working paper.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 126
Lev, B. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2005). The valuation of organization capital. In Measuring
capital in the new economy, pages 73–110. University of Chicago Press.
Lev, B., Radhakrishnan, S., and Zhang, W. (2009). Organization capital. ABACUS, 45(3).
Lev, B. and Sougiannis, T. (1996). The capitalization, amortization, and value-relevance of
r&d. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21(1).
Leverty, J. and Qian, Y. (2011). Do acquisitions create more value when good management
replaces bad management? Working paper, University of Iowa, Iowa City.
Leverty, J. T. and Grace, M. F. (2010). The robustness of output measures in property-
liability insurance efficiency studies. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(7):1510–1524.
Leverty, T. and Grace, M. (2012). Dupes or incompetents? an examination of management’s
impact on firm distress. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 79(3):751–783.
Li, C. and Ongena, S. (2015). Bank loan announcements and borrower stock returns before
and during the recent financial crisis. Journal of Financial Stability, 21:1–12.
Ludwig, A., Schelkle, T., and Vogel, E. (2012). Demographic change, human capital and
welfare. Review of Economic Dynamics, 15(1):94–107.
Lustig, H., Syverson, C., and Van Nieuwerburgh, S. (2011). Technological change and
the growing inequality in managerial compensation. Journal of Financial Economics,
99(3):601–627.
Malmendier, U. and Tate, G. (2008). Superstar ceos, volume w14140. National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Mart́ın-Oliver, A. and Salas-Fumás, V. (2012). It assets, organization capital and market
power: Contributions to business value. Decision Support Systems, 52(3):612–623.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 127
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., and Xie, F. (2007). Corporate governance and acquirer returns.
The Journal of Finance, 62(4):1851–1889.
McConnell, J. J. and Servaes, H. (1990). Additional evidence on equity ownership and
corporate value. Journal of Financial economics, 27(2):595–612.
McConnell, J. J., Servaes, H., and Lins, K. V. (2008). Changes in insider ownership and
changes in the market value of the firm. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(2):92–106.
Meeusen, W. and van den Broeck, J. (1977). Efficiency estimation from cobb-douglas pro-
duction functions with composed error. International Economic Review, 18.
Mehran, H. (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance.
Journal of financial economics, 38(2):163–184.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market
valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of financial economics, 20:293–315.
Murillo-Zamorano, L. R. (2004). Economic efficiency and frontier techniques. Journal of
Economic Surveys, 18(1).
Ongena, S. and Smith, D. C. (1998). Bank Relationships: A Review in The Performance of
Financial Institutions. Cambridge University Press.
Oshima, A., Ravikumar, B., and Riezman, R. (2009). Entrepreneurship, organization capital
and the evolution of the firm. Working Paper 2242, CESifo.
Papke, L. E. and Wooldridge, J. (1993). Econometric methods for fractional response vari-
ables with an application to 401 (k) plan participation rates. Technical Working Paper
147, NBER.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 128
Petersen, M. A. and Rajan, R. G. (1994). The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence
from small business data. Journal of Finance, 49(1).
Phelan, G. (2017). Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation. The Journal of Finance.
Preece, D. and Mullineaux, D. J. (1996). Monitoring, loan renegotiability, and firm value:
The role of lending syndicates. Journal of Banking & Finance, 20(3):577–593.
Prescott, E. C. and Visscher, M. (1980). Organization capital. Journal of Political Economy,
88(3):446–461.
Rajan, R. and Winton, A. (1995). Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor. The
Journal of Finance, 50(4):1113–1146.
Ramalho, E. A., Ramalho, J. J., and Henriques, P. D. (2010). Fractional regression models
for second stage dea efficiency analyses. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 34(3):239–255.
Ramalho, E. A., Ramalho, J. J., and Murteira, J. M. (2011). Alternative estimating and
testing empirical strategies for fractional regression models. Journal of Economic Surveys,
25(1):19–68.
Roberts, M. R. (2015). The role of dynamic renegotiation and asymmetric information in
financial contracting. Journal of Financial Economics, 116(1):61–81.
Rosenbaum, P. R. and Rubin, D. B. (1985). Constructing a control group using multi-
variate matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score. The American
Statistician, 39(1):33–38.
Sanderson, E. and Windmeijer, F. (2016). A weak instrument f-test in linear iv models with
multiple endogenous variables. Journal of Econometrics, 190(2):212–221.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 129
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1986a). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal
of political economy, 94(3, Part 1):461–488.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1986b). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal
of political economy, 94(3, Part 1):461–488.
Shue, K. and Townsend, R. R. (2017). Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the rise
in ceo pay. Journal of Financial Economics, 123:1–21.
Spyridopoulos, I. (2017). Tough love: The causal effects of debt covenants on firm perfor-
mance. Working paper.
Stulz, R. (1990). Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of financial
Economics, 26(1):3–27.
Sufi, A. (2007). Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: evidence from syndi-
cated loans. Journal of Finance, 62(2).
Venieris, G., Naoum, V. C., and Vlismas, O. (2015). Organization capital and sticky be-
haviour of selling, general and administrative expenses. Management Accounting Research,
26:54–82.
Whited, T. M. and Wu, G. (2006). Financial constraints risk. Review of Financial Studies,
19(2):531–559.
Williamson, O. E. (1963). Managerial discretion and business behavior. The American
Economic Review, pages 1032–1057.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT press.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors.
Journal of financial economics, 40(2):185–211.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 130
Yosha, O. (1995). Information disclosure costs and the choice of financing source. Journal
of Financial intermediation, 4(1):3–20.
